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ABSTRACT 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF SUB-STATE ENTITIES IN 
COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION PRACTICES 
 
 
Yön, Hasan 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Associate Professor Ersel Aydınlı 
 
September 2010 
 
This dissertation is an analysis of the role of sub-state entities in countering 
transnational terrorism especially in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which emerged 
as an alternative option to the traditional security understanding basically shaped by 
nation states. Emerging practices and roles of sub-state entities in countering 
terrorism has been investigated to understand both their roles in the counter-
terrorrism field and their influence on nation states. Examination of a plethora of 
existing and newly emerging sub-state practices reveals that such entities have been 
taking growing roles in the counter-terrorism field, which were previously believed 
to belong solely to nation states and their relevant international instruments. More 
importantly, this dissertation proposes that nation states are also trying to adapt 
themselves to this new emerging counter-terrorism environment enriched by sub-
state entities. In that regard, emerging new cooperative police initiatives present 
valuable examples.  
 
Keywords: Terrorism, cooperation, state-centric approach, multi-centric approach, 
police cooperation, police liaisonship. 
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ÖZET 
 
TRANSNASYONEL TERÖRİZMLE MÜCADELEDE DEVLET ALTI 
YAPILARIN ROLÜNÜ ANLAMAK: TRANSNASYONEL POLİS İŞBİRLİĞİ 
UYGULAMALARI ÖRNEĞİ 
 
Yön,  Hasan 
Doktora, Uluslar arası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı 
 
Eylül 2010 
 
Bu tez, ulus devletler tarafından şekillendirilen geleneksel güvenlik anlayışına, 
özellikle 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında alternatif bir opsiyon olarak ortaya çıkan 
devlet altı yapıların transnasyonel terörizmle mücadeledeki rolünün bir analizidir. 
Devlet altı yapıların terörle mücadelede sergiledikleri uygulama ve rolleri gerek 
terörle mücadelede üstlendikleri rol ve gerekse de ulus devlete etkileri açısından 
araştırılmıştır. Devlet altı yapıların mevcut olan ve yeni ortaya çıkan pek çok 
uygulamasının incelenmesi bu tür oluşumların daha önceden ulus devlet ve ilgili 
organlarının uhdesinde olduğuna inanılan terörle mücadele alanında büyüyen roller 
üstlendiğini göstermektedir. Daha da önemlisi bu tez, devlet altı yapıların 
zenginleştirmesiyle ortaya çıkan bu yeni terörle mücadele ortamına ulus 
devletlerinde adapte olmaya çalıştığını ileri sürmektedir. Bu kapsamda, ortaya çıkan 
yeni polis işbirliği girişimleri değerli örnekler teşkil etmektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, işbirliği, devlet merkezci yaklaşım, çok merkezli 
yaklaşım, polis işbirliği, polis irtibat görevliliği. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The September 2001 attacks in the USA (United States of America) 
represent the most dramatic evidence we have that the world is faced today with a 
new kind of security challenge, a challenge which has been examined in detail over 
the last nine years. Naturally, studies have tended to focus on either the threat—e.g. 
what kind of terrorist organization could manage to carry out such an attack—or the 
response, e.g. how can such a terrorist organization be defeated? Threat and 
response are concepts which mutually constitute each other in an ongoing process. 
In that respect, identifying the relationship between threat and response at this initial 
stage is a necessity, because the basis of this study is grounded on the relationship 
between these two. The term ―delay‖ will be utilized for describing the relation 
between threat and response. The purpose of this reasoning is my assumption that 
threats constantly change and evolve while responses follow. Consequently, 
response is usually a delayed phenomenon, which aims to catch up with the threat.  
This dissertation is based on two primary claims. The first is that while the 
influence of terrorism has been steadily increasing due to its escalating transnational 
  
 
2 
 
nature, national actors find it difficult to produce equally transnational response 
measures and thus the overall response to terrorism—which remains to a large 
extent unchanged and traditional—is far from adequate. As a result, the delay 
between the threat and response has been steadily increasing.  
The second claim is that while the delay may be widening, this does not 
mean that states have been completely resistant to change or failing to adopt. This 
study aims to show how sub-state actors have instigated several new response 
initiatives alongside the traditional methods, and that states are directly or indirectly 
encouraging these transnational initiatives. After investigating the general view of 
response initiatives, in this thesis I focus in particular on one sub-state entity, police 
organizations, and their recent efforts to initiate transnational relations in the fight 
against terrorism. One of these efforts involves the increasing and changing usage of 
liaison officers. Questions remain however: what exactly is the mission and scope of 
police liaison officers? Do these developments on the part of these sub-state entities 
constitute sufficient evidence to be able to say that states are adapting in a 
transnational manner? 
 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
Two broad terms have been used to depict the overall picture of world 
politics today: A state-centric approach obviously implies on-going state control of 
and a primary role in international relations, while a multi-centric approach, looks 
beyond states and claims the importance of non-state and sub-state entities in world 
politics. Proponents of the latter perspective argue that ―the state-centric system now 
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coexists with an equally powerful, though more decentralized, multi-centric system‖ 
(Rosenau, 1990:11). International institutions, non-state entities, sub-state entities 
and their networked relations constitute this other realm (Aydinli and Rosenau, 
2005:1; Wolfish and Smith, 2000: 55,63; Slaughter, 2004: 18). 
 If state-centric and multi-centric are two main depictions of the overall 
picture of world politics, ―international‖ and ―transnational‖ can be said to describe 
the patterns of activity, relations, and processes within (respectively) the state-
centric and multi-centric worlds. Thus, international or interstate relations refer to 
the interactions that take place between unitary states, and which are controlled and 
directed by particular foreign relations organs of states. In this approach, domestic 
interests can have effects on international politics only through foreign policy 
channels (Nye and Keohane, 1971-a: 721).  On the other hand, transnational 
relations imply interactions of non-state and sub-state entities beyond states. Nye 
and Keohane conceptualized the term in the 1970s in different writings. For example 
in 1971, Keohane and Nye defined ―transnational relations‖ as ―contacts, coalitions, 
and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign 
policy organs of governments‖ (Nye and Keohane, 1971-b: 331). Accordingly, 
transnational relations also include ―relations between governmental actors that are 
not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of their governments‖  (Nye and 
Keohane , 1971-b: 335).  Keohane and Nye redefined transnational relations in 
1974. This time, they distinguished transnational and transgovernmental from each 
other. They defined transgovernmental relations as ―direct interactions between 
agencies (governmental subunits) of different governments where those agencies act 
relatively autonomously from central governmental control‖ while defining 
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transnational relations as ―interactions across the border in which at least one actor 
is nongovernmental‖  (Keohane and Nye, 1974: 596). 
 The fundamental characteristic of transnational relations is the existence of 
interactions across the borders of nation-states and the existence of actors who are 
capable and willing to initiate such cross border relations with a desire to create 
networks. While some researchers take a process-centric approach and mention the 
increase in transnational relations (Zürn, 1998: 648, Vercauteren, 2001: 1) others are 
more actors-centric, and focus on organizations or actors which go transnational 
(Huntington, 1973: 333, Meyer, Boli-Bennett and Chase-Dunn, 1975: 236, Sjoberg, 
Gill and Williams, 2001: 22).  
 We can talk about a similar rising trend in the transnationalization of crime, 
terrorism and response initiatives of organizations responsible for fighting them 
(Sheptycki, 1995, Williams and Savona, 1996 :80, Jones and Newburn, 2002: 129,  
Makarenko, 2004: 129,  Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 245-250). This study will 
try to investigate how terrorism as a threat and policing as a response are going 
transnational. At the end, I will try to determine whether states are trying to adopt 
themselves to the changing nature of the transnational threat environment.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
Methodologically my research largely follows a qualitative course by mainly 
focusing on interviews, existing data and a literature review. Absence of a plethora 
of existing studies on the issue encouraged me to pursue inductive reasoning. In that 
regard, I mainly focused on specific observations to discern patterns and regularities 
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regarding police counter-terrorism experiences developed to respond to the 
transnational terrorism, and understand them based on theroretical approaches. 
During my research, I observed changes in the importance of police liaisonship in 
countering transnational terrorism and decided to focus on it as my case study within 
the overall structure of my thesis.  At the end, I try to find out if states and the state 
system appear to be evolving to meet the transnational terrorism threat.  
 I had several difficulties in collecting data and information. Basically, three 
difficulties can be mentioned here. First of all, I observed that the existing literature 
generally focuses on individual cases, and studies focusing on countering 
transnational terrorism in particular are not comprehensive. Therefore, due to the 
restricted number of academic studies on the issue, especially regarding the role of 
police liaisonship, I was forced to develop my own frameworks. Secondly, as the 
issue of countering terrorism involves a great amount of secrecy and sensitivity, the 
process of obtaining statistics and data did not materialize as expected. While some 
the countries put relevant information directly on their related organizations‘ 
webpages, e.g. theFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  and the information they 
provide on their Legal Attaches (LEGATS), others do not. The existing information 
on the webpages of international organizations also tend not toprovide a general 
framework of information. Thirdly, the interviews that I conducted (mostly with 
police liaison officers) generally had to be done on the conditions of not providing 
their names, not recording, and not going in-depth into details of specific cases. 
These conditions, though limiting from a researcher‘s perspective, are nevertheless 
understandable due to the sensitive and secret nature of the overall issue. Despite the 
existence of those difficulties and other minor ones that will be mentioned in 
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relevant parts of the thesis, I tried to develop a general framework to understand and 
conceptualize what is happening in the field of countering transnational terrorism by 
focusing primarily on police experiences.  
One of the primary tasks of this dissertation is to illustrate the changing 
nature of terrorism, which is the starting point of my inquiry. Based on findings 
about terrorism and changes relevant to it, this work goes on to explore whether 
state responses to terrorism are adequate to meet the threat. Therefore, 
understanding terrorism and its development throughout history will guide us as to 
how to proceed from there.  
 
1.3 Understanding the Threat 
Scholars have given special attention to the history of terrorism. It is possible 
to come across different narratives about when terrorism started and which terrorist 
groups have operated throughout the history. Although it is argued that the roots of 
terrorism can be traced back to ancient times, as seen in the historical narrative of 
terrorism within this study, the emergence of Anarchism in the late 19
th
 century is 
accepted as the starting point of modern or systemic terrorism by leading terrorism 
scholars such as Rapoport and Laqueur (Rapoport, 2006: xxviii, Laqueur, 1977:11).  
From the 1880s until the 1910s, revolutionary movements and Anarchism 
occupied the agenda of the European States, Russia and America as an important 
threat. In the movement‘s early years, Anarchists targeted primarily the ruling elites, 
and assassination was their significant method of attack. As time passed, ordinary 
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citizens also became targets since Anarchists did not hesitate to use indiscriminate 
attacks.  
In terms of structure, national Anarchist groups were operating in their 
respective countries.  However, we also see that Anarchist groups had relations with 
each other. The most significant example of such relations was the London 
Conference of Anarchists in 1881. Another important characteristic of the Anarchist 
movement was the mobilization of both Anarchists themselves and their ideas 
especially by means of written publications. As a result of these various ways of 
connecting with each other, Anarchism became a global phenomenon from  the end 
of the 19
th
 century until the 1910s.  
As another variety of terrorism, a further emergence of terrorist groups is 
observed along with national aspirations at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Such 
terrorist groups targeted especially the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Since then, terrorist groups with an agenda of national liberation have 
continued to exist.  
Although terrorist activities have remained on the world scene since the 
emergence of Anarchism, the 1960s marked the strong comeback of the term and of 
widespread consciousness of ‗terrorism‘.  Ideological rivalries during the Cold War 
facilitated the emergence of especially left wing terrorist groups. Terrorist groups of 
left wing orientations and of national liberation were active in a wide range of  
countries. 
A new term, international terrorism, was also pronounced widely by the 
1960s. This new term was coined to describe terrorist groups operating in more than 
one country or targeting foreigners within a country. Attacks at the Munich Olympic 
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Games in 1972 played an important role in drawing world attention to the 
phenomenon of international terrorism. An important aspect of this new era was the 
popularity (and apparent effectiveness) of employing violence for international 
recognition, which increased terrorist activities all over the world.   
By the 1980s, terrorism inspired by religious beliefs had also become one of 
the important trends. This, alongside new realities such as Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) and nuclear/biological terrorism were all vital issues which 
added new dimensions to the terrorism debate. When the 9/11 attacks occurred in 
the United States, the world realized it was facing a global phenomenon, not unlike 
the Anarchist movement that emerged at the end of the 19
th
 century.
1
 However, the 
new experience has been more destructive and influential when compared with 
previous examples. Today, the world is experiencing the reality that today more than 
ever, non-state entities have the capacity to rival states in the influencing of 
international security and relations.  
Based on the above narrative, an examination of the history of terrorism 
starting from Anarchism and briefly explaining consequent variations that have 
emerged over time, shows us that the place and significance of terrorism in world 
politics has indeed changed. In parallel, the ways that terrorism has been understood 
have also changed. Terrorism was generally seen and understood as a matter of 
individual states in the past. Nowadays, we observe that there are new approaches, 
which have been trying to use a wider perspective to understand terrorism. 
                                                 
1
 Similarities between Anarchism and today‘s jihadist groups are made by scholars such as Aydinli 
(2008) and Gelvin (2008). Scholars such as Richard Bach Jensen (2008) basically oppose that view 
by arguing that differences exist between two especially in terms of their way of operations and 
approach to violence. Gelvin and Jensen‘s articles give brief information about this debate. As this 
dissertation focuses on the transnationalization of terrorism, similarities between Anarchism and 
today‘s terrorism at the organizational and functional levels are vital for this study.  
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1.4 Understanding the Place of Terrorism Based on Traditional and Non-
Traditional Security Approaches 
Not only has terrorism, but the environment within which terrorism emerges, 
also has changed throughout history.  Terrorism has often been accepted as an 
internal matter of states in the years following the Anarchist era without considering 
its international relations dimension. This approach can be labelled as a traditional 
security understanding, which accepts states as the only threat for each other as 
based on military calculations. Over time, we have seen the emergence of the term 
―non-traditional security threats‖, which implies that states face threats other than 
military ones. These may include such things as environmental, economic and social 
threats. Among those threats, terrorism presents the violent dimension that can be 
initiated by non-state entities. On the basis of this, Keohane (2002, 30) has also 
defined terrorism as informal violence.  After the 9/11 attacks, terrorism revealed 
that it has gone a step further among other non-traditional threats because of the 
impact of the attacks on world politics. 
  
1.4.1 Traditional Security Understanding 
Until the end of the Cold War, states were interested in securing their 
territory by military means. During this era, having military power, preventing 
military attacks from others, and fighting wars were the main themes of state 
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security. This traditional conceptual approach to state security is basically defended 
by the realist school of IR. 
According to realist understandings, states are accepted as rational actors 
living in anarchy. Traditionally, protecting the sovereignty of a state and securing its 
borders are the main aims of states in the anarchical nature of international relations. 
States can protect themselves by military power. Consequently, military threats to 
states, usage of military power, and wars have been the main issues of security. Walt 
(1991:213) also adds to this list ―statecraft,‖ which includes arms control, 
diplomacy, crisis management, and similar fields as subjects of security.  
However, after the end of the Cold War, the security field began facing a 
discussion about the enlargement of security. While some new issues, such as 
environmental degradation, human rights, and migration, have been presented by 
some as new fields of security; proponents of a traditional security understanding 
have rejected their inclusion into the realm of of security. According to Walt, such 
an enlargement of the concept  of security is not proper because ―defining the field 
in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to 
devise solutions to any of these important problems‖ (Walt, 1991: 213). Despite 
such rejections targeted at an enlarging of security studies, a vast scholarly literature 
has emerged identifying terrorism as one example of non-traditional security threats. 
 
1.4.2 New Non-Traditional Security Threats? 
After the end of the Cold War, some people argued that non-traditional new 
security threats had emerged against states,and thus necessitated a rethinking of 
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traditional understandings of state security. According to Mandel (1994:3), the Post-
Cold War transformation of the national security context includes three main trends: 
the decline of national sovereignty, escalation of international interdependence and 
proliferation of anarchic conflict. Mandel (1994:3) proposes that the main 
characteristics of the decline of national sovereignty are as follows: the emergence 
of non-state actors, the permeability of national borders, the fragmentation of 
nations, lower national self sufficiency, the dispersion of technology and the 
diffusion of power. The second trend, escalation of international interdependence, 
has the following characteristics: a move from a bipolar to a multipolar system, a 
rise in regionalism, a homogenization of tastes and technology, standardized 
weapons systems, mounting migration, and spreading democracy and capitalism 
(Mandel, 1994:3). The last trend, proliferation of anarchic conflict, includes fewer 
organized and large-scale wars, decreasing ideological and territorial clashes, the 
failure of deterrence, the rise in ethnic disputes, growing unconventional low-
intensity conflict and, lastly, increasingly visible subnational and transnational 
tensions (Mandel, 1994:3).   
According to Aravena, international security has the following four 
characteristics in the post-Cold War stage of globalisation: (1) it has extended 
beyond its military components, (2) it is transnational, global and interdependent, (3) 
it is produced not by only states but by a plurality of actors, (4) it has enlarged its 
agenda with a demand that actors work together (2002: 9). 
Krause and Williams (1996:229-230) claimed that three main approaches, 
which changed security thinking, emerged in the 1990s. Accordingly, the first 
approach broadened the ―neorealist conception of security‖ by introducing new 
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fields such as environmental, economic and human rights issues. The second 
approach deepened the agenda by focusing on all levels of security, namely, the 
individual, international, regional and societal levels. Krause and Williams lastly 
argue that the third approach remained in a state-centric position but proposed new 
terms such as common, co-operative, collective and comprehensive security for 
supporting different multilateral forms of interstate co-operation.  
The given narratives show that, subsequent to the Cold War, the national 
security understanding has changed dramatically with the emergence of new threats 
and new ways those threats have been perceived. Consequently, while security 
issues related to military threats, power, and war have been accepted as traditional 
security, new challenges have been called as non-traditional new security threats. 
 
1.4.3 Types of Non - Traditional New Security Threats 
The most comprehensive picture of those new threats has been depicted by 
the United Nations (UN). A UN report titled ―A More Secure World‖ clearly 
summarises the new threats that we face today. Accordingly there are six groups of 
threats: 
-Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease  
  and environmental degradation 
-Inter-State conflict 
-Internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale  
  atrocities 
-Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 
-Terrorism 
-Transnational organised crime (UN, 2004: 2) 
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As seen, there are six important main areas of new threats in today‘s world. All of 
those areas comprise their own peculiarities and degrees of importance. However, 
after the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has come to be considered as the most important of 
all new threats. In fact, this categorization presents itself as a good example of how 
terrorism has been transnationalized parallel to other transnationalization examples 
in various fields. Considering the worldwide focus on terrorism, it can be argued 
that terrorism presents itself as the most dangerous transnationalized issue in today‘s 
world.  
 
1.4.4 Terrorism as Non-Traditional Security Threat 
Changes in terrorism have been named differently by several authorities. 
Transnational terrorism and new terrorism are examples of such names. In fact, the 
concept of new terrorism emphasizes the increasingly transnational nature of 
terrorism. As will be explored in the following relevant sections, a networked 
organizational structure, the use of information technology, conducting more lethal 
acts in a war paradigm, having a religious nature, and reduced reliance on state 
sponsorship, are the proposed characteristics of new terrorism.   
 Based on the given characteristics, it can be argued that the states themselves 
are losing their central role in shaping the threat understanding both within and 
outside of their borders.  Examples show us that the capabilities of a terrorist 
organization may go far beyond the reach of a state in today‘s world, where 
terrorism can not be confined within the borders of states anymore due to changes ın 
organizational structure and technology. All kinds of activities of a terrorist 
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organization do not need to be placed and performed in a certain location. Terrorist 
organizations benefit from all the advantages of today‘s administrative 
understandings, social structures, and technology. In terms of administrative 
understandings, techniques such as the establishment of global cells and operational 
groups beyond borders in order to serve a particular purpose, succeeding 
coordination between those groups, permitting autonomy to individual initiatives, 
and advertisement of goals and performances through communication channels are 
observed. In terms of social structure, terrorist organizations may create global 
support, global recruitment, and global activity based on shared identities 
worldwide. Technologically, terrorist organizations use advances to successfully 
carry out administrative tasks, develop their social structure, and conduct attacks. 
With those characteristics of establishing a global structure, in other words by 
creating transnational networks and operational capability, terrorism presents a new 
dimension for states to deal with. 
 
1.5 Research Question: What About the Response? 
If the world is witnessing transnationalization of terrorism and thus its broad 
risks, what can be said about the response to terrorism? Has it been successful in 
adapting this evolving phenomenon?  
One way of measuring success against a transnationalizing terrorism could 
be by looking at the institutions of international understanding and mechanisms 
against terrorism, such as the establishment of common definitions of terrorism, the 
creation of conventions and resolutions, which constitute the backbone of the 
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responses to international terrorism. However, those initiatives have been arguably 
limited in their success because of differences of state perceptions about terrorism 
and non-binding nature of conventions.  
An alternative way of measuring success is to look at operational activities of 
military, intelligence and police organizations. Traditionally, quantitative statistics 
such as thwarted attacks, numbers of killed or captured terrorists, cleared cases, 
amount of intelligence gathered, and numbers of investigations or operations have 
been used as measures of success against terrorism, all of which can be categorized 
by yearly statistics. Probst criticizes such ―short term‖ approaches, however, as they 
mainly try to measure success in yearly fiscal terms, while terrorists ―take the long 
view‖ (Probst; 2005: 317-321). Given Probst‘s assertion, effective counter-terrorism 
should concentrate on goals such as delegitimizing the terrorists‘ causes and 
breaking their morale (Probst; 2005: 319-321). This may be so, but measuring the 
achievement of such practices is not easy.  
In fact, an overall assessment of counter-terrorism is that it is a reactionary 
practice, and is thus always at least one step behind the threat. Logic would tell us 
that the ultimate measure of counter-terror success would be in looking at whether it 
can jump a step ahead of the threat, moving into a pre-emptive rather than 
reactionary position. Perhaps the best way of measuring success therefore, is to 
consider the adaptability of the response actors and practices. If terrorism is 
becoming increasingly transnational, then the obvious measurement of counter-
terror success is to ask whether the countering actors are able to create succesful 
transnational activities. This point constitutes the backbone of this thesis. In the 
following parts of this thesis, the focus will be to understand whether states are able 
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to create structures to deal with transnational terrorism. In other words, are states 
and the state system equally evolving in their international coordinated cooperation 
efforts to defeat the increasingly transnationalizing threat of terrorism? 
 
1.6 Framework of the Thesis 
The second chapter of the thesis will look at the theoretical framework in 
detail. Particularly realist and liberal understandings of cooperation will be explored 
in this chapter. An examination of cooperation approaches within those theories and 
differences between their proposals play a guiding role for designing the thesis.   
 The third chapter will focus on the threat of terrorism. A historical narrative 
will be provided to track the emergence and development of terrorism throughout 
history. The main aim of this chapter is to portray how the transnationalization of 
terrorism took place throughout history. 
 The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters will look at the response initiatives to 
counter terrorism, basically as based on liberal and realist theories. For 
accomplishing a clear understanding of the various options provided by those 
theories to explore the issue, a framework based on actors and forms of security 
cooperation relations has been conceptualized. Accordingly, Chapter 4 will focus on 
Realist/State-Centric approaches, Chapter 5 will explore Liberal/State-Centric ones 
and Chapter 6 will explore Realist and Liberal Multi-Centric approaches.  In each 
chapter, a general perspective about the theoretical frameworks and their approaches 
to responding to terrorism will be examined. Then police responses will be 
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predominantly examined by prioritizing new police practices employed to meet the 
transnationalization of terrorism.  
Chapter 7 will focus on the police liaison system as a case study of 
cooperation against terrorism. The history of police liaisonship, its enlargement and 
application in terrorism issues will be examined in detail to show how the police 
liaisonship system is structured and how—or whether—it has managed to meet the 
transnational terrorism threat. The final chapter provides a concluding analysis to the 
above. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
COOPERATION THEORETICALLY 
 
 
 
 The increasing need for cooperation in the fight against terrorism 
necessitates understanding what cooperation is. Therefore, theoretical perspectives 
will be explored in this section in order to better outline the dynamics of security 
cooperation in general and how states perform or struggle in this respect.  
 
2.1 Cooperation 
 According to Axelrod and Keohane, cooperation does not necessarily mean 
harmony and  ― achieving cooperation is difficult‖ while  ―cooperation varies among 
issues and over time‖ (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 226). Based on those 
characteristics, Axelrod and Keohane propose that ―cooperation occurs when actors 
adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others‖ (Axelrod 
and Keohane, 1985: 226, , Milner, 1992: 467). 
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 In fact, cooperation against terrorism contains many characteristics of the 
above definition. For example, it is indisputable that achieving cooperation against 
terrorism is very difficult. Lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism is a 
reality and an obvious sign of the difficulty in establishing a common understanding 
and strategy. As another point, the willingness of parties to cooperate against 
terrorism may vary depending on issues and time. Some states may be very willing 
to cooperate against religiously motivated terrorist groups, but not show the same 
disposition for cooperating against other groups claimed as terrorist by other states. 
As a basic example in terms of the time dimension, everybody will probably agree 
that states and other entities are more inclined to cooperate after 9/11 as compared to 
the past.  
 The main issues mentioned to explain cooperation in general clearly 
demonstrate its dynamic nature, and show how it may be really very difficult to 
achieve. When we talk about cooperation against terrorism, extra difficulties should 
be added into our discussion. These emanate from the particular nature of terrorism, 
because it is a field within which actors may have great difficulties to adjust their 
behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others. Having difficulties in 
reaching a general terrorism definition, interpretation differences in portraying 
terrorist organizations, and differences in counter terrorism approaches may be 
counted here as examples of such ‗extra' difficulties. Ironically, although difficulties 
exist in succeeding at cooperation against terrorism, what we have been 
experiencing for decades shows us that the vital need to do so has been growing due 
to the changing nature and growing danger of terrorism.  This thesis will look at this 
issue by investigating if states are finding ways to cooperate against terrorism, 
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despite all difficulties. For achieving this aim, this section will focus on the main 
theoretical approaches and vital themes of cooperation. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Cooperation 
  It is possible to argue that there are three main approaches of international 
relation theories that focus on cooperation problem. The first two approaches are 
based on realism and liberalism. Assumptions of realism and liberalism and the 
competition between these two schools can help to have a better understanding of 
cooperation.  It is possible to argue that there is quite a serious competition between 
these two theoretical approaches on the cooperation issue. The reflective 
approaches, which are cognitivism and constructivism, constitute the third main 
approach. These theoretical approaches focus on issues such as interests and 
identities. Consequently the scholars of these approaches try to explain cooperation 
based on identity and interests. As mentioned above, this thesis will mainly follow 
the liberal – realist understandings of cooperation and the competition between 
them. The reason for this choice emanates from the thesis question asked in this 
study. The traditional domination of realist understandings over states´ security 
perceptions and the dismissing of terrorist groups as non-state actors have thus far 
led to limited success in the establishment of common understandings and 
cooperative strategies. This situation encouraged me to focus on questioning 
whether this traditional approach has been shifting because of the changing nature 
and growing danger of terrorism. If there is a change, I would like to find out what 
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those changes are, and what the meanings of those changes are for international 
relations theory, particularly as based on realist and liberal understandings.  
Although reflective approaches provide applicable narratives and 
explanatory power to the issue, I do not intend to focus on those theories for 
practical and theoretical reasons. First of all, I do not want to enlarge the study area, 
which already represents a complex nature. Secondly approaches of realism and 
liberalism with their existing literature provide the basic foundations for my 
research. Therefore investigation of countering terrorism based on reflective 
approaches is believed to be the subject of another study. 
 
2.2.1 Neorealism-Neoliberalism Debate over Cooperation 
 There is an ongoing debate between neorealism and neoliberalism over the 
issue of cooperation. We can talk about several attempts, which aimed to explain the 
main differences between the two theoretical approaches. Based on his investigation 
of previous scholarly studies, according to Baldwin (1993: 4-11) there are six focal 
points between neorealism and neoliberalism. First of all, while examining the 
nature and consequence of anarchy, based on Stein‘s argument Baldwin implies that 
neorealism focuses on independent decision-making while neoliberalism focuses on 
joint decision-making. (Baldwin, 1993:4; Stein, 1982: 324). Secondly, it can be 
understood that cooperation is limited according to neorealists, while neoliberals put 
more emphasis on cooperation--according to Baldwin‘s account on international 
cooperation (Baldwin, 1993: 5). Summarizing Baldwin‘s other points: neorealists 
believe that relative gains are more important, while neoliberals believe in the 
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importance of absolute gains; neorealists place more emphasis on national security, 
while neoliberals focus more on economic welfare; neorealists give more emphasis 
to capabilities while neoliberals focus on intentions; and lastly, neorealists argue that 
institutions are limited while neoliberals give great importance to institutions 
(Baldwin, 1993:5-11).  
To summarize, neorealists focus on independent decision making, the limited 
nature of cooperation, relative gains, national security, capabilities and the 
impotency of institutions. On the other hand neoliberals focus on joint decision 
making, the overall importance of cooperation, absolute gains, economic welfare, 
intentions and institutions. I would like to note here that those differences are not 
clear-cut borders between the two approaches. Rather, both approaches give 
importance to the mentioned alternatives, but the level of emphasis within the two 
theoretical approaches is different. For example, the emphasis of liberal thought on 
institutions does not mean that realists do not care about institutions, but the level of 
emphasis is lower when compared with a liberal approach. Based on this clarifying 
note, I would like to evaluate these differences below. Meanwhile, the meanings of 
those discussions for establishing cooperation against terrorism will also be 
evaluated when necessary.  
 -Independent decision making / joint decision-making. Decision making 
procedures in fighting against terrorism has been one of the most important issues 
following 9/11. The USA has been criticized for shaping its response against 
terrorism unilaterally, in other words its been accused of independent decision-
making in arranging its response against terrorism.  In fact, the level of unilateral 
behavior or independent decision-making tends to be linked to the power of a state, 
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and may give several advantages to powerful actors in an anarchical world. Thus, 
the USA‘s initial strategy, as the main target country on 9/11, was to shape the 
international response according to its own interests, as based on a realist 
understanding. Although the international community supported the USA at the 
beginning, disagreement emerged later between the USA and especially European 
countries about the response methods. 
As an alternative, the emergence of liberal proposals that focus on 
establishing cooperation by forming joint decision-making structures that can work 
to identify the problems mutually and establish a common understanding jointly, 
have also been observed. UN initiatives such as broad condemnation of the 9/11 
attacks, and establishing task forces and committees to develop cooperation against 
terrorism, can be counted here as examples of such initiatives. 
It would be proper to mention here that such liberal joint decision-making 
approaches may also have problems.  As the issue is cooperation against terrorism, 
which lacks a common definition, having a joint decision-making outcome against it 
may be very difficult to achieve. A global consensus such as condemnation of 
attacks can be reached only under extraordinary circumstances such as those of 9/11.  
Although condemnation of terrorism is widespread among members of the 
international community; achieving active and strong cooperation continuously is 
still not an easy task. When looking at the global level, the United Nations has long 
proven unable to produce a universally acceptable definition of terrorism. Although 
the UN continues to improve cooperation in this area, its efforts seems to be 
restrictive. Other relevant international institutions also have similar problems.  
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Another issue to be discussed here is the number of actors discussion. 
Cooperation requires more than one actor. Alternatives to cooperation are unilateral 
behaviour and inactivity (Milner, 1992:468). Cooperation may have different forms 
based on the involved parties. The most basic one is bilateral cooperation, which is 
cooperation established between two countries. The second one is multilateral 
cooperation, which requires cooperation of three or more states. Multilateral 
cooperation can also be established in an institutional form.  
 There are mainly two approaches to deciding which type of cooperation is 
preferable. A first perspective is that fewer actors are better for cooperative 
arrangements, in the understanding that two is the ideal number of players (Milner: 
1992: 473). A second approach favors more actors. According to Milner‘s argument, 
a large number of players provides more opportunities for exchanges and side 
payments, can be reduced to smaller numbers, and can enhance relative gains 
(Milner: 1992: 473-74). 
Regarding the number of partners, Grieco has argued that in times of 
uncertainty, states may prefer more partners in order to allow them to choose the 
best alternative based on realist approach, while a small numbers of participants can 
be seen as providing better hope for compliance and sanctioning of cheaters 
according to neoliberals (Grieco 1988: 506). 
 We should also mention here the role of regional initiatives in establishing 
cooperation. The European Union seems to be a good example in terms of 
establishing a definition of terrorism and improving cooperation. But it still has 
problems according to Keohane (2005:2-3), because the EU (European Union) ―is 
not a national government‖, so there are failures of sharing intelligence, and counter 
  
 
25 
 
terrorism remains still a not clearly defined policy area. Consequently it will take 
some more time for European Union to establish a more coherent counter- terrorism 
structure.  
Another issue related to this subject is iteration. Iteration means repeated 
play and refers to ―players` expectations about the future‖ (Milner, 1992: 474). This 
concept aims to investigate the willingness of parties to continue cooperation in the 
future or not. Especially game theoretic models focus on this concept. The key 
principle of this concept is making calculations about future behaviour of parties. 
According to Milner, iteration increases the probability of cooperative outcomes by 
making continued cooperation more beneficial compared to defection, especially in 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma games (Milner, 1992: 474). 
When the above-mentioned theoretical approaches are linked to today‘s 
counterterrorism environment, the following remarks can be made: 
First, negligence of non-state and even sub-state actors by, in particular, 
realism, has constituted an important lack of vision for understanding what is 
happening in transnational terrorism and counterstrategies. The threat posed by these 
actors seems to influence cooperative endeavours today both in bilateral and 
multilateral settings. As for response actors, we can also observe the emergence of 
transnational level activities of non-state and sub-state actors, such as private 
intelligence agencies and police liaisons. Consequently, the realist approach may 
need to open room for sub-state response entities, such as liaison officers, rather 
than relying only on the foreign affairs structure of states in responding to 
transnational threats.  
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In today‘s world, transnational terrorism, by its cross-border nature, pushes 
states to initiate cooperative endeavours with others either in bilateral or multilateral 
forms.  Bilateral cooperation, identified as an ideal form by Milner in terms of 
actors, really seems to be a highly preferred method. Several examples in the 
following parts of the thesis support this argument. For example, while a cooperative 
mechanism has been established between Europol and US authorities, information in 
Europol Reports mention that US authorities generally prefer to establish bilateral 
links in most cases instead of contacting Europol directly. As another example, one 
author mentions powerful states preferring to give assistance to third countries 
bilaterally, instead of using UN structures. Consequently, although existing 
multilateral settings and institutions provide cooperation mechanisms to states, 
bilateral relationships remain alive as an important cooperation method due to its 
apparent advantages. This situation is understandable for reasons such as secrecy 
and not wanting to make any concessions in multilateral settings. Interestingly, in 
particular states which are declared as targets by terrorist groups and neighboring 
states seem to be the ones which prefer bilateral cooperation most. It is 
understandable for neighboring states to have bilateral ties as they share the same 
border. Expansion of bilateral cooperation by especially powerful states, declared as 
target by terrorist groups, may be commented as a result of a transnationalization of 
the threat. As transnational terrorism has the capacity today to recruit members all 
around the world, to establish communication globally without any interruption and 
to initiate attacks, global or regional, players need bilateral assistance in meeting 
those threats. This seems to be one of the driving reasons for the expansion of the 
police liaison system, especially by powerful states.  
  
 
27 
 
 9/11 opened the way for an enormous increase in multilateral initiatives, 
especially within the structure of global and regional institutions. Although a 
common understanding and definition of terrorism still cannot be reached, the world 
witnessed a global condemnation of the attacks, and various new policies and 
initiatives. In fact, this increase has succeeded because of the existence of a 
transnational threat, which urged states to look for transnational response methods.   
Lastly, a few words on iteration may be added here. Cooperation in 
countering terrorism requires high levels of confidentiality between parties. In that 
respect, iteration is an important aspect in establishing and continuing cooperation. 
This is especially true in the new terrorism concept. Operating worldwide with 
members diffused in different countries, new terrorism makes close and continuous 
cooperation necessary among state partners. Trust and solid cooperation can be 
achieved by repeated interactions between partners. This is necessary both in order 
to follow current developments and to meet the terrorist challenge in emergency 
situations.  
Explanations regarding the independent and joint decision-making issue 
reveal that states are in a position to incline more through joint decision-making 
both in bilateral and also multilateral settings. As transnational threats have the 
capacity to emerge suddenly anywhere in the world and with global capacity in 
organizing and acting, responses decided on by independent decision- making may 
not produce the desired end results. Cooperation of response partners requires joint 
decision-making to deal with the problem of building up the most proper reaction.  
 -Discussion on the Limited Nature of Cooperation: This is one of the most 
significant distinctions between the two theoretical approaches.  In fact, both 
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Neorealism and Neoliberalism agree on the anarchical nature of international 
relations. The existence of anarchy is identified as a lack of government, which 
implies that there is no central authority in world politics. In the absence of a central 
authority, states try to protect their own interests for survival. As the result of 
competition for survival among states, conflict emerges. The difference between 
neorealism and neoliberalism becomes apparent at this point. Neoliberalism sees 
more possibility for cooperation, even in such an anarchical structure, and believes 
in the value of cooperation especially via the establishment of international 
institutions.  
Neorealism contrarily argues the limited nature of cooperation. Neorealist 
belief that cooperation is limited emanates from its own theoretical formation that 
states as interest-driven actors live in anarchy with an aim to achieve survival. 
Neorealists‘ approach of seeing cooperation as limited is one of the key points of 
this thesis. Changes in the nature of terrorism show us that, today, we face a new 
terrorism reality that can operate worldwide by benefitting from administrative, 
technical and social advances.  
The natural extension of this discussion emerges in the debates over 
unilateralism and multilateralism, as discussed above. After 9/11, the USA preferred 
a unilateral approach within its global war paradigm. Consequently the USA‘s 
unilateral tendencies created problems first on the European side. Multilateralism 
was the preferred strategy of Europeans. However it was an issue of interests. And 
as known, the concept of interests is always a problem in terrorism-related issues on 
all levels of understanding, from defining it to establishing agreement about 
cooperation, because interests may vary from state to state and from time to time.  
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The key issue here is the nature of the threat, which is transnational 
terrorism, and whether limited or intense cooperation is needed to defeat it. While 
transnational terrorist groups have the capacity to establish communication 
throughout the world with advanced technology and they have the ability to carry 
out high impact attacks with awful results, will limited cooperation help in 
constructing a speedy response to the threat? Also, should states be restricted to 
following formal procedural cooperative methods and information sharing channels? 
As will be seen in the following chapters, the importance of informal 
communication is growing between security actors. Consequently, states seem to be 
in a position to diversify their cooperative methods and channels to meet a 
transnational threat which is instantly evolving. Moreover, I believe that the 
transnationalization of threats is urging states to stretch their way of looking at the 
cooperation issue. The New York Police Department (NYPD), which initiated a 
global police liaison project as a sub-state entity, can be shown as a good example. 
Although the federal state agencies of the USA were initially frustrated with the 
NYPD because such initiatives were meant to be their responsibility, they were 
obliged to accept this practice. This example reveals how states may loosen strict 
international relations rules and practices when the issue is one of responding to 
transnational threats. Therefore, it can be proposed that transnational threats may 
change the way that states look at cooperation issue when it comes to initiating 
transnational responses. 
  -Relative or Absolute Gains: The problem of gains also constitutes a 
key debate in the international relations field. Neoliberals focus on states` individual 
absolute gains and see them as ―indifferent to the gains of other states‖ (Powell, 
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1991: 1303).  Powell‘s assumptions can be summarized as follows: Neoliberals do 
not care if cooperation results in a relative gain or loss, if it brings an absolute gain; 
on the other hand, neorealists focus on relative gains, which means controlling what 
others get (Powell,1991:1303). This debate therefore influences the approaches of 
theories to cooperation and conflict, with neoliberals believing that cooperation will 
result in gains for all involved parties and thus are important, while neorealists 
always make a comparison about who gets what. Consequently, although neorealists 
do not reject cooperation completely, they approach it hesitantly and carefully.  
Another argument, worthy of examination here, is issue linkage, proposed by 
Grieco. Accordingly, if cooperation in one area increases the power of a state in 
other areas, realists may reject cooperation, while neoliberals tend to find that 
―tightly knit linkages within and across issue-areas accentuate iterativeness and thus 
facilitate cooperation‖ (Grieco 1988: 506).  The meaning of this argument is quite 
clear and interesting when applied to the terrorism issue. Accordingly, if cooperation 
against terrorism may make a state more powerful in other issue areas, a realist 
understanding may prevent cooperation on terrorism to weaken the other state which 
will probably enhance its situation in other areas.  For example, countering terrorism 
means expending money and other economic resources. If a state deals with 
terrorism for a long time, it may lose its economic strength and sustainability. 
Consequently, other states that do not want this particular state to be economically 
strong, may not approach to cooperate on terrorism issues with that state.  
A crucial question at this point is whether fighting against terrorism is a 
global good or not. Is it possible to establish sound cooperation when the ―one 
man‘s terrorist is another man‘s freedom fighter‖ approach is still alive? The 
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existence of the ―state sponsored terrorism‖ phenomenon is a clear sign that 
terrorism can be ignored, motivated and even created by states for achieving their 
own national interests and with an aim of harming other states. This point presents 
another reason of not being able to produce a worldwide understanding and 
definition of terrorism.  
As mentioned, new terrorist groups are broadly not welcome in current world 
politics. Consequently, each state is expected to give a response to new terrorism, or 
at least express condemnation. However, as states are interest driven entities, they 
will look at how much they may gain in cooperative arrangements.  This logic urges 
one to reach the conclusion that states adjust their contribution against terrorism 
based on what they get. Here the problem of gains emerges as an important concept. 
There are a few questions to be answered for a better understanding of the concept 
of gains and its usage with respect to terrorism, especially after 9/11. 
 Is fighting against terrorism a global good, or will some states benefit more 
from the global fight against terrorism? What about fighting with traditional terrorist 
groups that operate at the national level? Will those states, which have national level 
terrorism problems, get any assistance and benefit from the global response to 
terrorism? 
 Since 9/11, Al Qaeda and its associated groups have been placed on the 
global scene as the main targets. Al Qaeda has been presented as the most dangerous 
entity of our time, and has caused chaos and hatred worldwide. A liberal narrative 
has been produced about the necessity to fight with it. It has been argued that 
fighting with this threat is a global responsibility for a peaceful world. Consequently 
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the idea presented here is that everybody will win from the fight against Al Qaeda 
terrorism.  
 However every country has its own preferences about the pros and cons of 
contributing to the fight against Al Qaeda. At this stage, we face with national 
calculations and individual approaches to the problem.  After the September 11 
attacks, a worldwide response was delivered by almost all states and relevant 
international organizations. Fighting against the threat was made a priority. The 
USA, as the main target, has been the leading force in responding to the attacks. The 
European Union and individual states worldwide reacted against the attacks. 
International institutions, the UN stands first on the list, responded immediately to 
the attacks. However differences emerged among contributors over time. The Iraq 
invasion was the first problem among the various parties. While the USA defended 
the idea of invading Iraq, most European countries rejected it. The underlying cause 
for rejection was their own interests. The biggest difference came into being 
between the EU and the United States in terms of their approaches to the fight 
against terrorism. While the USA labelled fighting against terrorism as a war and 
extended it beyond its borders, the EU focused mainly on domestic counter-
terrorism policies (Keohane, 2005:12). While most European countries rejected the 
invasion of Iraq, their mind probably was full of their own interests with that 
country and also on the USA‘s interests in invading Iraq. Consequently the realist 
concept of relative gains entered the scene at one stage of the cooperative process.  
 Countries that contribute to cooperative arrangements against terrorism also 
look for advantages in different areas. Some of them may have their own terrorist 
problems. Consequently they pursue a way to solve their terrorism problems by 
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cooperating with others, especially with the strongest ones such as the USA or 
England. Some others pursue economic input as compensation to their contribution. 
This is also a reflection of realist thinking in terms of relative gains.  
 This picture shows that cooperation against terrorism may use both liberal 
perspectives of absolute gains and also realist ones of relative gains. Basically, the 
rhetoric to reach the anticipated end results overlaps with a liberal understanding of 
gains, but in practical application, states seem to be closer to seeking to achieve their 
own interests, which is best explained by a realist understanding of gains. 
Sometimes the clash between states to reach those gains may cause problems 
between states. Consequently cooperation against terrorism is not still an easy task 
because all states want to be satisfied with the results according to their own 
calculations and expectations. Therefore, a balanced relationship should be 
established between the states for harmony. 
  It should also be mentioned here that the defection problem is particularly 
acute when it comes to cooperation against terrorism. It can be argued that 
cooperation against terrorism must be as comprehensive as possible due to the 
global nature of the threat. On the other hand, once the number of the actors grows 
bigger, so does the defection problem. Therefore, cooperation dilemmas of terrorism 
related issues seem to be different than with other kinds of security dilemmas. If a 
state fails in performing active cooperation, this failure may negatively influence 
larger anti-terrorism cooperation schemes, because terrorists may easily benefit from 
the failure of this state.  There may be, for example, countries that cannot contribute 
to anti-terrorism cooperation because of their inabilities in controlling their own 
borders and their state coherence. Although they may express and indeed have a 
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willingness to contribute to the fight against terrorism within an absolute gains 
approach, their incapability and weakness to control their own statehood and 
geography prevents these states from being a provider of security in the international 
area. Iraq, Afghanistan and several states in Africa may be given as examples of 
such states. Terrorist organizations operating within the borders of such states may 
present a threat to both regional and global security by benefitting from the 
weaknesses of such states. There is a natural negative defection issue in such cases. 
Although states do not want to be part of the terrorism supporting mechanisms, their 
weaknesses do not let such states to accomplish a positive role in countering 
terrorism. Therefore they become natural defectors playing a negative role in 
cooperation.  
 An overall evaluation of this section in relation to transnational threat 
presents several points. First of all, after 9/11, the idea of absolute gains has been 
presented in particular by liberal actors. Today, more activities in sharing 
experiences, guiding states to establish counterterrorism strategies and structures, 
and providing aid in different fields related to counter-terrorism issue are now 
mainstream strategies by leading institutions such as the UN. Consequently it can be 
argued that states look for more cooperative endeavours as a response to 
transnational threats by promoting the idea of absolute gains. The relative gain 
expectation of states is still alive, on the other hand. The example provided in this 
thesis that the choice by strong states to support weak partners bilaterally, instead of 
making use of their expected contribution within the structure of institutions such as 
UN, may be accepted as a significant issue that they would like to increase their 
value as a partner for relative gain purposes. 
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In fact, the aim of responding to a transnational threat seems to lead the 
emergence of complex relationship structures wherein the borders of absolute and 
relative gains of states can not be defined clearly. The increasing application of the 
police liaison system as a response to transnational threats both by states bilaterally 
and also by institutions such as Europol and Interpol at the institutional levels can 
also be presented as an example of this situation. 
The de-politicization of terrorism and police practice of seeing terrorism as a 
crime (Deflem, 2007), is also a significant point here to understand why police 
cooperation is rapidly growing. When the police interpret terrorism as a crime like 
all other crimes and thus de-politicize it, the police are seeing an absolute gain. This 
interpretation makes cooperation easier for police all around the world because all 
parties look at the terrorism issue from the same perspective. A transnational police 
understanding, interpreting transnational terrorism in the same way, may have more 
success in establishing cooperative schemes. States may like to enhance their 
relative gains from this transnational police approach which emphasizes absolute 
gains.   
-National security / economic welfare. Several arguments suggest that there 
is difference between cooperation in the fields of security and economics.  
According to Müller (2002:370) security cooperation implies relying, on the 
resources, intentions and activities of other states for national survival. According to 
Lipson (1984: 2) situational context is important in cooperation and the ―context is 
significantly different in economic and security issues.‖ Lipson (1984: 12) argues 
that when compared with economic issues, security regimes are very rare.   
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 After 9/11, initial response methods, based on realist understandings, 
generally focused on succeeding national security. In time, two different methods 
competed with each other within this paradigm. The USA favored a global war, 
while the Europeans focused on a law enforcement approach. According to Woolsey 
(2002: v) the USA`s response to terrorism before September 11 was heavily rooted 
in law enforcement and focused on prosecuting individual terrorists, but this 
approach was replaced with a worldwide war thinking after 9/11. The USA`s 
approach following 9/11 introduced new methods such as a preemptive response 
alternative and homeland security approaches (Satoh, 2003: 15). On the other hand, 
other countries, especially Europeans, favored usage of law enforcement and 
intelligence methods to combat with terrorism. According to Nye, Satoh and 
Wilkinson (2003: 1) other countries were in the belief that the USA was 
overreacting with its global war approach.  
 Liberals have argued that terrorism can not be defeated by only military or 
security measures. Liberal accounts have focused on economic poverty, inequality 
and backwardness as the main sources of terrorism. Thus their prescription has 
given more emphasis to the removal of those negative causes in the fight against 
terrorism.  Advocates of this perspective have argued the necessity of relieving 
differences and inequality. This difference in perceptions also shows how two 
different theoretical approaches in international relations view the terrorism problem 
and its treatment. 
The ability of transnational terrorism to emerge at any time in any place of 
the world is a reality today. Dealing with this threat requires both economic power 
and also well established security management systems. Looking at the issue in an 
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economic perspective leaves no doubt that war is a costly way of dealing with a 
transnational threat. Instead, a security architecture well managed in terms of 
economic support mechanisms may serve better in dealing with transnational 
threats. In that regard, the insertion of police liaison systems in such a security 
mechanism has been in play in the world. The employment and encouragement of 
police liaison systems by regional initiatives like European Union and ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Nations) should be accepted as examples of trying 
to achieve an architecture configured to have security components with an ability to 
deal transnational threats.   
 -Intentions/Capabilities: States calculate their power and capabilities in 
establishing their relationship with others. How much power each of the cooperation 
partners has is a key issue in establishing and continuing cooperation. For that 
reason, states always monitor power and capability levels of other states. For 
example, as mentioned earlier, according to Grieco (1988:506), if a cooperative 
arrangement provides additional capabilities to the partner, cooperation can become 
unattractive to a state. Milner (1992:470-480) and Baldwin (1993: 22-23) examine 
the future directions of cooperation based on six hypotheses. The sixth point focuses 
on power asymmetries, which Baldwin and Milner mostly relate to hegemonic 
stability theory. Milner (1992:480) proposes that imbalances in power are 
―conducive to cooperation‖ as stronger actors are allowed a greater role in 
organizing the system. In this approach tendencies to initiate unilateral behaviour by 
stronger parties may emerge. 
I also would like to refer to Ole Waever`s and Barry Buzan`s model of power 
interactions on global and regional level here as a guiding conceptual framework. 
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While studying Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), Buzan and Waever proposed 
three kinds of power: ―superpowers and great powers at the system level and 
regional powers at the regional level‖ (Buzan and Waever, 2003 34). According to 
Buzan and Waever (34-37), characteristics of power types can be summarized as 
follows: 
 -Superpowers should exercise their military, economic and political 
capabilities all over the international system. Their rank should be accepted by other 
parties. The USA carries this rank after the Cold War. 
 -Great Powers don‘t need to have big capabilities in all sectors. They differ 
from regional powers in terms of their system level influence and responsibilities.  
 -Regional powers mainly have influence and capabilities to exercise in a 
region.  
 As mentioned above, a realist emphasis is on relative gains and power in 
establishing cooperation. Especially the power of a state is essential in convincing 
other parties for cooperation. Also, the level of power may give states different 
status such as super power, great power and regional power. The degree of power 
that a state has, is decisive in its cooperative arrangements in terms of how a state 
gains relative to others in the arrangement.  
Gathering approval and support of others is important at least to justify 
actions and convince the international community for the necessity of action. 
Therefore we can observe that powerful unilateral actors are trying to find partners 
and supporters by using their power and capabilities. The USA‘s war approach 
following 9/11 can be shown as an example here. On the other hand, the institutional 
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initiatives of organizations such as the UN focus on establishing long term policies, 
rules and standards by prioritizing intentions.   
A connected issue is Grieco‘s durability hypothesis, which argues that 
neorealism focuses on less durable cooperative arrangements while neoliberalism 
focuses on durability to prevent cheating (Grieco 1988: 505-506). No doubt the 
establishing of a long term working policy with the contribution of all states such as 
a universally acceptable UN definition would produce a durable situation. However 
resistance by states to approve such a definition may be their choice for less durable 
and non-binding cooperative arrangements.  
States‘ choice to follow a policy based on capabilities or intentions carries 
importance. As transnational terrorism is a cross-border phenomenon with an ability 
to use advanced technology today, states should calculate carefully their response 
alternatives in terms of whether they can rely on their own capabilities to fight with 
terrorism or whether they should contribute to creating common intentions to 
prompt a strong reaction to terrorism.  
 -Institutions: The USA‘s approach is a clear representation of a realist 
approach following 9/11. The USA`s policy of the war against terrorism after 9/11 
reveals that the USA basically has focused on its own power both to deal with 
terrorism unilaterally and also to convince other parties and partners to cooperate 
with it. In that regard, pushing other parties to cooperate in terrorism-related matters 
seems to be a way of politics for terrorism cases by powerful states. This approach is 
clearly in line with realism oriented theories such as Hegemonic Stability Theory. In 
that regard realism gives limited role to institutions. 
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Contrary to realism, liberalism gives importance to the establishment of 
institutions. Keohane is the leading scholar of institutional theory. According to him, 
institutions in the wide perspectives refer to ―persistent and connected sets of rules 
(formal or informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations‖ (Keohane, 1988:383). According to Keohane and Martin, states 
construct institutions to benefit from cooperation jointly for the following purposes: 
―Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments 
more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the 
operation of reciprocity.‖ (Keohane and Martin: 1995: 42)  
States may face a dichotomy in forming a response to transnational 
terrorism: They may choose a policy based on power, with a limited focus on 
institutions, or a common policy established by institutional approaches, which is 
created by common understandings, policies and expectations. In other words, they 
must decide whether their individual power and abilities are enough to meet this 
transnational threat or whether they should focus more on creating a common 
strategy and coordination by creating institutional forms. 
What has been discussed so far will help to establish a framework of 
cooperative initiatives based on theoretical approaches. Actors and forms of 
relationships can be mentioned as significant issues in forming cooperative relations. 
The theoretical ground of actors and their diverse relationship characters will guide 
us to understand the current complex nature of cooperative alternatives. Actors can 
be states, dominantly as a realist actor, or others of liberal thought, such as 
institutions, conventions, or regimes. This dissertation also gives great importance to 
non-state and sub-state actors emanating from a liberal understanding with a desire 
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to investigate if there is any change in states‘ approaches to these actors. A second 
issue for establishing the framework is forms of security relationships. One 
dimension of the relationship covers state-centric forms and the other dimension 
consists of multi-centric relations. One of the main aims of the study is to question 
whether states are going beyond the realist boundaries by tolerating multi-centric 
relationships. 
 
2.3 A Framework for Analysis for Security Cooperation  
 Examination of differences between realism and liberalism led me to think 
that two main dimensions are particularly important in constructing a framework of 
analysis for this thesis‘ main inquiry. Those two dimensions are the actors and the 
forms of cooperative security relations.  
 In terms of actors, the realist argument focuses on the state itself. States 
perform cooperative initiatives through the channels of international relations such 
as diplomacy and the establishment of foreign offices. A realist emphasis on 
independent decision making, the limited nature of cooperation, the importance of 
relative gains, the significance of national security, the emphasis on capabilities and 
the belief in the limited nature of institutions refer to the supremacy of state as the 
preeminent actor. On the other hand, liberalism proposes the existence and 
importance of actors other than states, such as institutions and sub-state entities. An 
important issue to be mentioned here is the emergence of non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups. While realism strictly ignores non-state entities as actors, liberalism 
gives room for their existence as actors.  
  
 
42 
 
 Forms of cooperative security relations emerge as the second dimension 
from the discussion between realist and liberal approaches. With respect to security 
cooperation, realism focuses on interactions shaped and organized by state entities, 
responsible for establishing international cooperative initiatives. Liberal approaches, 
on the other hand, give room for interactions that are produced by entities other than 
states such as institutions, sub-state actors and non-state actors. Table-1 gives a basic 
framework of interactions based on actors and forms of cooperative security 
relations. Each part of this table will be explored in detail in the following parts of 
this study to specify their meanings. However, the main aim will be to explore 
whether any essential change of state behaviour has taken place in terms of security 
cooperation in the case of the fight against terrorism. To explain this point further, I 
will see whether states show any signs that they are diverting from their formal, 
state-centric traditional standings.  
  
2.3.1 Response Types and Actors 
Pillar and Nye categorize kinds of responses which should be developed 
against terrorism. Pillar (2001:73) argues that ―diplomacy, the criminal justice 
system, interdiction of financial assets, military force and intelligence‖ are 
instruments of counterterrorism. Nye (2003:10-13) focuses on a five point strategy 
which includes military measures, intelligence sharing and police cooperation, 
diplomatic measures, homeland security and finally aid and assistance as ways of 
responding to terrorism. 
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 The authors given above are not exhaustive but illustrative. They both 
mention the importance of international cooperation in fighting against terrorism. I 
would like examine those response alternatives and their main characteristics briefly 
below. Then I will look at the police in more detail, as they constitute the main 
research area of the thesis. 
  As the first option, diplomacy refers to the management of relationships 
between nations in general. Each country has an overarching foreign affairs 
structure, which is responsible for establishment and maintenance of relationships 
with other countries. All issues including terrorism fall under the responsibility of 
foreign affairs mechanisms. Especially in relations with other countries, diplomats 
are essential tools of co-operation and information/experience exchange. Different 
levels constitute foreign affairs. Central bodies organize the policy and main courses 
of actions. On the other hand country level initiatives are performed by embassies, 
based on the guidelines of the central authorities.  
 In terms of terrorism related issues, different bodies of government 
contribute to the policy establishment and application procedures. Within the central 
structure, intelligence agencies and security apparatuses such as military and law 
enforcement bodies join in the decision-making procedure. In the structure of 
embassies, personnel from other parts of the government can be appointed as agents 
and facilitators of co-operation. Intelligence, law enforcement and military attaches 
perform as agents of co-operation in terrorism related issues by contributing to the 
formation of policy and application of strategies. Involvement of the diplomatic 
head with terrorism related issues also constitutes an essential role in especially vital 
problems (Pillar, 2001:75). Consequently, the diplomatic head acts both as co-
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ordinator of relevant parties that take presence at the embassy and also as an 
important figure in corresponding with his/her counterparts.  
 We should also touch on the nature of diplomacy in terrorism related issues. 
States tend to focus on establishing ad hoc, short-term bilateral co-operative 
endeavours in political issues. Arguments of several authorities in the terrorism field 
also prove this theoretical contention. According to Pillar (2001: 75), ―The 
counterterrorist diplomacy that matters most is bilateral‖, but some effective 
cooperation with three or more states can happen where diplomacy plays ―only a 
supporting role to practical police or intelligence work.‖ Pillar (2001: 76-79) also 
argues that multilateral diplomacy helps counter-terrorism in three ways: by 
providing a formal structure; reinforcing an international norm against the use of 
terrorism; and providing common standards for counter-terrorism. As another 
authority, Nye (2003:11) argues that ―Intelligence sharing and police co-operation 
are often the most effective front line of counter-terrorism.‖ and ―because of the 
sensitivity of sources and dangers of disclosure, much of this work will be carried 
out in a series of bilateral arrangements‖. As observed, there is an emphasis on the 
importance of bilateral relationships in the fight against terrorism. In that respect, 
there is a significant responsibility of embassies and their agents for establishing co-
operative endeavours with their counterparts in terrorism related issues. 
 Intelligence, as the second kind of response alternative, involves the 
gathering of information. Gathered intelligence is used for a variety of purposes, 
ranging from policy formation to police or military operations. Consequently, 
intelligence is related to almost all relevant fields of counter-terrorism. Policy 
makers, military and law enforcement agencies are the most essential buyers of 
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intelligence. Consequently gathered intelligence may lead to very crucial policy 
decisions, or to a vital military or law enforcement operation. Intelligence gathering 
and sharing has a vital importance in cooperation against transnational terrorism. As 
transnational terrorist groups have capabilities to establish networked structures 
supported by advanced communication abilities and technology, sharing intelligence 
regarding their structure and intentions between countries may carry crucial 
importance. Timely shared intelligence can prevent attacks and save lives.   
Gathering intelligence may fall into the responsibility of different 
organizations. While some states have a distinct intelligence agency, some states 
place this agency within police organizations. In some cases there may be both an 
individual independent intelligence agency and also an intelligence department 
within the police.  
In fact ‗intelligence‘ and ‗police work‘ complete each other. That is why 
they are pronounced together most of the time. When people talk about intelligence 
and law enforcement in terrorism related issues they refer to the processes of 
gathering information by intelligence agencies and apprehension of terrorists or 
preventing terrorist plots by police forces. That is probably why Nye (2003:11) 
argues that intelligence sharing and police co-operation is often the most effective 
front line of counter-terrorism. 
 As a third response alternative, the usage of military force in terrorism 
related issues depends on special characteristics. It is not the first option that comes 
to mind. According to Pillar (2001: 97) military force may be used in hostage taking 
situations, retaliatory strikes following a terrorist attack, or as a pre-emptive strike.  
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 Terrorist groups today have considerable financial strength. A sound 
counter-terrorism strategy should involve cutting off their incomes. Consequently, 
economic sanctions play another important part in fighting against terrorism. 
Law enforcement, as the last option of response, is an umbrella term, which 
includes agencies such as prosecution, police, customs, immigration services, 
probation services and other agencies that have similar tasks. In terrorism related 
issues, the police are generally the most referred to law enforcement agency because 
of their responsibility for fighting against terrorism. I would like to briefly clarify 
why the police is an important cooperation actor here. The police, as a force for 
establishing order within the borders of a country, have natural domestic 
responsibility in the fight against all kinds of crimes including terrorism. In past 
decades, the world has observed the emergence of cross-border crimes such as 
narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. This new trend in crimes also 
urged police forces to take a greater presence in the international arena. 
Consequently, the police forces of a country often no longer work only within the 
borders of that country. The presence of police in the international arena has been 
increasing for a long time. And it seems that its presence will continue in the future. 
 Careful investigation of police work on the international level easily shows 
that the police take a role in the fight against terrorism in diplomacy, intelligence 
and law enforcement/intelligence fields. For a long time, appointing police liaison 
officers to the embassies, especially in the narcotics field, has been a common 
practice by most countries, so the police liaison position also carries a diplomatic 
role. This study reveals that, especially after 9/11, this liaison method has become an 
important tool for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.  
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 The police are naturally related to all law enforcement functions and 
intelligence. Consequently, on international level investigations, the relationship 
between police forces and other relevant law enforcement bodies such as 
prosecution, the court system and the probation system is vital for effective 
administration and prosecution of cases. The police also have intelligence gathering 
capabilities, so they are both an important provider of intelligence as well as a 
partner for other intelligence services in the system. Lastly, the police may take an 
investigative role in economic crimes. The police are an active contributor in the 
fight against terrorism in the economic field.  
 Based on the given brief introduction about actors, this study will divide 
actors into two main groups: realist and liberal forms of actors. This division is 
essential because as liberalism and realism have significant differences, actors 
representing those theoretical approaches also reflect them. It should be emphasized 
that I investigated the police both in realist actors and also in liberal actors according 
to various forms of police performance in different fields of activity. Although the 
police can be considered a sub-state entity and thus an actor of liberal understanding, 
their increasing role in diplomatic circles such as employment at Embassies and 
their increasing power in international counter-terrorism circles against transnational 
terrorism as representative of state policies directed me to place the police also in the 
section of realist actors. In fact this choice emanates from observing the evolution of 
police work as a response to transnational threats, and especially terrorism.  
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2.3.1.1 Realist Forms of Actors 
 The central actor in realist understandings of international security 
cooperation and conflict is the state itself, as the individual player in a billiard-ball 
approach. States execute their international roles through a variety of actors. The 
first one is diplomacy, which is performed by ministries of foreign affairs or home 
offices. Embassies as part of that mechanism constitute a form of realist actor of the 
state. Diplomacy, with the contribution of all other relevant sections mentioned 
below decides the overall state policy and manages it.  
Secondly, states rely on military power to protect their existence and unity, 
therefore military means represent an important dimension of the state especially in 
a realist understanding. If an assault takes place from outside of a country‘s borders, 
then the state employs its military means as a traditional mean of security.  The 
problem here arises: is the ability of military forces, which is organized to meet a 
conventional threat, proper to meet a terrorist threat? In fact, usage of military 
means is only one of a variety of tools in today`s counter terrorism strategies, which 
has already been summarized under five titles as diplomacy, military power, 
intelligence, law enforcement and financial sanctions. The importance of the 
military will endure without any doubt, however the changing characteristics of 
terrorism reveal that military force may be becoming obsolete in meeting today‘s 
new terrorism due to the changes in the nature of threat. Narratives about new 
terrorism clearly demonstrates that terrorist organizations today may have a 
networked structure with an ability to disperse all around the world, a tendency to 
use technology in structuring and communication and ability to survive without state 
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support. All these new characteristics of terrorism naturally make it hard for military 
forces to deal with terrorist groups. 
Intelligence is another important tool that is used by states to counter 
terrorism by getting information about hostile intentions and plans against 
themselves. Based on intelligence, states evaluate the threats, take necessary 
measures and act in accordance to the quality and reliability of the information. 
Therefore intelligence plays a vital role in shaping diplomacy, military planning and 
other relevant state policies.  
Financial measures, as another response method against terrorism, have 
always been an international tool used by states and their diplomatic channels. 
Especially powerful states may employ sanctions or provide credits to other 
countries according to their behaviour on terrorism issues. Therefore financial 
measures are tools that diplomatic entities of states employ in terrorism related 
issues according to their interests. 
Lastly, law enforcement has been mentioned in the previous section as a 
response alternative against transnational terrorism. Law enforcement can be 
accepted as a domestic structure in general. When the activities of domestic law 
enforcement entities reach an international level, standard judicial rules are launched 
by judicial authorities principally to continue investigative and legal procedures in 
other countries. Although this principle continues to exist, we can readily observe 
that police activities today have a clear capacity to establish links and practices to 
cooperate with their partners in other countries, such as information sharing, 
cooperation building and training, to meet the transnational threats. Several of these 
police practices are taking place under the umbrella structure of diplomatic entities. 
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For example, most police liaison officers, tasked to cooperate with their counterparts 
in other countries, are stationed within their respective Embassies. Without a doubt, 
the work and activities of those liaison officers are performed within the limits of 
state policies on threats. Therefore, although the police as a traditional domestic law 
enforcement entity theoretically can not be counted as a realist actor, their placement 
and activities in diplomatic channels forced me to locate several police initiatives 
within the realist framework. I accept this situation as an evolution of 
transnationalization of response activities to meet transnational threats.  
As another issue, although international organizations are mostly linked to   
liberal thought, police forces contributing to International Organizations such as the 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), undoubtedly present official 
opinions of their states about terrorism. I think this is in harmony with realists‘ 
approach to benefitting from international institutions to take decisions and set 
policies according to their standpoints.  
 
2.3.1.2 Liberal Forms of Actors 
 The power of liberal understanding lies in its vision to give credit to actors 
other than states. Therefore, while a realist understanding may have problems in 
identifying the emergence of terrorist groups as non-state international actors; a 
liberal understanding presents us a richer image. The same proposal is also valid for 
response actors against terrorism. While a realist approach focuses on the primacy of 
state actors, a liberal approach provides us a wider spectrum, by recognizing non-
state and sub-state entities as international actors.  
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 First of all, we should mention institutions. Although institutions are created 
by states, they act with an ability to operate individually. The United Nations is the 
prime example of an international institution in the fight against terrorism in a 
widely populated world of institutions such as NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization), the G-8, and the European Union. For this reason, in this thesis the 
main focus will be on the UN and on cooperative police entities such as Interpol and 
the European Police Office (Europol). All those organizations try to establish a 
ground for cooperation against terrorism.  
 Conventions and regimes are other entities which represent individual sets of 
legal or agreed upon rules and regulations which are created to regularize certain 
issue areas. Also, there are regimes which regularize the areas of cooperation 
between countries. The judicial cooperation regime can be proposed here as a prime 
example of a regime, which regularizes the rules of contact on judicial cooperation 
such as extradition, letters of rogatory and so on.  
 The idea of sub-state entities as international actors also takes its roots from 
liberal understandings. I focus in this study on police organizations as sub-state 
entities and their international counter-terrorism cooperation initiatives which reflect 
national interests and security.  
Liberal assumptions about the importance of non-state actors and individuals 
also presents valuable insights in understanding the establishment of response 
initiatives against terrorism. For example, employment of private security initiatives 
for anti-terrorism protection has a long history. The existence of think-tanks on 
understanding terrorism is also not new. Examining the scope and expansion of such 
entities will shed light on the significance of liberal actors against terrorism.  
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Regarding this study, I see the police as an important sub-state liberal entity 
to meet the transnational terrorism threat. While several terrorist organizations are 
transnationalizing, they seem to succeed in this process either by using existing local 
connections and structures or by creating new local ones around the world. Such 
globally growing terrorist networks also drive local law enforcement bodies to look 
for connections with others around the world.  
Consequently, the police, as part of a state`s domestic security architecture, 
seem to play international roles today. Looking at the history of response to 
terrorism reveals that this is not a new application in fact. As will be explained in the 
following parts of this study, history shows that police cooperation was also 
performed as an international cooperation instrument during the Anarchist wave. In 
the years following the peak of the Anarchist movement, international police 
cooperation against terrorism was kept to a limited scope in terrorism related issues.  
However we see that the role of police forces against terrorism on 
international territory is again growing bigger and more important in recent years, 
due to changes in the nature and realities of terrorism. Not only national level but 
also local level police forces of different countries have a need today to speak with 
their counterparts in other countries to understand the threat, prevent attacks, and 
investigate cases. Therefore, police forces would like to have an independent ability 
to establish international links beyond the diplomatic channels of the state.  
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2.3.2 Forms of Cooperative Security Relations 
 Forms of security relations, which are state-centric and multi-centric forms, 
will constitute the second dimension of the framework. The reason for choosing 
forms of security cooperative relations as a dimension of my table is based on my 
observations that realist and liberal actors do not strictly follow expected 
relationship patterns based on the theories they may have emanated from. As 
exemplified before, the police as a sub-state entity may nevertheless involve state-
centric forms of relationships.  
In fact, there are different ways of theoretically classifying cooperation 
forms. For example Milner (1992:469) proposes that cooperation can be achieved in 
three ways: tacit, negotiated or imposed. Tacit cooperation occurs ―without 
communication or explicit agreement‖ because ―the expectations of the actors 
converge‖; negotiated cooperation is accepted as ―the most common type of 
cooperation‖ with ―an explicit bargaining process‖; and lastly imposed cooperation 
occurs with the forcing of the stronger party by adjusting its policies and realizing 
mutual gains (Milner, 1992: 469). As another example, Oye also makes a 
classification about kinds of cooperation. According to Oye ―states can realize 
common interests through tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multilateral 
negotiation, and the creation of international regimes‖ (Oye, 1985: 1). Those forms 
represent the theoretical approaches, which compose their roots. Consequently, a 
logical way to investigate forms of cooperation is to create a classification based on 
realist and liberal assumptions.  
However one should also keep in mind that differences between these two 
theoretical approaches do not mean that they cannot co-exist in the same form at the 
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same time. For example, usage of power and influence is not an isolated 
phenomenon that only belongs to realism-influenced forms. Nobody can deny that 
powerful actors always have strength in international institutions and organizations, 
which are liberalism-influenced forms. Consequently, while studying realist and 
liberal versions of cooperative forms, the interaction between approaches should not 
be ignored.  
 
2.3.2.1 State-Centric Forms 
International or interstate relations refer to the interactions that take place 
between unitary states, and which are controlled and directed by particular foreign 
relations organs of states. Realist forms of cooperation focus more on realist 
understandings, which are power, relative gains and security issues. In this 
approach, domestic politics can have effects on international politics only through 
foreign policy channels (Nye and Keohane, 1971-a: 721).   
 The most basic form of establishing cooperation is bilateral. Relevant 
authorities of two entities arrange regular initiatives and structures to discuss and 
decide certain issues. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassies and Diplomats may be 
actors in establishing such relations. Sub-state entities also develop bilateral 
relations with their counterparts. Police organizations may perform bilateral 
relations in different ways and methods. Establishing direct meetings between 
headquarters at several levels is one way of succeeding bilateral relations. Focus 
area of this study, employment of police liaison officers to other countries, 
represents an important kind of bilateral relations between police organizations. In 
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terrorism related issues, the responsibilities of police liaison officers most of the 
time may come across with the responsibilities of Embassies. Cooperation of police 
forces with partners on terrorism issues carries more meanings than solely 
cooperating on crimes and investigation procedures, because the significance of 
terrorism issues is quite high for national interest. Therefore when police liaison 
officers deal with terrorism cases, they function within the state-centric format of 
relations.  
 
2.3.2.2 Multi-Centric Forms    
 As explored in the theoretical framework section at the beginning of this 
thesis, transnational relations and actors emerged as new phenomenons in the 
international relations. Actors other than central foreign policy organs and their 
relations beyond state boundaries expanded the borders of the international relations. 
As crime and terrorism became transnationalized, we also observed 
transnationalization response initiatives of organizations responsible to fight with 
them. Therefore, this study mainly investigates how terrorism as a threat and 
policing as a response is going transnational.         
Beside transnational relations, another important concept related to this issue 
is global governance. We have met with this term during 1990s. The term clarifies 
the effect of globalization on governance and international relations. Global 
governance implies ―a much looser and less threatening concept of collective 
organization and regulation without coercion" (Slaughter, 2004: 9). Global 
governance explains profound changes in the world including global networks, 
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which is another important theme of this study.  According to Slaughter rise of 
global policy networks is a major element of global governance. (Slaughter, 2004: 9)  
Slaughter argues that there are three main shifts in world affairs based on the 
impact of globalization. These shifts are from national to global, from government to 
governance and from unitary state to disaggregated state (Slaughter, 2004: 12). The 
concept of disaggregated state is important for the purposes of this study. 
Disaggregated state implies "the rising need for and capacity of different domestic 
government institutions to engage in activities beyond their borders, often with their 
foreign counterparts" (Slaughter, 2004: 12). This concept underlines the fact, clearly 
explained by Slaughter, that states are still crucial actors but they do not relate each 
other only through the Foreign Office (Slaughter, 2004: 5).  According to Slaughter 
three new channels, regulatory, judicial and legislative channels are employed by 
domestic institutions without involving with Foreign Office (Slaughter, 2004: 5).  
Slaughter argues that interactions of those entities can be labelled as networks. 
Slaughter classifies those networks according to their forms (vertical and horizontal 
networks), their functions (information, enforcement and harmonization networks) 
and their scope (bilateral, plurilateral, regional and global) (Slaughter, 2004: 131). 
Slaughter also argues that interaction may take place between government networks 
and nongovernment actors of private and nonprofit sectors on a formal or informal 
basis (Slaughter, 2004:131-132).  
According to Slaughter government networks creates convergence and 
informed divergence, exports regulatory forms, distils and disseminates credible 
information, assume the use soft law (international guidance and non-legal 
instruments) more than hard law (treaties and other international agreements),  
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creates informed divergence which creates diverging fortuitously and deliberately, 
improves compliance, facilitates enforcement by harnessing the power of national 
government institution, enables capacity building and enhances cooperation 
(Slaughter, 2004:171-195). 
We should also emphasise the increasing importance of Slaughter's proposal 
of disaggregated world and role of government institutions in the transitional sphere. 
In this new trend, there is not need for foreign offices in establishing international 
relations. Slaughter summarises this situation as follows: "Networks of government 
officials - police investigators, financial regulators, even judges and legislators- 
increasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to combat global crime 
and address common problems on a global scale." (Slaughter, 2004:1) Slaughter also 
argues that law enforcement officials share information for preventing terrorist 
threats (Slaughter, 2004: 2).  
 This approach stresses issues such as information and network. According to 
Slaughter the important point in network understanding is that "…individual 
government institutions are interacting with their counterparts either abroad or above 
them, alongside more traditional state-to-state interactions." (Slaughter, 2004:14) 
Slaughter also argues that "Networked threats require a networked response." 
(Slaughter, 2004: 2) And for facilitating such networks, information is the biggest 
tool. Without having knowledge about the problem, trends, examples and responses, 
it is impossible to create strategies and methods. In that respect information 
gathering in networked structure is vital for government institutions today.  
In terms of this thesis, it is possible to observe that numerous interactions 
between police forces are conducted within a network structure in today‘s 
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disaggregated world. The term ―transnational police cooperation‖ can be seen as the 
model expression for describing the contemporary relationship style between police 
organizations as sub-state actors. Part of the transnational police cooperation scheme 
is the employment of police liaison officers between countries.  
It is quite obvious that transnational relations is increasing and spreading in 
today‘s world. This trend is also valid for state entities that counter and fight 
terrorism. Because transnational relations permit interactions between sub-state 
actors without the control of foreign office, it provides an atmosphere for informal 
and flexible relationships. In that respect, understanding the nature of transnational 
relations is vital for the purposes of this study because the main question of this 
study focuses on if any changes take place between states to meet the changes in the 
threat environment. Then we will be able to have an understanding about if states or 
other entities are adapting.  
 
2.4 Framework of Cooperative Methods 
The framework presented in Table-1 below will be used as a guiding pattern 
in the following parts of this thesis. Although understanding about the general terms 
has been delineated above, each part of the table will be introduced briefly.  
 
2.4.1 Realist/State-Centric Domain 
Realist centric domain covers realist actors and their state-centric-
international relations. States establish special branches such as foreign offices or 
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ministries of foreign affairs and embassies to establish international relations with 
other states and countries. Those entities represent the state in relations with its 
counterparts. Another function of those entities is their umbrella role for sub-state 
policies and entities. For example, sub-state entities appoint their agents in other 
countries to the embassies. So, embassies do not only cover personnel of foreign 
affairs, but also function as a home for other entities. 
 
Table-1: Framework of Traditional Cooperative Methods 
 
 
 Forms of Cooperative Security Interactions 
 
State-Centric 
Interactions 
(Formal relations 
formulated by central 
state organs) 
Multi-Centric 
Interactions 
(Formal/informal 
relations formulated by a 
mix of state, sub-state or 
non-state entities) 
 
 
A
c 
t 
o
r 
s 
Liberal Forms of 
Actors and Practice 
(International 
organizations, 
conventions, regimes) 
 
 
Liberal/State-Centric 
Realm 
 
 
Liberal/ Multi-Centric 
Realm 
Realist Forms of 
Actors and Practice 
(Diplomacy, formal 
bodies) 
 
 
 
 
Realist/State-Centric  
Realm 
 
 
 
Realist/ Multi-Centric 
Realm 
 
The realist/state-centric domain traditionally contains diplomacy, which 
represents a state‘s overall approach on an issue within a realist paradigm. 
Diplomacy is the establishment of international relations between states through the 
channel of a foreign office. Naturally, usage of diplomacy by states in terrorism 
related cases is common and vital. States reflect their approaches and understandings 
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through diplomacy. However, differences of interests between states may negatively 
influence cooperative initiatives between states. Only when states‘ mutual interests 
overlap in cooperation against terrorism, then diplomacy may produce benefit. 
 
2.4.2 Liberal/State-Centric Domain 
The liberal/state-centric domain is constituted by international organizations, 
conventions and regimes, which are created by states but operate as individual 
entities. Entities in the liberal/state-centric domain enable states to pronounce their 
interests internationally. Therefore states give importance to entities in this domain 
to influence international politics in the name of their interests.  
 
2.4.3 The Liberal/Multi-Centric Domain 
 This domain covers liberal actors and multi-centric relationships. This area is 
far from the influence of state actors. Traditionally this area is constituted by non-
governmental organizations, individuals, and private entities.  
 Entities in this area may have an interest in terrorism issues; however their 
role in shaping state behaviors and agendas has always been accepted as limited in 
the past, especially in the terrorism field. This approach has changed somewhat with 
the emergence of transnational terrorist groups as actors with an ability to influence 
the state-dominated international relations field.  
While terrorist groups emerged as non-state groups in this realm, this study 
will look at whether more proper countering actors have also emerged. It is possible 
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to classify several groups under this domain. First of all we can talk about Police 
Associations and policing focused initiatives, and secondly we can consider the 
private security companies or entities. As will be examined in detail below, several 
private entities today are following terrorist trends, observing their internet 
connections and evaluating that information. As an interesting development, it is 
understood from examples that those private entities may provide such information 
to official circles for evaluation. 
 
2.4.4 The Realist/Multi-Centric Domain 
 This domain covers realist actors but within multi-centric relationships. 
Although examples exist in the history, the involvement of state actors with multi-
centric relationship forms against terrorism has not been common. To exemplify in 
the historical context, we can mention here the employment of police officers to 
other states during the Anarchist wave. Also, employment of the agents of private 
entities in other countries has also been observed during the Anarchist wave. 
Interestingly, while, those initiatives during the Anarchist wave did not survive long 
to become customary tools in the fight against terrorism, more recent changes in the 
nature of terrorism seem to be bringing about the rebirth of such tactics in today‘s 
world. For example local authorities, suffering from terrorism, are looking to 
establish international links to increase their efficiency by bypassing national 
authorities, which are theoretically responsible for establishing such contacts. This 
can be observed in the case of the New York Police Department, which deploys its 
own police liaison officers to other countries. The emergence of private entities and 
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think-tanks to follow terrorist activities and report their findings to state entities have 
also been observed. In the next chapters, first terrorism as the primary threat will be 
examined. Then response will be explored based on the framework set up in this 
chapter. To have a better understanding of how cooperation governance has been 
evolving, there is a need to conduct an in-depth analysis of briefly explained 
domains. Especially the hybrid domains, such as the realist-multi-centric domain, 
deserve special attention, due to ongoing and spectacular interactions taking place 
there.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THREAT AND RESPONSE 
 
 
 
 In this Chapter, I will first focus on a definition and history of terrorism. The 
aim in narrating the history of terrorism is to show the evolution of terrorism from 
its emergence to how it became a transnational phenomenon. Then I will investigate 
the evolution of response methods to terrorism and the changing nature of response 
alternatives to meet the threat. This historical account is important to have an 
understanding about what has changed after 9/11, especially in terms of the 
emergence of response options to a threat which represents a highly transnational 
character. While giving brief information about those issues, similarities between 
Anarchism and today‘s transnational terrorism are also examined. 
 
3.1 Key Issues in Studying Terrorism  
 Studying terrorism is a complicated field. Basic difficulties of studying 
terrorism take root in the inability to generate a universal understanding about it. 
One man's terrorist may still be another man's freedom fighter. Thus, terrorism can 
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be labelled as a subjective and value-laden phenomenon. This character of terrorism 
creates problems when trying to construct a universal understanding and definition 
about it. In fact, this problem presents itself as the most important issue, followed by 
the issues of actors, who are in a responsible position on international grounds to 
counter terrorism at various levels, such as politicians, diplomats, and bureaucrats, 
including law enforcement officials. The inability to come to a common 
understanding naturally creates difficulty not only for establishing the definition of 
terrorism but also for constructing a history of it. Therefore special attention should 
be paid to creating a coherent definition or at least a set of characteristics to define 
what terrorism is. Then a sound historical account of terrorism can be established on 
this understanding. 
   
3.2 Definition of Terrorism 
 Differences in terrorism definitions may be observed based on the person or 
authority who defines it. A terrorism reader should keep in mind that those 
definitions are constructed according to the interests and priorities of the defining 
person or entity. Basically there may be three kinds of endeavours to define 
terrorism. A scholarly academic definition of terrorism aims to find out general 
characteristics of terrorism based on investigated cases, realities and research. It is 
possible to argue that there may be various scholarly academic definitions of 
terrorism based on the preferences and research field of the scholar. While 
sociological definitions focus on the sociological causes of terrorism, political 
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approaches mainly investigate the issue from a political perspective and basically 
focus on the effects of terrorism on politics and vice versa 
A state definition of terrorism reflects how that specific state perceives 
terrorism.  Based on perceptions reflected in the definition, states design 
punishments, and protective strategies with an aim to preserving their own 
existence. The literature on terrorism reveals that there may be even differences 
about the definitions of terrorism by different entities within a single state, e.g. 
definitional differences of the USA's several official authorities (Hoffman, 2006:31). 
In terms of international relations, definition of terrorism by a state is important 
because it characterizes the international behaviour of that state on terrorism matters.    
A third classification can be named as definitions of international bodies, 
organizations or authorities. For the field of international relations, it is very 
important to have an internationally accepted or agreed upon definition of terrorism. 
However, there has not been great success in building such a universal definition. 
The United Nations is still working at producing such a definition. International 
success for producing such a common definition has been attained by regional 
organizations such as the European Union in recent years. As will be explored when 
examining such regional endeavours, their definitions do not represent a worldwide 
consensus and may be controversial. 
The value-laden character of defining terrorism represents itself as another 
difficulty to reaching a common definition. The saying of one man`s terrorist is 
another man`s freedom fighter is the most renowned representation of this character.  
The information provided above reveals that it has not been possible to 
produce a universally acceptable terrorism definition worldwide. Being aware of the 
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difficulty in establishing an acceptable definition, several scholars have employed 
another method to define what terrorism means by focusing on listing the 
characteristics of terrorism. In fact, this approach takes its roots from the perception 
that terrorism is basically a tactic.  Employing such a method may be helpful to 
avoid the definitional dilemmas. Pronouncing Combs and Whittaker as examples of 
this approach seems to be proper. According to Combs, there are four crucial 
components of terrorism, which are: acts of violence to influence an audience, 
creating fear, existence of innocent victims, and political purposes (Combs, 1999: 
8). Another scholar, Whittaker, summarizes the main characteristics of terrorism as 
having a political aim, violence, creating psychological effects beyond the 
immediate victims or target, existence of an organization, and perpetration by a sub 
national group or non-state entity (Whittaker, 2007: 9).    
 
3.3 History of Terrorism and Response  
 Analogous to defining terrorism, creating a history of terrorism is not also an 
easy task. In fact these two issues are highly interconnected, because creating a 
history depends on what you understand of it. Therefore, it is also possible to find 
out differences among studies that focus on the history of terrorism. There are 
different ways of narrating the history of terrorism. One way of investigating the 
history of terrorism is examining the developments in a linear narrative format. 
Arranging groups based on kinds of terrorism such as revolutionary, left wing, right 
wing and religious terrorism is another way of classification based on historical 
accounts. As another recent example, Rapoport has presented a different approach, 
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which focuses on periodical classification of modern terrorism beginning with the 
Anarchist movement. According to Rapoport, modern terrorism starts with 
Anarchism in the 19
th
 century, while other previous examples are called pre-modern 
terrorism (Rapoport, 2006: xxviii). Rapoport then divides modern terrorism into four 
waves, which are the Anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave, the new left wave and 
the religious wave ( Rapoport, 2006: xxviii, Rapoport, 2004: 46).  
As understanding the response to terrorism, and particularly police response 
to terrorism, is the main focus of this study, developments in the response field will 
also be explored by focusing on trends and strategies. Rapoport`s claim that modern 
terrorism starts with Anarchism is accepted as a guiding principle for this thesis in 
terms of investigating the interaction between threat and response. Throughout the 
next sections, the evolution of terrorism and response initiatives will be examined. 
This baseline investigation will be particularly helpful in trying to understand what 
happened after 9/11 in terms of today‘s new initiatives to meet the transnational 
terrorism threat.  
 
3.3.1 First Examples of Terrorism 
 Several terrorism experts argue that the first examples of terrorism have been 
found in the ancient times. Rapoport labels those examples as "pre-modern terror" 
(Rapoport, 2006: xxviii). According to Rapoport, the Thugs, Assassins and Zealots-
Sicaari represent the first examples of terrorism (Rapoport, 1984: 658). All of those 
three groups are associated with a religion: Thugs are Hindu, Assassins are Muslim, 
and Zealots are Jews. Laqueur adds militant secret societies in China to the list 
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(1977, 9). Mob violence before the American Revolution, and Ku Klux Klan 
activities are also touched on as early examples of terrorism (Rapoport, 2006: 
xxviii). 
 
3.3.2 The French Revolution 
The 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries have hosted important events that changed the 
course of history, such as the French Revolution, the Enlightenment, and the 
Industrial Revolution. Those events also influenced the emergence of terrorism in 
the following centuries.  
The term of terror emerged during the French Revolution. The period 
between 1793 and 1794 was called as "Reign of Terror" (Weinberg, 2008: 3), 
because of the repression of the ruling power. Terror was the governing method of 
the Jacobeans and their allies against those who were the opponents of revolution. 
This is an interesting point because the term of terror was first used for a method of 
government during this era. Contrary to the initial usage, the term of terror would 
have been used as the name of a method employed against governments in the 
following years.   
The struggle between forces to gain power dominates the French Revolution.  
Ivianski argues that the Thermidor Reaction, the removal of Robespierre from 
power, was the starting point for both revolutionary undergrounds and also for 
modern counter-revolution.  (Ivianski, 1980: 340). Therefore the French revolution 
and the following period seem to attract scholars who focus on terrorism. 
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Nationalist movements became very important in shaping politics after the 
French Revolution and the industrial revolution. The French Revolution increased 
nationalist aspirations; consequently having a state became an important ideal for 
every nation. Employment of terrorism became a popular strategy among groups 
seeking national liberation.   
The industrial revolution also played an influential role in the emergence of 
terrorist groups motivated against capitalist and colonialist powers. Undoubtedly, a 
Marxist understanding provided a significant theoretical ground for those groups 
with revolutionary ambitions, including those with terrorist tendencies.  
 
3.3.3 Emergence of Modern Terrorism 
 There are different interpretations about when terrorism emerged in today's 
meaning, which implies usage of violence with an aim to challenge state authority 
by creating fear among people. Rapoport uses the term ―modern terrorism‖ for the 
late 19
th
 century Anarchist movement to imply the emergence of terrorism in today`s 
meaning (Rapoport, 2006: xxviii, Rapoport, 2004: 47). Laqueur on the other hand 
uses the term ―systemic terrorism‖ for the same period (Laqueur, 1977:11).  
Although Weinberg divides terrorist violence in this first wave of terrorism 
as Russian revolutionaries, Anarchists and nationalists according to their pursued 
goals, he also mentions that those ideas and groups fed on each other (Weinberg, 
2008, 29). As a supportive argument, White mentions that the methods developed by 
19
th
 century Anarchists ―were subsequently adopted by nationalistic and ideological 
movements‖ (White, 2002: 149). By keeping in mind the diversity of different 
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labelling for those groups, usage of Anarchism and Anarchist groups as a starting 
point seems to be more common.  
The Anarchist movement played a leading role for the spread of violence 
throughout the world in the late 19
th
 century. It is argued that Anarchism emerged as 
an ideology or theory then turned into a social movement in the nineteenth century 
(Jensen, 2004:118, Aydinli: 2008, 904). The success of the Paris Commune in 1871 
played a contributing role to the Anarchist understanding (Jensen, 2004: 123). 
Anarchists were very active and influential all over the world especially during the 
1890s, which were called as the ―Golden Age of Assasination‖ and during which 
assassins were moving ―easily across international borders‖ (Rapoport, 2004: 52).   
Anarchist thinkers and leaders such as Mikhail Bakunin, Sergey Nechaev, 
Peter Kropotkin and Johan Most were a few names who were leading figures of the 
Anarchist movement.  The propaganda of the deed approach, which can be 
summarized as an understanding that real propaganda can be achieved only by 
actions and that violence can be used for educating the masses, were spreading 
among Anarchist groups. 
The most important group pioneering Anarchist ideals at that time, was the 
Narodnaya Volya in Russia. It was established in 1878 with an aim to attack 
Tsardom and the Tsar‘s family, and indeed managed to kill several officials and as 
well as Tsar Alexander II (White, 2002: 156).  
After the attack on Tsar Alexander II in March 1881, an Anarchist 
conference was held in London, which seems to be an important turning point for 
the spread of violence throughout the world (Jensen, 2004:129).From  the1890s until 
1901 was the period of regicide and Anarchists assassinated quite a lot of leaders in 
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Europe, for example President Sadi Carnot of France in 1894, Prime Minister 
Antonio Canovas of Spain in 1897, the Empress Elizabeth of Austria in 1898, and 
King Humbert of Italy in 1900 (Jensen, 2004:134). 
The Anarchist movement also reached to the United States, where the 
Haymarket bombing took place in 1886 by an unknown but probably an Anarchist 
assailant (Jensen, 2004: 132). Another important attack occurred in America in 1901 
when the President of the United States, William McKinley, was assassinated 
(Rapoport, 2004: 46, Jensen, 2004:134). It is believed that mass journalism was an 
important factor in the spread of Anarchism (Jensen, 2004: 140, Aydinli, 2008: 910).  
In addition to those attacks on leaders, there were numerous bombings and 
attacks that targeted civilians, such as bombings of cafes and other places, including 
the Opera House bombing in Barcelona, which resulted in the death of civilians, 
including children (Jensen, 2004:134). One of the most important characteristics of 
those attacks mentioned by Jensen is that the attacks were occurring ―in several 
countries simultaneously, which magnified their psychological impact and made 
them seem part of one vast terrorist conspiracy‖ (Jensen, 2004:134-135). Jensen 
implies that the Anarchists were supporting each other worldwide but on the other 
hand governments were also taking into consideration what was happening in other 
countries to compose their reactions (Jensen, 2004: 135).  
While Anarchism lost its influence over time, Jensen argues that there is a 
strong belief that Anarchism was associated with a successful conspiracy because 
both police and non-Anarchists distorted and exaggerated the real size of Anarchism 
(Jensen, 2004: 139-140). As an alternative approach, Aydinli argues that Anarchists 
―failed to organize effectively at a transnational level, and thus to maintain a 
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sustainable, cohesive, and adaptive mechanism capable of carrying out their struggle 
against the state system.‖ (Aydinli, 2008: 904). 
Britain`s rule of Ireland was another issue that fed into the emergence of 
terrorism in the 19
th
 century. Irish groups started to use terrorism through the end of 
the 19
th
 century.  For example the Irish Republican Brotherhood was one of such 
groups at that time. Those groups started a terrorism wave, which has been 
continuing until today, although differences exist in the exact groups and the 
methods they use. Irish groups initiated a bombing wave in the 1880s by targeting 
big cities of England such as London, Liverpool and Glasgow (Hoffman, 2006: 10). 
According to Hoffman, Irish groups ―were among the first to recognize the 
importance of establishing a foreign base…‖ (Hoffman, 2006: 10). 
Before the First World War, terrorism was also used for gathering national 
liberation and freedom. This new trend influenced two Empires, namely the 
Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian. The Ottoman Empire faced attacks by 
Armenian Groups from its Eastern parts (Hoffman, 2006: 11, Weinberg, 2008: 31). 
Attacks against Turkish authorities from the Balkans were initiated by IMRO – the 
Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Laqueur, 1977: 13, Hoffman, 
2006:11, Weinberg, 2008: 31-32).On the other hand, threats to Austria-Hungary 
came from Serbian and Bosnian organizations such as Narodna Obrana, The Union 
of Death, Crna Ruka, Black Hand and Young Bosnians. (Hoffman, 2006:11-13). 
 During the 1930s, repressive governance, fascism and communism represent 
important issues for terrorism scholars. Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany and 
Stalin in Russia were the leaders of repressive administrations. Hoffman argues that 
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practices of those leaders can be accepted as repression and terror by states against 
their own citizens (Hoffman, 2006:14-15).  
 
3.3.4 After the 2nd World War 
After the 2
nd
 World War, we observe a gradual spread of terrorism almost all 
over the world. Nationalism and colonialism were still reasons to utilize terrorism. 
As another factor, the Cold War also facilitated the spread of terrorism. 
Consequently, ideological differences became one of the main reasons for the 
emergence of terrorism. Social problems such as poverty and cultural differences 
contributed to the rise of terrorism. Lastly, the importance of religion in utilizing 
terrorism has also increased over time.   
It is observed that terrorism has expanded around the world especially during 
the 1960s and 1970s, with different causes and characteristics. Therefore it may be 
logical to investigate terrorism based on geographical areas to present a global 
picture of the issue. Liberation and independence was an important aim for quite a 
lot of groups, especially in Asia, Africa and the Middle East after the 2
nd
 World 
War. According to Hoffman, usage of terrorism was important in the establishment 
of Israel, Kenya, Cyprus and Algeria (Hoffman, 2006:16). Radical Jewish groups of 
Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang are argued to have utilized terrorism in the 
establishment of the Israeli state. Until the 1960s, EOKA Ethniki Organosis 
Kypriakou Agonos, ―National Organization of Cypriot Struggle/Fighters‖ also used 
violence against the British army to urge them to leave the island of Cyprus 
(Hoffman, 2006: 53-57, Weinberg, 2008:35).   
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   The Algerian group FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale, or National 
Liberation Front) used terrorist tactics against France, one of the most famous 
examples of fighting for freedom and interdependence. Various Armenian Groups 
also emerged and targeted Turkish existence all around the world.  
  Latin America was a special location in terms of growing terrorism. 
Basically, colonialism, poverty, and political unrest were the main reasons of 
terrorism in Latin America. The Latin American experience was very important 
because of significant figures such as Marighella and Che Guevera. Marighella, a 
Brazilian, was the founder of urban terrorism. Che Guevera, an Argentinian, had a 
role in the Cuban Revolution with Castro. He is an important figure in establishing 
the theoretical framework of guerrilla warfare. Famous terrorist groups in Latin 
America were as follows: the Zapatas in Mexico, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the 
Sandinista Guerillas in Nicaragua, and the Shining Path in Peru.  
 The Middle East is another area that always has been open to violence and 
terrorism. The Palestinian problem, unrest between other Arab Countries, oil issue 
and western involvement in the area always feed terrorist movements in the region.  
 In Europe, left wing, separatist and right wing groups were very active 
especially during the 1970s and 1980s. Well-known left wing groups in Europe can 
be listed as follows: Direct Action in France, Communist Combat Cells in Belgium, 
the Red Army Fraction or Baader Meinhof Gang in Germany, the Red Brigades in 
Italy, 17 November in Greece, and Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left) in Turkey. Famous 
Separatist Groups are ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) in Spain and the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers‘ Party) in Turkey. There were also Neo-Fascist groups in 
especially Germany and Austria.  
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 In the United States varieties of terrorist groups have emerged such as the 
left-wing Weather Underground, as well as right-wing supremacist white and 
religious groups. 
 
3.3.5 Internationalization of Terrorism 
 The spread of terrorism worldwide also resulted in international activities of 
several groups which required international attention and reaction. Therefore, the 
term ‗international terrorism‘ requires explanation. There are significant questions 
about this term such as when terrorism becomes international and what international 
terrorism is. It is possible to observe different explanations about international 
terrorism. Mostly, international terrorism is believed to mean cross border actions of 
terrorist organizations. This definition argues that terrorist activities become 
international when a terrorist group established in one country operates in the 
territories of other countries. Such internationalization of terrorism is believed to 
have begun by the 1960s, when terrorist organizations gathered the ability to 
conduct attacks in other parts of the world beside their original country. As another 
issue, attacks in one country against foreigners also carry an international character. 
We can observe the emergence of new tactics and strategies, which accelerated the 
discussions about the internationalization of terrorism, such as hijackings, 
kidnappings, and state support of terrorism. Rapoport‘s proposal explains those 
changes more that revival of international terrorism by new left wing activities 
presented new realities such as international dimensions in target selection, groups 
conducting activities in other areas, attacking foreigners in their lands, teams 
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composed of different national groups, co-operation in attacks and new tactics such 
as hijacking, kidnapping, attacking embassies and committing bank robberies 
(Rapoport, 2003: 42-43). According to Hoffman (2006: 78) the emergence of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1960s facilitated the 
internationalization of terrorism because of its ―internationalist orientation‖ and ―by 
the early 1980s at least 40 terrorist groups‖ had learned from the PLO. 
According to Rapoport, cross border activities have happened throughout  
history, yet the most important international dimension is the existence of similar 
terrorist organizations in different countries at the same time with an ability to 
establish relationships with each other and also with other international actors 
(Rapoport, 2006: xxviii). Rapoport examines the international course of terrorist 
activities based on five actors: ―terrorist organizations; diaspora populations; states; 
sympathetic foreign publics; and, beginning with the second wave, supranational 
organizations‖ (Rapoport, 2004: 50). Although terrorist groups were generally 
operating in their respective countries in the years following World War II, we 
understand from the examples that some of them also began to operate across 
borders both in terms of active attacks and also for supportive arrangements. 
Consequently, usage of the term international terrorism spread after 1960s. 
The 1972 Munich Olympic attack and also several hijackings in the 
following period intensified the discussions about international terrorism. Growing 
mass communication, ―increased migration and travel, and new technologies for 
weapons systems‖ increased the likelihood of international terrorism and this trend 
continued in the 1980s as ―part of a long-term process of change‖ (Hurrell, 2002: 
198). 
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 During the 1980s, a new term, state supported terrorism, was popular. 
Accordingly, some states were supporting terrorist groups to operate according to 
their wills. Hoffman has labelled this phenomenon as ―covert or surrogate warfare‖, 
which implies activities conducted with the support of other states (Hoffman, 2006: 
17). 
 The terms narco-terrorism and gray area phenomenon were other issues that 
emerged in the 1990s. While narco-terrorism refers to usage of drug-trafficking for 
terrorist purposes, gray area phenomenon implies a situation in which the control of 
certain areas passes to non-state entities (Hoffman, 2006: 17-18). 
By the 1990s, terrorism with religious motives had also begun to increase 
worldwide. This period also witnessed the emergence of new realities such as 
biological terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cyber terrorism, and 
transnational terrorism.  
 
3.4 Tracking the changes in terrorism: From formal violence to informal 
violence 
In fact, those discussions were all pioneers of a new period in which 
terrorism now presents a different and more dangerous threat. Developments in 
terrorism ultimately brought us to the September 11 attacks, where a non-state entity 
challenged a state. This situation has intensified discussions on terrorism. Different 
authorities have labelled this new era with different names, from post-modern 
terrorism and new terrorism, to asymmetric warfare and informal violence, all of 
which implying changes in the character of terrorism.  
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 In 1996, Laqueur (1996: 35-36) proposed the necessity of developing new 
definitions and terms for the new realities of terrorism when using the terms of new 
terrorism and post-modern terrorism to mention the changes regarding the 
motivations, approaches and aims of terrorists. The phrase ―New Terrorism‖ was 
one of these new definitions and phrases developed in the following years. Pioneers 
of this new concept were noted specialists in the field, namely, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce 
Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michael Zanini and Brian Jenkins. In 
1999, these experts co-authored a book, entitled ―Countering the New Terrorism‖, 
for the American RAND Corporation (Research and Development Corporation). 
Since then, usage of the term ―New Terrorism‖ has been spreading, in particular 
following the September 11 attacks. The idea of New Terrorism points to 
fundamental changes from concepts and practices of traditional terrorism (Arquilla, 
Ronfeldt and Zanini, 1999: 67). Adherents of this thesis argue that there have been 
significant changes mainly in the structure and communication strategies of some 
terrorist groups. Accordingly, there are terrorist groups that have network structures 
and take advantage of new opportunities for communication such as the internet and 
computers. ―New‖ terrorist groups are also characterized by being less dependent on 
states, operating generally with religious motives, and aiming to carry out attacks of 
unprecedented destructiveness. Adherents of the new terrorism concept have argued 
that traditional terrorist groups will continue to exist but the new terrorism concept 
will provide a structural and operational alternative to old formats.  
As another term, asymmetric warfare or threat is generally used in military 
contexts. The weaker party may apply strategies and tactics against a stronger party 
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to erode the opponent's capabilities. Hit and run strikes are examples of such 
asymmetric warfare approaches.   
Noted international relations scholar, Robert Keohane, also attempted to 
define the changing characteristics of terrorism by proposing the terms of "formal 
violence" and "informal violence" (2002, 31). Keohane's attempt of constructing a 
terrorism definition seems to focus on finding a place for terrorism in the 
international relations discipline. Formal violence, in this conceptual effort, 
represents state-controlled violence such as the wars between states (Keohane, 
2002:31-32). Informal violence, on the other hand is defined as:  
violence committed by nonstate actors who capitalize on secrecy and 
surprise to inflict great harm with small material capabilities. Such 
violence is ―informal‖ because it is not wielded by formal state 
institutions and it is typically not announced in advance, as in a 
declaration of war (Keohane, 2002: 31). 
 
The international relations literature has not paid particular attention to 
terrorism for a long time. Within this field, the general tendency was accepting 
terrorism as a matter of domestic politics of states based on a billiard ball approach, 
which as a realist conception, argues that all states are considered as billiard balls in 
the international area without considering their domestic politics. This situation 
seems to have changed dramatically after the 9/11 attacks, because a terrorist 
organization was shown to be capable of inflicting enormous damage that would not 
even have been expected from another state. Accordingly, the effect of the 9/11 
attacks has influenced not only the USA but the whole international system. 
Successive attacks around the world demonstrated that the threat is not an exception, 
but a reality which can emerge anywhere in the world, where conditions feed the 
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emergence of such plots. Those attacks also surprised the scholars of international 
relations, who had, until then, mainly focused on states as actors in the international 
relations. The emergence of a non-state actor as a violence producer confused minds 
in the field.  
In that regard, Keohane`s attempt to formulate a formal and informal 
violence dichotomy can be accepted as an effort to create room for terrorism in the 
IR field for further conceptualization and studies. We see that states today give 
importance to informal violence as much as formal violence. Informal violence is an 
important aspect of today's security understanding. 
 
3.5 Informal Violence: The New Terrorism Discussion 
Although changes in terrorism have been named differently by several 
authorities, all of those various efforts underlie the increasingly transnational nature 
of terrorism. Among those efforts, the proponents of new terrorism try to detail the 
characteristics of new terrorism and its differences from traditional terrorism. 
Therefore, examining characteristics of new terrorism may help us to understand 
what the traditional terrorism is, and how terrorism is becoming transnational.  
An important characteristic of new terrorism is clearly its organizational 
structure, which is changing from a hierarchical one to a networked and 
decentralized one (Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini, 1999: 41; Hoffman, 1999: 9, 
2006:271-72; Simon and Benjamin, 2000: 70; Richmond, 2003: 299).  The leader of 
the group acts like a guru and draws only the general lines of conduct. Spatially, the 
units or cells of the organization are no longer connected organically in a defined 
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geography. They can, however, easily establish connections from distant locations 
via information technology, making it difficult to identify and comprehend the full 
extent of the terrorist organization‘s structure.  This organizational network structure 
is the clearest indicator of the transnational orientation of new terrorism. Such a 
structure makes it possible for the group to elude national barriers, establish 
international links and operate all around the world.  
As suggested, the use of information technology is another important 
characteristic of the new terrorism (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini, 1999: 41; Richmond: 
2003, 291). Information technology now enables terrorists to communicate 
effectively in their globally networked structure. The internet is the prime example, 
providing worldwide communication, which, with the development of special codes, 
is able to be kept relatively secret. The internet and other information technology 
thus provides terrorist organizations with a great ability to spread propaganda (via 
email and the creation of webpages), give opportunities for terrorist organizations to 
carry out new kinds of attacks in terms of hacktivism such as blockades, e-mail 
bombs, web hacking and creates fears about the possibility of cyber-terrorism, 
which makes possible to create harms on facilities, which depends on computers. 
(Denning, 2001: 241-284; Ballard et. al, 2002: 1007; Homer-Dixon, 2002: 54-57; 
Hinde, 2001: 568; Furnell and Warren, 1999: 30-32; Stohl, 2006: 236) The fact that 
services and products of communication with common characteristics and quality 
can be found easily around the world is yet another sign of the transnationalization 
of the world today. 
 The third characteristic of new terrorism is noted in terms of doctrine and 
strategy, namely, new terrorism attempts to conduct more lethal acts in a war 
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paradigm by aiming at systemic level disruption (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini, 1999: 
41). The pervasive use of the word ―war‖ is significant in expressing how these 
terrorist organizations perceive their struggle. Statistical findings show that although 
the number of incidents dropped after the Cold War, the lethality of terrorist attacks 
has increased (Enders and Sandler, 2000: 307; Hoffman, 1999: 10-11)—with the 
September 11 attacks causing the highest point of lethality in a single attack in 
2001—and raises the spectre of possible use by terrorists of weapons of mass 
destruction. This potential has created a worldwide perception of fear and 
vulnerability which is a transnational phenomenon. For example Spencer (2006b) 
clearly examines how the attacks of September 11, Madrid and London influences 
fear among people in the USA and Europe.  
Running through several of the above characteristics is a fourth one, and this 
is their divine nature. Rapoport (2004, 47) classifies the current ―wave‖ of terrorism 
as a religious one, and even before 9/11 Hoffman (1999:9) defined new terrorism as 
characterized by the terrorists‘ ―amorphous religious and millenarian aims‖ and 
Wilkinson (2000) noted that new terrorists were generally under the leadership of a 
spiritual leader. Religion is also a concept that overlaps with a transnational 
understanding. Religions are not usually directly associated with nations, but are 
rather created for humanity in general, meaning that a terrorist group operating 
based on religious imperatives has the potential of finding sympathizers and 
supporters all around the world. Since people that belong to a religion usually read 
the same texts, worship in more or less similar ways and share broadly similar 
feelings, terrorist groups may create a common understanding among various groups 
or individuals around the world and more easily coordinate their activities. 
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Lastly, and arguably most important in the sense of revealing the 
transnational nature of new terrorism, is the discussion that new terrorists are no 
longer reliant on state sponsorship (Simon and Benjamin, 2000: 59; Tucker, 2001:1;  
Richmond, 2003: 291), or at least, if there is state sponsorship, it is very difficult to 
expose (Lesser, 1999: 87). This argument relates back to the issue of new terrorists‘ 
network structure which, reinforced by easy communication capabilities, enables 
terrorists to establish coordination wherever they are in the world. In that respect, 
they can establish a safe environment as long as they can secure their 
communications, thus reducing their dependence on states for safe havens. 
Moreover, increasingly easy access to cheap materials to produce weapons—even 
those of mass destruction—decreases the need for state-level financial support, and 
the rise of private financers, such as Osama bin Laden.  
 There are alternative views about the usage of ―new terrorism‖ term as a 
label of the changes in terrorism. In fact, those critics accept the existence of the 
characteristics of new terrorism concept; however they basically argue that those 
characteristics are not new in terrorism. First of all, the main critisism of those 
arguments focus on the network structure. Several studies mention that a network 
structure has been observed previously in several terrorist organizations throughout 
history (Hess, 2003: 351; Tucker, 2001:1-5; Spencer, 2006a: 23; Duyvesteyn, 
2004:444). Secondly, sceptics focus on the question of lethality, especially the usage 
of WMD by terrorists. Spencer argues that the tendency of terrorists to succeed at 
inflicting mass casualties is not a new phenomenon and the number of casualties 
began to increase in the 1980s (Spencer, 2006a: 15). In terms of WMD, Crenshaw 
argues that the number of studies focusing on WMD has increased since 1995, but 
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they basically focus on opportunities and capabilities because of the lack of concrete 
information on possible motivations (Crenshaw, 2000: 413). Although there are 
examples, such as the Sarin Gas attack by Aum Shrinkyo and the anthrax letters 
following 9/11, a strong opponent of new terrorism concept, Duyvesteyn, argues that 
those attacks do not represent a trend and can be accepted as exceptions 
(Duyvesteyn, 2004:448). As a third issue, opponents of the new terrorism concept 
tend not to focus on usage of information technology. Rather, they interpret it as a 
natural process of the changes that are taking place in the world. Fourthly, 
opponents of new terrorism argue that religion is not a new phenomenon for 
terrorism, giving several examples including the IRA (Irish Republican Army), 
Irgun, EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Struggle) and the FLN (National 
Liberation Front) cases, which also reflect religious dimensions (Spencer, 2006a: 14, 
Duyvesteyn, 2004:445). Lastly, several opponents of the new terrorism concept 
argue that state support is still continuing in different ways at least in the sense of 
permission being given to activities within the borders of a state (Spencer, 2006a: 
24, Tucker, 2001: 5).  
 As can be seen above, the opponents of new terrorism do not reject the 
proposed characteristics of new terrorism. They basically argue that those 
characteristics have existed in terrorist groups before. However, we should accept 
that all those new changes emerged or intensified as a result of transnationalization 
throughout the world due to changes in social life, technology and structures. 
Consequently terrorism represents a phenomenon today that is at a different level 
and has a more complex structure. Therefore I do not see any problem in using ―new 
terrorism‖ as a term to label those changes.  
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 The timeline between Anarchism and the new terrorism phenomena clearly 
reveals enormous changes in terrorism in terms of structural and functional means. 
Those changes can be explained by considering the transnationalization of terrorism. 
The transnationalization of terrorism can be either due to an increasing transnational 
context or to the quick evolution of the terrorists as violent transnational non-state 
actors, or both, but in any case, this whole point deserves an independent study 
beyond the scope of this thesis. What is focused on here is revealing the change in 
the nature of the threat and its transnationalization.  
 
3.6 Response 
As we are talking about an increase in terrorism basically due to a 
transnationalization of its nature and thus its broad risks, we should also think about 
how the response to it should be managed. Therefore, response initiatives up until 
now should be investigated to determine whether they hav also been been evolving 
in countering this phenomenon and therefore can be considered in any way 
successful at adaptation.   
Below I will first discuss how a terrorist group becomes a matter for 
international cooperation, and then will focus on the history of response basically 
based on police response initiatives.  In the following chapter I will try to categorize 
response initiatives according to the framework detailed in Table 1, then evaluate 
their evolution and success based on findings. 
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3.6.1 Setting up the parameters for assessing international response: How does 
a terrorist group come to matter for international relations? 
 For responding to terrorism effectively, it is necessary to understand what the 
nature of the problem is in each case. As known, the difficulties of reaching a 
common understanding emanate from different approaches of states to the terrorism 
problem. Similarly, each terrorist organisation presents a different situation for both 
individual states and the international environment. Therefore denouncing a group 
as ‗terrorist‘ only by one state may not get international endorsement, while a larger 
consensus of states may produce better results. A terrorist group may come to matter 
for international relations in different ways. Below I will try to summarize basic 
themes related to the emergence of terrorism as an international phenomenon and 
responses to it.   
 
3.6.1.1 Territoriality 
 Where a terrorist group operates is a significant issue for deciding its 
placement within international relations. In terms of territory, a terrorist organisation 
should exceed the boundaries of a country to become a matter of international 
relations. Table 2 is produced with the aim of understanding the boundaries of 
terrorist organizations in terms of their activity. The activities of a terrorist 
organisation can be divided mainly in two groups. One is the field of operation, 
which indicates the area in which the terrorist organisation carries out its attacks. 
The second is the field of management and support activity, which is the area used 
by terrorist organizations for both management purposes and gathering support. 
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Each dimension of the table is divided into three sections by focusing on domestic, 
regional, and global activity. In fact this division is important when talking about 
international cooperation, because when a terrorist organisation crosses international 
borders in either operational or managerial/support activity, this activity becomes an 
international issue for the states suffering from those activities. Examining the 
terrorism problem in a three layer approach of domestic, regional and global levels 
as done in this table is a frequently used method in terrorism studies while working 
on both the problem and the responses (Alexander 2002:5, Ramraj, Hor and Roach, 
2005:1).  
The table does not represent a stable situation for terrorist organizations as 
the place of terrorist organizations in the table may change occasionally according to 
alterations in its operational and organizational activities. A terrorist organisation 
operating in a domestic territory may carry its operations to a regional level. 
Consequently a new perspective is required both for understanding its new status 
and also for responding to it. As the level increases from domestic through regional 
and global levels the cooperation need of nation states also increases.  
If a terrorist organization is operating within the borders of a state without an 
aim to cross regional or international areas, then this particular state deals with the 
problem within its own capabilities. However in cases when a terrorist organization, 
operating in one country, carries out attacks against foreigners, then the existence of 
such an organization may also become a matter for international relations. 
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Table-2: Fields of Activity and Response 
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A3 
Nation states should 
cease the direct support 
of other countries or 
support of people living 
in other countries which 
host  managerial and 
support activity. 
 
A2 
Support 
activities in 
the region 
should be 
ceased. 
A1 
Complete 
international 
cooperation is 
required. 
 
 
 
 
Regional 
Operatio
ns 
 
B2 
Nation states in the 
region should solve the 
problem by combining 
their willingness and 
capabilities. States in 
the region should 
convince the state 
which hosts managerial 
and support activity. 
 
B1 
Complete 
regional 
cooperation. 
A4 
Nation state(s) 
in the region 
should get the 
cooperation of 
states 
internationally. 
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C 
Nation state should 
solve the problem with 
its own capabilities. 
 
However if a domestic 
groups targets 
foreigners within the 
borders, then the issue 
may become subject of 
international 
cooperation 
 
B3 
Nation state 
is in need of 
regional 
(bilateral or 
multilateral) 
support for 
cutting 
managerial 
and support 
activities. 
A5 
Nation state is 
in need of 
international  
support 
(bilateral or 
multilateral) 
for cutting 
managerial and 
support 
activities. 
 Domestic Management 
and Support 
 
Regional 
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t and 
Support 
Global  
Management  
and Support 
Field of Management and Support Activity 
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 If a terrorist organization operates or gathers support within the territories of 
more than one state, then international cooperation is necessary for coping with the 
problem. Terrorist organizations generally follow a hierarchical journey from 
domestic to regional and finally global level in expanding their activities.  Related to 
this point, we should remember Rapoport's argument about the actors of 
international terrorism. Accordingly, there are five actors of international terrorism: 
terrorist organizations, diaspora populations, states, sympathetic foreign publics, and 
supranational organizations. The cadres of terrorist organization and diaspora 
populations abroad are the ones who actually carry out the activities of a terrorist 
organization. Sympathetic foreign publics and supranational organizations such as 
NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) may help them in their organization and 
operation abroad. Other states are also important in their approaches to the terrorist 
movements. They may prevent--or fail to prevent--the activities of a terrorist 
organization. Therefore as those other actors become involved with the activities of 
the terrorist organization, then the response initiatives and need for cooperation may 
become more complex.  
For example, the PKK was established in Turkey with an aim to establish a 
sovereign state in the South Eastern part of Turkey. The key cadre of the 
organization managed to establish a place in other countries in the same region. As a 
result, the PKK became able to operate both in Turkey also in the region. By the 
time they established a support mechanism in Europe, they had reached partly global 
activity. In the late 1990s they were also able to initiate operational activities in 
Europe, such as demonstrations. The PKK used Europe as a field for management 
and support activity in the following period.  
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Although the PKK problem was considered as an internal matter at the 
beginning, we observed how it became first a regional than a partly global problem. 
The case of the PKK organization shows that a terrorist organization‘s field and 
support activities may change over time on the international level. Every growth or 
decrease in capabilities of terrorist organizations at the state, regional or global 
levels necessitate new understandings of the situation. The natural consequence is 
the reconsideration of the cooperative arrangements and initiatives.  
We can talk about a deterritorial transnationalization today. Entities and 
individuals may become transnationalized without being bound by a territory. A 
person living in a European territory may become part of an initiative that is 
organized in Afghanistan. This is happening by the outcomes of transnationalization. 
This issue is a physically cross-border phenomena, but we can also talk about social 
and psychological sides of this phenomenon.  
A natural extension of the territoriality discussion is to consider the kinds of 
responses to terrorism. Those responses have generally been categorized as domestic 
responses and international responses. One of the questions being posed in this 
thesis is whether, with the emergence of transnational terrorism, new ways of 
dealing with terrorism have emerged apart from proposed domestic and international 
responses to terrorism.  
Domestic Responses are those strategies and methods that one state uses in 
its fight against terrorism within its borders. According to Alexander (2002: 377), 
domestic governmental responses to terrorism have traditionally been intelligence 
gathering, enacted appropriate legislation, apprehension, prosecution and 
punishment of terrorists, and providing greater protection to the government 
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facilities and officials, and places such as airports. Conceptually, the fight against 
terrorism within domestic borders falls under the responsibility of that state. 
Although this assumption is theoretically true, what should be mentioned here is that 
the international community may become involved with the anti terrorism struggle 
of a state on different grounds. For example, one of the most important issues of the 
international community‘s involvement with a state‘s response to terrorism is human 
rights. Accordingly, a state should take the possible international responses into 
consideration while responding to terrorist groups domestically.  
International responses are strategies and methods which are used in the 
international area to prevent terrorism. According to Alexander (2002: 379), the 
kinds of international measures against terrorism have traditionally been the use of 
diplomacy, economic sanctions,  cooperation in law enforcement, ratification of 
international conventions, and employment of military force.  
 Alexander also summarizes a mixture of domestic and international 
government responses to terrorism which are seeking ―political means of 
conciliation to resolve underlying issues in an effort to undermine popular support 
for terrorist acts‖, ―widespread repression not only of terrorists but of innocent 
civilians‖,  military attacks,  police raids, ―freezing the financial assets of individuals 
believed to be connected to the terrorists, arranging for training in counterterrorism 
practices and rallying international support‖ (Alexander, 2002:13). 
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3.6.1.2 Legality 
 When countries suffer terrorist activities by perpetrators with an ability to 
cross borders in organizational and managerial means, then the country needs the 
assistance of other countries to deal with the problem. This need for assistance 
requires legal procedures. However, as mentioned many times in this thesis, defining 
terrorism and responding to it based on the established understanding appears to be 
the basic need for international response to terrorism, but a highly challenging one to 
achieve. In other words, legal structures should make cooperation possible for 
cooperation, but how feasible is this?  
The difficulty, as mentioned in almost all terrorism related papers, articles, 
books and reports, is the absence of  a globally accepted definition of terrorism. 
Each state has the authority to identify its own terrorism definition and how to 
respond to it. Consequently, defining terrorism reflects mostly a state-centric attitude 
to the problem. Definition and relevant legislation made by a state is a strong tool 
within the borders of any state.  However, at the international level, a state‘s 
definitions and legislation should also be welcomed by others for cooperative 
purposes. Consequently, when stepping into the international field, states need 
common understandings on terrorism to improve cooperation. This point represents 
the biggest obstacle to establishing cooperation on terrorism related issues.  
As differences in definitional issues and legal procedures exist between 
countries, relevant authorities dealing with terrorism should have knowledge of 
those basic differences and design their policies accordingly. The UN‘s efforts to 
establish a common decision, regional initiatives, and bilaterally mutual assistance 
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treaties, are all focusing on establishing an understanding between states to 
overcome problems in cooperation against terrorism. 
As will be examined later, an important task of liaison officers is also to 
research the legal procedures of the host country to learn what the legal necessities 
to succeed at cooperation are. In this way, when cooperation is needed, liaison 
officers can direct their own authorities about what to do, and about which strategies 
to follow to adjust the legal systems mutually.  
 
3.6.1.3 Target selection and managerial/operational area of the group 
 Target selection and influence of the terrorist group on the regional or 
international levels is another point to be discussed here. If the target selection and 
activities of a group provoke regional or global sensitivities, this group‘s activity 
may become an international issue, even if the group operates within the borders of 
a state. A terrorist group may operate only within the borders of one state, but it may 
target members of other nations. Alternatively, their attacks may endanger the 
survival of one specific state which is believed to have a crucial role in the region or 
global system. In such cases, international attention may be directed to this terrorist 
group.  
 The managerial/operational area of the group also influences the need for 
international cooperation. As exemplified before by the PKK, its activities both in 
the region around Turkey and also in Europe necessitated that Turkey initiate 
cooperative endeavours with its neighbors in the region and its partners in Europe.  
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3.6.1.4 Human rights issues 
 The international community may also become involved with a terrorist 
group based on human rights issues. This perspective generally focuses on a state‘s 
way of dealing with terrorist groups. States` actions against a terrorist group are 
observed and scrutinized by international actors. Therefore states should take into 
consideration human rights issues in shaping their response to terrorism. Even if a 
terrorist organization operates only domestically, response to it by the state may 
always become an international relations issue on human rights grounds.  
 For example, one of the issues the European Union has focused on with 
respect to Turkey‘s membership to the union was its human rights records. Turkey 
has made a plethora of changes in its laws to reach the European standards regarding 
human rights. Today, the human rights issue is also the focus of non-governmental 
organizations such as Amnesty International.  
 
3.7 Historical Police Response to Terrorism 
 This part is a logical extension of the history of terrorism section. In the 
previous section I examined the developments of terrorism historically to reveal how 
the threat has been transnationalized. In this part I will investigate responses to  
terrorism in the same method to understand whether response, especially police 
response, has been transnationalized to meet the threat.  
 Existent research shows that international law enforcement and police 
cooperation started in the 19
th
 century. During a workshop at the United Nations 
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2005, international law 
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enforcement cooperation was discussed. From this workshop, three important issues 
for the purpose of this thesis should be mentioned here as follows: First, traditionally 
crime was a ―local or at most national issue‖ (UN, 2005:3). As the second point, 
during the 1700s and 1800s “piracy, the slave trade, smuggling and cross border 
forays by bandits‖ were the main concerns, and states were responding them 
unilaterally even by entering into foreign territory (UN, 2005:4). Lastly, problematic 
unilateral methods have been replaced with informal and later formal methods (UN, 
2005: 4-5). What we understand from these three issues is that international 
cooperation emerged when crimes crossed borders, thus becoming an international 
problem, and initially informal then formal methods have been developed between 
states to deal with them.  
 In fact, we can argue that this proposal is also valid for terrorism. When 
terrorism has shown its ability to cross borders, we observe that states and police 
forces have developed international cooperative initiatives alongside domestic 
measures. We can argue that an important characteristic of the Anarchist era was the 
reality that states both faced with the threat individually within their own borders 
and also observed that this threat was able to show up in other countries with an 
ability to establish links between each other. Therefore, states on the one hand tried 
to develop domestic mechanisms, but also looked for ways to develop international 
cooperation.  
In terms of domestic responses, states have developed different strategies. 
First of all, they have tried to establish or develop their law enforcement forces to 
deal with the threat. Ivianski argues that the origins of establishing secret or political 
police go back to the era of the French Revolution (Ivianski, 2006: 339). Ivianski 
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also argues that European states expanded and organized their police forces in the 
mid-19
th
 century for dealing with threats from the masses (Ivianski, 2006: 340). 
According to Ivianski, the task of such police forces in nineteenth-century Europe 
was to terrify the masses, to root out revolutionary groups. (Ivianski, 2006: 339). 
Similarly, Hoffman notes that the bombings of Irish groups in the 1880s urged the 
establishment of a Special Branch in Scotland Yard (Hoffman, 2006: 10).  
According to Jensen, Anarchists killed about 60 and injured over 200 in 
France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, England, Switzerland, the Ottoman Empire and the 
United States during the 1890s (Jensen, 2001, 16). Russia was the most affected 
country, consequently counter-terrorism in Russia was very significant. It has been 
argued that political policing started in France, then Russians learned it from 
Westerners, but used more violent means of political policing in the following years 
(Ivianski, 2006: 343). Ivianski also argues that in Russia at the end of the 19
th
 
century, 200,000 people, including police, took a role in the fight against 
revolutionaries (Ivianski, 2006: 344).  
Enactment of legislation was another method used during the late 1880s and 
1890s by, for example, France, Spain, Italy, Germany and Switzerland (Jensen, 
1981: 325). Based on works by Jensen, it can be argued that intelligence gathering, 
enacting appropriate legislation and improving international cooperation were 
significant  methods among others to deal with Anarchism (Jensen, 1981 and 2001). 
The wave of Irish terrorism also led to a special emphasis on police surveillance, 
border and port control, use of informants, national and international cooperation, 
and liaisoning between law enforcement agencies (Hoffman, 2006: 10). Emergence 
of new developments such as the creation of Special Forces against terrorism was 
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also observed, as, according to Rapoport, states transformed their police 
organizations to penetrate underground groups. Examples of such police 
organizations are Russian Okhrana, the British Special Branch, and the USA's FBI 
(Rapoport, 2004: 68, footnote:4). 
Although the Anarchist threat ended in the 1910s, most of the domestic 
strategies used by police during the Anarchist wave have been regular tools and 
processes for countering terrorism since then.  
 
3.8 International  responses 
  
 3.8.1 The Anarchist Wave 
 Early developments of international police cooperation took place in the 19
th
 
century in Europe (Deflem 2002: 70, and Anderson et.al: 1995: 46). The mobility of 
criminals, who were capable of using the developments in transportation and 
technology without being restricted by borders, drove police authorities to co-
operate internationally (Anderson et.al: 1995: 46-47). Anderson et.al. uses the term 
cross-border policing, which is argued to have been performed for two purposes in 
the 19
th
 century: first against ordinary criminals and secondly against radical, 
socialist and Anarchist movements with a political police approach (Anderson et.al: 
1995: 47). At the time, Anarchism was a problem for nation states in Europe; 
consequently initial international cooperation between police forces were established 
within the area of political violence. One of the initial international cooperative 
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arrangements for political purposes took place in 1851, when police officers of the 
German States created an international police organization, the Polizeiverein - 
Police Association (Fijnaut, 1997: 107-108 and Deflem, 2002:232)
2
. This 
organization lasted until 1866. In this same year, police officers from 35 different 
states joined an exhibition in London with an aim ―to investigate the activities of 
communists and liberals‖ (Deflem, 2002: 232).  
 From the 1880s until the 1910s, Anarchism dominated the agenda in almost 
all European countries, Russia, America, and even in India. Anarchist groups were 
operating in their respective countries but also were in contact with other Anarchist 
groups in different countries. Ideas of leading Anarchists were spreading among 
groups by way of publications. Anarchists were also coming together, such as that 
which took place in England in 1881 when they had an international conference. 
Although their attacks were mainly targeting elites and rulers of states, civilians 
were also hurt by their discriminatory attacks, as happened in the Haymarket 
bombing in the United States. Co-operation between Anarchist groups and their 
spread all over the world led  states and police organizations to also cooperate 
(Rapoport, 2004:52). 
 According to Jensen, co-operation between states and police organizations 
was not always in harmony in the fight against Anarchism for different reasons. As 
we understand from Jensen' s writings, Germany and Russia were co-operating 
closely and trying to create an international response against Anarchism (Jensen, 
2001:15, 16, 19).  After the assassination of President McKinley, President 
Theodore Roosevelt made a speech which focused on the punishment of all 
                                                 
2
 Fijnaut uses the term Polizeiverein - Police Association, while Deflem uses the term Police Union 
of German States for this gathering. 
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Anarchists worldwide. This speech has been found to be very similar by some 
authors to President George Bush's speech following September 11. Still, we can 
observe the USA‘s reluctance to cooperate during this era with Germany and Russia. 
Jensen argues that Germany and Russia proposed co-operation with the USA and 
other states in their struggle against Anarchism, but faced the reluctance and refusals 
of the USA. Other European countries, on the other hand, replied positively, as in 
the case of the 1904 protocol signed in St Petersburg (Jensen, 2001: 19-21).  
According to Jensen, the reason for this approach was not only America's 
isolationist approach and other political reasons, but the lack of an American 
National Police and central criminal identification system (Jensen, 2001: 15-16). 
Italy also kept itself away from the 1904 protocol for fear that Italian Anarchists 
residing in other countries would be expelled to Italy if the proposal of expulsion of 
Anarchists to their native countries was accepted by other states (Jensen, 2001: 16). 
Another example that shows differences between  states regarding the measures 
against Anarchism  is the approval of an 1898 international conference by all of 
Europe, except Britain (Jensen, 2001: 19). According to Jensen, anti-Anarchist 
European initiatives led by Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia, fell 
apart with the outbreak of the First World War, as these nations began to fight with 
each other (Jensen, 2001:37) 
 Despite small differences of thought between states, examining this period is 
important in terms of observing what has been done in police cooperation between 
states. This period presents early examples of international police cooperation 
against a political threat.  
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 The first important event that should be mentioned here is the conferences 
held among European countries. The most important event of the late 19
th
 century in 
terms of police cooperation was the International Conference of Rome for the Social 
Defense against Anarchists, which took place in 1898, after the assassination of 
Empress Elizabeth of Austria in Geneva (Occhipinti, 2003: 29, Deflem 2002: 232 
and Fijnaut, 1997: 110).
3
 During this conference police officials held separate 
meetings about policing techniques (Deflem, 2002:232). Jensen argues that the 
decisions taken at the conference were not necessarily materialized in the following 
years, but that this conference helped in the establishment of direct relations 
between high police officers of each country and the secret exchange of information 
about Anarchists (Jensen, 2001: 19). A second conference was held in 1904 in St. 
Petersburg, where a secret anti-Anarchist protocol for police cooperation and 
information exchange was signed between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Russia, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire, 
while Spain, Portugal and Switzerland joined the protocol later (Jensen, 2001: 16-
21). In addition to ambassadors and other representatives, police managers of 
several countries joined and  held special meetings during this conference (Jensen, 
1981: 327, 332). In terms of the police field, controlling the Anarchists, establishing 
a central agency, and facilitating direct communications between central agencies 
were discussed during the conference (Jensen, 1981: 331). Jensen argues that the 
1898 and 1904 conferences added a new dimension to such cooperation by 
increasing ―the amount and  range of police collaboration on anarchist issues, 
                                                 
3
 Deflem uses the term ―the International Conference of Rome for the Social Defense against 
Anarchists‖, Fijnaut only mentions that ―Italian government had organised a secret conference in 
Rome‖, Occhipinti mentions that the conference was held when Empress Elizabeth of Austria was 
assassinated in Geneva in 1898. 
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making it official and systemic to a degree it had never been before‖ (Jensen, 1981: 
341-342). 
 Establishing police structures for dealing with international cooperation was 
another point that should be mentioned here, for example Switzerland ―created a 
central policing organization in the federal prosecutor's office‖ for providing 
information to foreign counterparts (Jensen, 2001: 29). The other point here is that 
states began to create formal mechanisms for controlling cooperation between states 
and police organizations. According to Jensen, the British Police banned direct 
communications, wanted the usage of diplomatic channels, and requested 
international or bilateral agreements for establishing cooperation (Jensen, 2001:29). 
Jensen argues that France and Italy ―signed bilateral anti-anarchist treaties with 
neighboring states‖ (Jensen, 2001: 38). Based on the resources mentioned in this 
thesis, it can be argued that while initial police cooperation was informal in general, 
states established formal structures over time.  
 Police organizations also tried to establish contact points in countries that fell 
into their interests because of the existence of Anarchist populations of their 
nationality. Early on, different methods were used for this purpose. In his study, 
Jensen gives the following examples, which were exercised in the USA: The first 
method was placement of a particular country's police officer in another country, for 
example, an Italian police officer was placed in New York. The second method was 
recruiting spies from the population in another country, as happened in the US 
where benefitted from Italian community. The third method was having agents, such 
as Austria-Hungary and Russia did, and a fourth method was the hiring of a 
  
 
102 
 
country‘s police officer or Detective agent by a foreign country, such as in the case 
of the hiring of a New York police agent by Germany (Jensen: 2001:27-28).  
 Associations were also active in establishing police cooperation. The 
National Bureau of Identification  established by an American initiative, the IACP 
(International Association of Chiefs of Police), was used as a contact point for 
establishing international contact for other countries (Jensen, 2001: 29) 
In 1914, France, under the auspices of Prince Albert I, initiated a police 
gathering with three hundred participants from fifteen different states (Anderson 
et.al: 1995: 47) Although decisions were taken about standardization of extradition 
procedures and creation of an international organization for gathering and 
exchanging criminal data, the outbreak of the First World War stopped the initiative 
(Anderson et.al: 1995: 47). 
 After the 1917 Revolution in Russia, cooperative initiatives between 
European and American authorities focused on the threat of communism. The 
German police for example, organized a secret meeting in Munich in 1920, entitled 
―The International Struggle against Bolshevism: An International Trouble‖ with 
contributions from six European countries (Deflem, 2002: 234-235).  
 
3.8.2 After the First World War 
 1923 was an important year in terms of police cooperation, because the 
forerunner of Interpol, the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), was 
established in that year as a result of a second international conference on crime and 
police in Vienna (Andersen et.al: 1995: 47). Exclusion of policing of political crimes 
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from the ICPC‘s agenda was proposed during the meetings (Deflem, 2002: 126). 
However, according to Mazower, the ICPC ―had an obvious anti-Communist bias‖ 
(1997:246). Fijnaut also implies that ICPC members used the conference ―to fight 
the Communist movement in a more indirect way‖ (1997: 114). The Nazis played an 
important role in dominating international activity against the communist threat by 
organizing several conferences during the 1930s (Deflem, 2002: 236 and Mazower, 
1997: 246).  After Germany invaded Austria, the ICPC headquarters were moved to 
Berlin in 1940 (Deflem, 2002: 236).  
 Police cooperation efforts grew more intense in Europe in the build-up to the 
Second World War, though until this point, the USA`s efforts were very limited in 
the international area (Nadelmann, 1993:15). 
 
3.8.3 After the Second World War 
 We see the re-emergence of the International Criminal Police Commission 
(ICPC) in Belgium in 1946, and in 1956 it became the International Criminal Police 
Organization (ICPO) or Interpol. Interpol has been an active player in the field of 
policing since its establishment.  
 With the beginning of the 1960s, police cooperation began to be wider and 
more complex. Different international institutions had roles in structuring and 
effecting police work and roles. Consequently, policing has been diversified and 
complicated especially after the end of the Second World War.  
 However, co-operation in preventing political crimes and especially 
terrorism was not an easy task after the Second World War. It was not easy to 
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establish cooperation between states when compared to the beginning of the 19
th
 
century. As mentioned in previous sections, initial international police cooperative 
efforts were mainly in the political policing area, because Anarchism was accepted 
as a common problem by most states. However, there was not an obvious common 
enemy such as Anarchism after the Second World War. Political crimes were taking 
on different meanings at that time. First, political crimes were committed with an 
ideological perspective in a world which was divided ideologically. Logically, states 
with different ideologies were looking at those crimes from different perspectives; 
for some of them they were political crimes and terrorism, but for some of them they 
were not. The second issue was groups operating with a national liberation ideal. 
Such groups were considered freedom fighters by some, but terrorists by others.  
Consequently, it was not easy to reach a cooperative solution about political crimes 
and terrorism.  
 Following the 2
nd
 World War, employment of diplomacy and international 
organizations were the main methods used against terrorism by states. However, 
their contribution to sound international cooperation seems to be inadequate. They 
were very restrictive in their nature to constitute an agreed upon way of response by 
all relevant parties.  
 The UN (United Nations) became the centre of international initiatives to do 
something about terrorism, but disagreement between countries on what terrorism is 
has long complicated this aim of the UN. The UN has never been able to define 
terrorism because of those differences. The UN only managed to define certain 
terrorist acts, and pass certain conventions and resolutions in the fight against 
terrorism since the 1960s. UN Conventions only criminalize certain acts of 
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terrorism, for example hijacking. The UN was not able however, to develop a 
comprehensive cooperative arrangement against terrorism until 9/11. The 
discussions in the following sections on the UN, reveal that although improvements 
have been achieved by the UN on terrorism, shortcomings still exist.  
Interpol, with its 188 member countries, is the second largest international 
organization following the UN,  that deals with terrorism cooperation. Its roots go 
back to 1923, when the ICPC was established. It was rebuilt again in 1946 just after 
World War II, and gained a new name of the ICPO (International Criminal Police 
Organization) or, for short, Interpol. However Interpol did not initiate particularly 
terrorism related cooperation until the 1980s due to the organization‘s mandate of 
avoiding issues of a the political nature.  
During the period following the Second World War, the most important and 
early initiatives against terrorism were taken in Europe. The terrorist attack at the 
Munich Olympics in 1972 increased the fears of terrorism in Europe. European 
countries set out to establish numerous arrangements, such as TREVI (an 
intergovernmental network of ministries of justice and interior created by European 
Community states in 1975), Europol, The Policing Working Group on Terrorism 
(PWGOT), the Club of Berne, the Club of Vienna, and the European Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorism, Kilowatt and Star Group. These groups will be 
examined in the following parts of this study in detail.  
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3.9 Evaluation of the Threat and Response So Far 
The history of threat and response reveal that an interactive process has taken 
place throughout history between the two. Actors on the threat side have always had 
a leading role in shaping the interaction between the threat and response. Every new 
action, attack, and method initiated by threat actors has created its reaction on the 
response side. So, responses have been created and shaped according to the methods 
and capabilities of threats, in other words, they were most of the time ―delayed‖. 
The history of threat and response reveals that this relationship between the 
two has created both domestic and also international mechanisms and bodies to deal 
with terrorism. This chapter investigated what happened in the 20
th
 century in the 
interaction between them. The next chapters will look at what changed after 9/11 in 
terms of responding to the current state of terrorism which is called as ―new 
terrorism.‖   
The following three chapters will examine what is happening in four realms 
previously established based on two dimensions, namely, the actors and the forms of 
cooperative relations. Chapter 4 will look at the realist/state-centric realm, Chapter 5 
will examine the liberal/state-centric realm and lastly Chapter 6 will focus on the 
liberal and realist multi-centric realms. The reason to investigate the liberal and 
realist multi-centric realms in the same chapter is to clearly present the growing 
importance of the multi-centric realm. Table 3 given below (designed based on 
Table 1) outlines the basic areas of police cooperation in response to terrorism. All 
four areas mentioned in the table will be examined in individual chapters based on 
the history of terrorism and response. Each chapter aims at  understanding what kind 
of strategies had been developed before 9/11, if they were adequate, and what, if 
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anything, has changed in light of new terrorism. The aim to follow this process is to 
find out if states, in their response activities, looked for new ways to adapt to the 
changing threat environment.  
 
Table-3: Framework of Police Cooperation 
 
  
FORMS OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY INTERACTIONS 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
REALIST / STATE-CENTRIC FORMS 
 
 
 
 The realist-state-centric domain covers realist actors and their state-centric-
international relations, an area where bilateral relations between states dominate. 
Diplomacy, establishment of foreign offices, ministries of foreign affairs and 
embassies are part of Realist- State-Centric forms. Sub-state entities as actors of 
transnational cooperation constitute their cross/border existence under the umbrella 
of embassies, thus such entities may also be placed within the Realist-Centric area.  
As another point, although liberalism may better explain the creation and forms of 
sub-state entities as transnational actors, several functions of those entities, 
especially transnational police interactions, should also be placed in the realist 
domain because of their representation of national interests. For those reasons, 
several aspects of transnational police cooperation such as the establishment of 
bilateral police cooperative schemes, appointment of police liaison officers, and 
their activities in the name of national interest, should be explained in the realist-
state-centric dimension of police cooperation.  
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 Since the emergence of modern terrorism with the Anarchist wave, states 
have carried out both domestic and international counter-terrorism initiatives. In 
terms of domestic initiatives we observe establishment of political police units, 
institution of legal instruments to deal with terrorism, usage of agents/ informants, 
and efforts to employ technological advances. Those domestic arrangements 
represent the states` responsibility and ability to settle peace inside the borders 
through police forces, therefore represent a realist-state-centric character. When a 
police organization as a traditional domestic entity carries its activities to the 
international zone as a sub-state entity alongside the traditional foreign relations 
actors, and with an ability to initiate transnational cooperation with its foreign 
partners, then it is possible to argue the transfer of its domestic realist/state-centric 
performance to the international and transnational level.     
 History shows us that police entities have experienced this transformation in 
the terrorism field during the Anarchist wave. In addition to the formation of 
domestic mechanisms to deal with Anarchism, states also focused on international 
cooperative initiatives, because the domestic security of states was influenced by a 
spreading cross border reality. Therefore we can argue that the emergence of 
Anarchism drove police organizations to establish international links as sub-state 
entities within a realist/state-centric paradigm. Events such as the International 
Conference of Rome for the Social Defence against Anarchists of 1898 show us that 
police cooperation has been structured as part of a wider diplomatic arrangement, 
but with an ability to develop its own cooperative mechanisms. The main authorities 
who organized this conference were central state and foreign relations authorities of 
contributing countries, but police officials had special meetings as part of the 
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conference. We also see the formation of direct contacts and relationships between 
police organizations beyond the relationship structure of traditional foreign relation 
actors. Another example is the establishment of contact points for communicating 
with  partners as seen in the example of Switzerland, which created a central 
policing organization in the prosecutor's office for relations with other countries 
(Jensen, 2001: 29).  
The appointment of police officers to other countries to track the Anarchist 
activities regarding their own countries was also initiated during this era. Based on 
given examples, we can argue that although a traditional foreign relations structure 
may draw the general framework of cooperative relations between states in a 
realist/state-centric paradigm; police forces, though remaining within the general 
framework, have developed independent relationships with their international 
partners.  
In the aftermath of the Anarchist wave, although the importance of the 
realist-state-centric area as a state level diplomacy increased, it is not possible to 
argue that there was a cooperative increase between police forces as sub-state 
entities. In the following years, the realist understanding that perceives terrorism 
solely as  an internal matter of states gained strength, therefore the core diplomatic 
structures of states such as foreign offices, state departments and embassies, 
primarily dealt with the issue on the international level, while police organizations 
mostly focused on domestic matters of terrorism.  
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4.1 Issues Related to the Realist/State-Centric Domain 
As bilateral relations dominate the realist/state-centric domain; mutual 
interests and configuration of power between parties shape the cooperative 
interactions in this area. Diplomacy is a tool which works when mutual interests 
overlap. In a world where one man‘s terrorist may be accepted as another man‘s 
freedom fighter, a terrorism problem in one country may be accepted as an 
advantage for others. As explained in the theoretical chapter, if cooperation will 
result in strengthening other states in other issue areas, realism gives room for states 
to avert from cooperation. There is no doubt that states dealing with terrorism must 
devote significant amounts of their resources to countering a terrorist threat, a 
situation which may provide incentives for other states to see that threat continue. 
Therefore, states looking for cooperation from others should define their own 
terrorism problem convincingly and show the mutual benefits of cooperation for 
potential partners. Overall, a precondition of establishing cooperation on terrorism 
between states depends on an acknowledgement of the existence of a terrorist threat, 
outlining mutual interests, and showing willingness to act frankly.  
A state‘s capacity to convince others in establishing cooperation against 
terrorism also lies in that state‘s own capabilities and power. There may be various 
cooperation alternatives between states based on their relationships as shaped by 
capability and power configurations. That is why we face proposals in theory such 
as Milner`s ―imposed cooperation,‖ which argues that the stronger party may 
succeed in the adjustment of its policies in a cooperative relationship. Here, we may 
also recall Ole Waever and Barry Buzan`s study, which tries to establish a wider 
model of power interactions. Their power categorization of superpowers, great 
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powers and regional powers, represents a hierarchical structure in which 
superpowers dominate the whole system, great powers may have system level 
influence, and lastly regional powers have influence within a particular region. 
Consequently, power levels of those states are decisive in the establishment and 
continuity of their cooperative relations with others, including on terrorism related 
issues. 
In fact we can apply those theories for law enforcement cooperation too. 
Establishing an international system and network for law enforcement cooperation 
requires power and capabilities. Parallel to this proposal, the existing literature 
reflects the idea that powerful states such as the USA and the leading European 
countries have more interest in establishing international law enforcement 
cooperation. As an example here, an investigation of international cooperative 
initiatives of the USA`s law enforcement activities may give us an idea about the 
character of those relations. The reason behind this choice may be explained as the 
USA`s reliance on international law enforcement cooperation in the fight against 
crimes, and existence of a broad academic literature on US initiatives.  
 
4.1.1 The USA Case  
Considering bilateral arrangements between countries in terms of policing 
efforts, the most effective country in establishing bilateral relations since the Second 
World War has been the USA. According to Deflem, the USA has engaged in 
unilateral cross-border operations in the past, for example in Mexico, but this 
situation created tensions (Deflem, 2001: 78). Currently, US policy seems to be to 
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establish cooperative strategies with its partners, instead of using unilateral actions 
abroad. Therefore, the USA has initiated worldwide policies to improve the 
effectiveness of its policing activities and especially its bilateral initiatives 
throughout the world.  
The USA interprets international law enforcement cooperation, including 
police cooperation, in a quite wide perspective, consequently various US agencies 
are seen as involved with international cooperative initiatives focusing on law 
enforcement issues. Deflem summarizes those organizations as the FBI, the DEA 
(Drug Enforcement Administration), the Coast Guard, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, the Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms, the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service, the Postal 
Inspection Service, the Criminal Division`s Office of International Relations in the 
Justice Department, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and even local police 
organizations, especially in border areas or in international training projects 
(Deflem, 2001: 75). Deflem also claims that ―The US State Department is 
increasingly involved in international police matters because the US government 
views the international crime problem as a component of foreign policy and national 
security, not just as a law enforcement issue‖ (Deflem, 2001: 76).  
Marenin`s approach is parallel to Deflem‘s when he argues that ―…police 
cooperation and assistance programs are part of the general foreign policy of the 
United States which is driven mainly by national interest considerations‖ and also 
mentions that these programs aim to present the US policing understanding as a 
model (Marenin, 2001: 314) 
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 According to Marenin, by establishing international police cooperation, the 
USA aims first at strengthening transnational policing cooperation, secondly at 
developing institutional and personal linkages, thirdly at helping to improve or 
change the ideologies, organizational stability, skills and performance of the police 
forces of other countries, fourthly at assisting international and multilateral 
peacekeeping and peace-building operations, and finally at helping to develop a 
supportive informational, legal, political and criminal justice infrastructure 
(Marenin, 2001: 297).  
 Marenin also investigates five current policing activities of the USA which 
can be gathered under the headings of crime control, linkage building, assistance 
programs, participation in international peacekeeping programs, and activities 
ancillary to and supportive of policing (Marenin, 2001: 298-313). A brief 
investigation of those policing activities in the following paragraphs based on 
Marenin`s account may help us to understand what the possible patterns of 
cooperative police cooperation are.  
 Marenin (2001: 298-303) argues that crime control takes place by four 
different methods. The first one is case related cooperation. The second one is 
information sharing by different forms such as using Interpol, MLATs (Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties), and extradition treaties, and especially via a network of 
informal contexts, acquaintances among police officers during case work, 
attendance at international workshops, symposia, and formal training programs. The 
third way of crime control is establishing liaison offices overseas, which is a central 
theme of this thesis. The USA has given special importance to improve its LEGAT 
program in the fight against terrorism. As will be examined in the Liaison Section of 
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the Thesis, one of the FBI`s responses to the 9/11 attacks was to increase the number 
of its LEGAT offices. And as a final crime-fighting method, we can consider 
strategic planning by the international criminal justice office in the Department of 
State for certain types of crimes. The second current policing activity of the USA, 
which is linkage building, occurs in three ways: participation in international 
institutions, building international institutions, and establishing networking 
(Marenin, 2001: 303-304). Although participation in international institutions such 
as Interpol and the UN is part of the USA`s cooperative law enforcement strategies, 
Deflem argues that the USA generally tries to control its international relationships 
by following unilateral or bilateral strategies (Deflem, 2001: 75). In fact, Deflem`s 
finding is supported in different parts of this study. For example while investigating 
the relationship between Europol and the USA, I found that the USA focuses more 
on improving bilateral relations with Europol members individually, instead of using 
Europol as a sole partner in Europe. The third type of activity consists of assistance 
programs, which generally focus on training. The USA follows several ways for this 
aim. Establishing overseas institutions, such as the International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA) opened in Budapest in 1995, is one way (Marenin, 2001: 305). 
The other way is US based training, which comprises ―attendance at general courses 
at the FBI Academy or other law enforcement teaching centers, specialized 
workshops and training sessions offered to police from other countries‖, practical 
case training and training offered by contractors (Marenin, 2001: 307). The third 
way of assistance program is host country training which is provided by USA in the 
territories of other countries (Marenin, 2001: 308). Lastly, the USA is providing the 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), 
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established in 1986 in the Department of Justice, for building effective and 
democratic police forces (Marenin, 2001: 309-311). The fourth type of American 
international policing cooperation efforts is the participating in peacekeeping and 
peace-building initiatives. Lastly, the USA is involved with support activities with 
an aim ‖to create  the political will, the legal infrastructure and its associated 
administrative agencies‖ by programs of  Rule of Law (ROL) and Administration of 
Justice (AOJ) (Marenin, 2001: 312). According to Deflem, the USA is hesitant 
about the quality of investigations being carried out by other police forces, tending 
to view those forces as corrupt and unprofessional (Deflem, 2001: 78). For this 
reason, the USA aims to improve the capabilities and atmosphere of its partners.   
The USA`s experience in establishing an international law enforcement 
cooperative system reminds us of several issues. Establishing such a large network 
requires capabilities, resources, and power. Every year, relevant USA authorities 
publish yearly reports on specific issues. For example, annual reports about 
terrorism are called as Country Reports on Terrorism, which are presented to 
Congress by the Secretary of State.
4
 In such reports the USA authorities analyze the 
current situation on a country by country basis and evaluate the cooperative 
approaches of those countries. These reports are believed to be important for 
countries taking part in those activities.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Retrieved from  http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/index.htm, on 15.12.2009. According to 
information on the State Department webpage, U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide 
Congress these reports. The reports were called as Patterns of Global Terrorism before 2004. 
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4.2 Possible Bilateral Cooperative Ways on Terrorism  
Examination of the USA case reveals that cooperation between states and 
specifically law enforcement agencies represents a multi-layer character which 
includes getting assistance in cases and information exchange, changing the 
behaviour of the partner through policy coordination by harmonising the law 
enforcement structure, linkage building, and providing assistance in improving the 
capabilities of the partner. With such a range of activities, investigation of how those 
strategies are performed in cooperative relations becomes important. In a mutual 
setting, those strategies are operationalized in a reciprocal way. Although the 
stronger party naturally has capabilities and power to influence the other party, 
cooperation may take several forms depending on the issue, and in certain 
circumstances, the weaker party may have a say in the process. With respect to 
cooperation on terrorism related issues; the terrorism problems of countries and 
comparison of the power capabilities of the partners may influence the kind of 
cooperative relationship between parties. Table 4 below shows possible 
configurations of cooperation based on interests of countries in a bilateral setting 
and with a focus on power differences.  
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Table 4: Possible Cooperative Version Between States Based on Power 
Calculations 
 
INTEREST 
OF 
COUNTRY 
A 
INTEREST 
OF 
COUNTRY 
B 
BALANCE 
OF POWER 
BETWEEN 
PARTIES 
AIM OF COOPERATION 
Ter. Org. A Ter. Org. A Equal 
Relationship 
Equal parties cooperate with each 
other in a balanced way in their case 
related, linking building, assistance 
providing, and policy coordination 
arrangements of cooperation. 
  Stronger 
Party / 
Weaker Party 
Relationship 
Beside usage of linkage building and 
case related arrangements of 
cooperation, stronger party may 
initiate assistance providing and 
policy coordination methods.  
Ter. Org. A 
and B 
Ter. Org. A 
and D 
Equal Equal parties cooperate with each 
other in a balanced way in their case 
related, linking building, assistance 
providing, and policy coordination 
arrangements of cooperation against 
the common threat of Terrorist 
Organization A. 
If parties have mutual interest in 
their cooperation against individual 
terrorist problems of B and D, then 
they also cooperate for those groups.  
As another option, parties may 
refrain from cooperating on their 
individual terrorist problems of B 
and D, while cooperating on 
common threat of A.  
If individual terrorist group for one 
country is more important than the 
common threat of A, and if the other 
party does not want to cooperate on 
it, then this specific country may 
hinder cooperation. 
  Stronger 
Party / 
Weaker Party 
Relationship  
 
 
 
 
 
Beside usage of linkage building and 
case related arrangements of 
cooperation, stronger party may 
initiate assistance providing and 
policy coordination methods 
regarding the common threat A. 
For the individual terrorist problems 
of B and D, the stronger party may 
want to dominate the cooperative 
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Stronger 
Party / 
Weaker Party 
Relationship 
 
(Continued) 
relationship based on its interests, 
while the weaker party would like to 
increase its strategic and tactical 
capabilities with the help of the 
stronger party. Case related, linking 
building and policy coordination 
initiatives may take mutually. The 
weaker party may request assistance 
from the stronger party 
Although there is a possibility of 
cheating the weaker party, the 
weaker party also has a potential to 
hinder the cooperative relationship 
for the common threat of A, if it 
doesn‘t get its end results from the 
cooperation regarding its own 
terrorism problem. 
Ter. Org. A Ter. Org. D  Equal If mutual interests exist parties may 
cooperate.  
Non-cooperation is also possible.  
Parties try to initiate case related, 
linking building, assistance 
providing, and policy coordination 
arrangements of cooperation to get 
the help of the other party. 
  Stronger 
Party / 
Weaker Party 
Relationship 
If mutual interests exist parties may 
cooperate.  
Non-cooperation is also possible.  
Parties try to initiate case related, 
linking building, assistance 
providing, and policy coordination 
arrangements of cooperation to get 
the help of the other party. 
Ter. Org. A No Problem Equal The party which has the terrorism 
problem tries to convince the other 
party to get its cooperation. They 
initiate case related, linking building, 
assistance providing, and policy 
coordination arrangements of 
cooperation to get the help of the 
other party. 
  Stronger 
Party / 
Weaker Party 
Relationship 
The party which has the terrorism 
problem tries to convince the other 
party to get its cooperation. They 
initiate case related, linking building, 
assistance providing, and policy 
coordination arrangements of 
cooperation to get the help of the 
other party. 
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4.3 Impotency of the Realist-State-Centric Domain Before 9/11 
 Diplomacy, as a tool of the realist/state-centric domain, works generally 
when mutual interests overlap. The interesting character of diplomacy is its 
continuing and endless nature in the pursuit of a state‘s interest. Therefore states 
always follow diplomacy for achieving their aims, although their expectations can 
not be met much of the time. Another characteristic of diplomacy is the dominance 
of foreign affairs entities in diplomatic operations. However, we see that diplomacy 
may not produce the desired end results in terrorism, because of terrorism‘s value-
laden nature. In such circumstances, states may try to benefit from sub-state entities 
and their capabilities of establishing transnational relations. Transnational relations 
of such sub-state entities may open channels for states to develop cooperative 
endeavours, and take advantage of the sub-state entities‘ strategies such as 
establishing linkages, working together on cases, policy coordination, and providing 
assistance.  
 
4.4 New Response Initiatives of the Realist-State-Centric Domain: Recalling the 
Police Liaison System Against Terrorism 
 After decades of the Anarchist era, the emergence of transnational terrorism 
with similarities to Anarchism seems to demand a revival of police cooperation as 
an important international/transnational counter terrorism tool again today. As will 
be explored in Chapter V, it is possible to observe an emphasis on the appointment 
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of bilateral police liaison officers between countries on terrorism related issues. In 
fact, this situation seems to suggest that states have again begun to make room for 
transnational relations carried out by sub-state actors alongside their diplomatic 
channels.   
 As an important theme of this study, the deployment of police liaison 
officers represents itself as having been an important transgovernmental strategy in 
the struggle against drugs in the second half of the 20
th
 century. Usage of this 
method in the fight against terrorism has developed quite slowly in recent years but 
represents a promising trend. It can be argued that the realist/state-centric domain 
was traditionally restricted to diplomacy and foreign affairs entities between the 
Anarchist wave and 9/11, therefore importance given to the bilateral transnational 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies and liaison officer appointments 
should be accepted as a new trend in today‘s response initiatives against terrorism. 
This development can also be shown as the sign of transformation of state in the 
realist/state-centric domain, via the channel of law enforcement bodies as sub-state 
entities.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE LIBERAL / STATE-CENTRIC DOMAIN 
 
 
  
The liberal / state-centric domain basically covers three main areas which 
can be labelled as international organizations, conventions, and lastly regimes. 
International initiatives falling into these three groups can also be divided into two 
groups as global and regional initiatives. Those areas and their varieties are basically 
depicted in Table 5 but will be explored in more detail in the following pages by 
focusing predominantly on police cooperation. 
The main aim in this section is to provide an overview of existing actors that 
fall into the liberal/state-centric domain, and explore their terrorism related 
mandates, aims, and policies. Their abilities and powers in terms of counter 
terrorism capabilities, as based on resources, is also discussed. At the end I hope to 
provide a general view of what kind of actors we have and what their capabilities 
are.  
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Table 5: Main Areas of the Liberal/State-State-Centric Domain 
 
 
 Examples at Global Level Examples at Regional  Level 
 
International 
Organizations 
 
UN 
Interpol 
 
 
Europol 
 
Conventions 
 
According to the UN webpage 
there are 16 international legal 
instruments including 
conventions. A list of those 
instruments will be provided in 
the following pages when 
investigating the conventions in 
detail. It should also be kept in 
mind that those conventions and 
others which are labelled as 
international legal instruments 
by the UN create a regime 
regarding terrorism. Therefore 
although conventions 
themselves may focus on 
specific individual issues, 
aggregation of those 
instruments creates a systemic 
mechanism which can be 
accepted as a regime.  
 
 
We also observe conventions 
of regional organizations 
regarding terrorism. 
Examples of such regional 
organizations are the League 
of Arab States, the Islamic 
Conference, European Union, 
OAS (Organization of 
American States),  OAU 
(Organization of African 
Union), South Asian 
Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) and 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States  
 
Regimes 
(Judicial 
Cooperation 
Regime) 
 
An example of judicial 
cooperation regime is 
extradition. The rule of 
―extradite or prosecute‖ exists 
in most of the UN conventions 
mentioned above. Those 
conventions either require or 
obligate states to prosecute 
offenders if they do not 
extradite them to another state. 
Treaties between individual 
countries also set the standards 
of extradition bilaterally.  
 
 
In regional contexts there 
may also be ground for a 
regime. For example, Europe 
has a European Convention 
on Extradition. 
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The examination method of international organizations will comprise a basic 
history of the organization, its activities regarding terrorism, and relevant police 
cooperation strategies conducted under its authority. As an essential aim, comments 
will be made on how much the policies and initiatives of the specifically examined 
organization s  have contributed to the fight against terrorism. Similar methods will 
be followed for regimes and conventions.  
 
5.1 International Organizations 
International organizations are created to facilitate cooperation with the 
contribution of countries and can be divided into two main groups: global and 
regional organizations. The difficulty in reaching a globally accepted understanding 
and definition of terrorism also negatively influences the efforts of international 
organizations. Despite the existence of this difficulty, international organizations 
have struggled to establish a common understanding and cooperation on terrorism.  
It is evident that the spectrum of international organizations that deal with 
terrorism has expanded widely after the 9/11 attacks. For example, the webpage of 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), titled as 
―Secretariat – Action Against Terrorism Unit,‖ provides a list of 57 International 
partners and explains its activities as ―Aside from providing assistance to OSCE 
participating States, the unit works with a variety of international and regional 
organizations.‖5 Examination of those organizations mentioned as the partners in 
                                                 
5
Retrieved from  http://www.osce.org/atu/13056.html on 08.04.2009. On the webpage, links of 
mentioned organizations are provided to get more information about them. 
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countering terrorism reveals the wide variety of organizations and initiatives in the 
field: Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) , Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) , African Union , Organization 
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization (CACO), Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) , Central European 
Initiative (CEI) , Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in 
Asia (CICA) , Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) , CIS Anti-Terrorism 
Centre (ATC) , Council of Europe (CoE) , CoE Committee of Experts on Terrorism 
(CODEXTER) , CoE MONEYVAL Committee , Commonwealth Secretariat , 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) , Eurasian Economic Community 
(EURASEC) , European Union , Council of the European Union , EUROJUST , 
Europol (European Police Office) , Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF) , Organization for Democracy and Economic Development 
(GUAM) , International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) , International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) , Inter Governmental Authority on Development - 
Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (IGAD-ICPAT) , International 
Labour Organization (ILO) , International Maritime Organization (IMO) , 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) , International Relations and 
Security Network (ISN) , International Organization for Standardization (ISO) - 
Task Force 3 on Machine-Readable Travel Documents , Interpol , League of Arab 
States (LAS) , North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , Organization of 
American States (OAS) , OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS-
CICTE) , Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) , Organisation for the Prohibition of 
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Chemical Weapons (OPCW) , Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) , Regional 
Cooperation Council , Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism 
(SEARCCT) , The SECI Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime , South 
East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) , Stability Pact (SP) , International 
Association of Public Transport (UITP) , United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Committee (UNCTC) , UNSCR 1540 Committee , United Nations Al-Qaida and 
Taliban Sanctions Committee , United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation 
Taskforce , United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) , United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)  , United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) , United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) , United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) , World Bank , World Customs Organization 
(WCO) 
As the focus here is on police cooperation, investigating all those and similar 
entities in detail is not possible. The approach instead will be on highlighting the 
entities which primarily represent or refer to police and law enforcement 
cooperation. In addition to police organizations created to improve police 
cooperation as their sole aim, such as Europol and Interpol, other international and 
regional organizations also give room for guidance and improvements in police 
cooperation. Several of these will be examined below, such as the United Nations, 
OAS, and ASEAN.  
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5.1.1 Global Organizations 
In terms of international organizations with connections to countering 
terrorism, the UN and Interpol are the most well known regarding police 
cooperation.   
 
5.1.1.1 The United Nations 
The United Nations, as the gathering ground for states, plays an important 
role in international cooperation against terrorism. According to Cortright and 
Lopez, ―its role as the primary source of international political legitimacy and legal 
authority for many nations‖ make the UN an important actor in international efforts 
to fight against terrorism for ―developing political consensus for the international 
cooperation.‖ (Cortright and Lopez, 2007:2). The efforts of the UN are vital for law 
enforcement bodies especially after 9/11 because, as Cortright et. al argue, ―the UN 
program has helped to validate the importance of non-military, cooperative law 
enforcement efforts as viable means of countering the terrorism threat.‖ (2007: 25). 
According to the information on the webpage of the UN, the efforts to 
establish an international ground on terrorism go back to the era of the League of 
Nations, which prepared a draft convention for the prevention and punishment of 
terrorism in 1934, adopted it in 1937, but was unable to put it into force.
6
  
                                                 
6
 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml  on 08.06.2008. This UN webpage 
provides a brief history of terrorism related initiatives of United Nations.  
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After its establishment in 1945, The United Nations focused on general 
crime related issues with an aim to formulate general frameworks of international 
cooperation, then by the 1960s, terrorism had also become one of the issue areas of 
the UN. According to the webpage of the organization, since 1963 the UN has 
established 13 universal legal instruments and three amendments about terrorism. 
Substantive changes were introduced to three of these instruments in 2005 and 
efforts are still underway on a draft comprehensive convention on international 
terrorism, which is believed to ―complement the existing framework of international 
anti-terrorism instruments and build on key guiding principles already present in 
recent anti-terrorist conventions.‖7  
This draft 14
th
 convention carries importance, because this convention aims 
to create a global understanding on terrorism, while the previous conventions were 
focused on defining and criminalizing certain terrorist offences. In fact, preparation 
of this convention should be accepted as one of the new dimensions of UN efforts 
after the 9/11 attacks, which urged the organization to develop a wider counter-
terror initiative.  
Actually, the terrorism related activities of the UN may be carried out by 
different bodies of the organization. For example, one new initiative worth 
mentioning here is the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task 
Force (CTITF), established by the Secretary-General in July 2005 to ensure overall 
coordination and coherence in the counter-terrorism efforts of the United Nations 
system with its 24 member entities, eight working groups and two project and 
                                                 
7
 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/terrorism/instruments.shtml, on 23.03.2009 
  
 
129 
 
initiatives.
8
 Concerning the General Assembly, it can be understood that this UN 
body focuses on ―terrorism as an international problem since 1972‖ and in addition 
to its work related to conventions, the Assembly has established four declarations 
and more than 50 resolutions.
9
  
As another entity of the UN structure, the UN Security Council, which ―has 
been dealing with terrorism issues since the early 1990s‖ plays an important role in 
establishing several mechanisms to deal with terrorism, by having four Counter-
Terrorism  related bodies (1267 Committee, CTC (Counter –Terrorism Committee, 
1540 Committee and 1566 Working Group) and more than 40 resolutions.
10
. The 
initial responses of the Council were in the forms of sanctions in the 1990s, such as 
sanctions against Libya and Sudan, which were ―considered to have links to certain 
acts of terrorism‖, as well as the establishment of Committees11.   
                                                 
8
 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml  on 23.03.2009. According to 
information provided on the webpage CTITF member  entities are as follows: Counter-terrorism 
Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) , Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Public Information (DPI) , Department of 
Safety and Security (DSS) , Expert Staff of 1540 Committee , International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) , International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) , International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) , International Monetary Fund (IMF) , International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) , Monitoring Team of 1267 Committee , Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) , 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) , Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) , 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) , Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism , United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) , United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) , 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) , United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) , World Customs Organization (WCO) , World Bank , World Health 
Organization (WHO) .   CTITF Working Groups: Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism 
(I-ACT) , Preventing and Resolving Conflicts , Supporting and Highlighting Victims of Terrorism , 
Preventing and Responding to WMD Attacks , Tackling the Financing of Terrorism , Countering the 
Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes , Strengthening the Protection of Vulnerable Targets , 
Protecting Human Rights While Countering Terrorism, Other CTITF Projects and Initiatives: 
UNICRI Center on Policies to Counter the Appeal of Terrorism , Documentaries Project  
9
 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/terrorism/ga.shtml  on 23.03.2009 
10
 Retrieved from http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml  on 23.03.2009 
11
 Retrieved from  http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml on 23.03.2009 
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It is possible to mention several important steps of the UN following 9/11 in 
the counter-terrorism field to materialize international cooperation worldwide. The 
first step was the establishment of Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001, just 
after the 9/11 attacks. Cortright and et.al. argue that ―Resolution 1373 was 
unparalleled in establishing legal obligations and mobilizing states for a campaign of 
non-military cooperative law enforcement measures to combat global terrorism.‖ 
(Cortright et. al., 2007: 23). Resolution 1373 ―obliges all States to criminalize 
assistance for terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists 
and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks.‖12 The same 
resolution established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor the 
implementation of the resolution, and in 2004, Resolution 1535 created the Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to provide the CTC with expert 
advice. According to Cortright et. al., the CTC Committee is tasked with 
strengthening  ―the counter-terrorism capacity of UN member states‖ (Cortright et. 
al., 2007: 24).  Later important steps were Resolution 1540, which calls on states to 
prevent non-state actors (including terrorist groups) from accessing weapons of mass 
destruction and creates the 1540 Committee.  Also Resolution 1566 in 2004 ―called 
on Member States to take action against groups and organizations engaged in 
terrorist activities that were not subject to the 1267 Committee's review‖.13  
Those actions of the UN can be described as very strong moves in the 
counter-terrorism field. According to Cortright and Lopez, UN activities following 
9/11 ― stimulated significant international action to build counter-terrorism capacity‖ 
                                                 
12
 This sentence which summarizes the main aim of Resolution 1373 has been taken from a page of 
UN.  A link to Resolution 1373 is also provided on the webpage. It is retrieved  from  
http://www.un.org/Docs/ctc/  on 28, 11, 2007 
13
 Retrieved from  http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml on 23.03.2009 
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and ―also sparked greater international cooperation and coordination among regional 
and sub regional organizations, along with specialized international agencies‖ 
(Cortright and Lopez, 2007:10). Cortright et. al. also argue the difficulty of 
measuring the success of non-military counterterrorism efforts of these UN 
activities, but mention successes as establishing a stronger legal foundation, getting 
reports from countries, and a marked increase in the signing of thirteen conventions 
(Cortright et al., 2007: 29).  
It should also be mentioned here that the global counter-terrorism strategy 
adopted by the United Nations and launched  in 2006, presents as the first event that 
―all countries in the world agreed on a common approach to fight terrorism.‖14 The 
strategy is established on the following points:  preventing and combatting 
terrorism; building state capacity to counter terrorism, protecting human rights, and 
addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.  
Although positive developments exist, examination of research also reveals 
several impotencies of UN initiatives, e.g. management problems, lack of harmony 
within the UN system, and lack of resources. In terms of management problems, 
Cortright et.al argue that the CTC was promising at the beginning but ―suffered from 
uneven leadership, administrative and bureaucratic delays, and lack of resources‖  
(Cortright et. al., 2007: 26). Rosand and Millar also argue that the UN framework is 
essential and useful, but the monitoring system is inadequate (Rosand and Millar, 
2007: 52). In their investigation of UN responses, Rosand and Millar, argue that  
―slothful, bureaucratic responses are not sufficient‖ against a threat ―that is 
constantly transforming‖ (Rosand and Millar, 2007: 76). 
                                                 
14
 Retrieved from  http://www.un.org/terrorism/framework.shtml  on 23.03.2009 
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We also observe problems within the organization, where cooperation and 
coordination is found inadequate by Cortright et. al. (2007: 41), who also criticize 
that the United States, the United Kingdom and other permanent states of the 
Security Council were influential in shaping the CTC agenda while developing 
nations had little voice (Cortright et. al., 2007: 27). An important point in the 
structure of the UN counterterrorism system is the existence of different UN bodies 
working on counterterrorism issues with different mandates but working in an 
overlapping manner without adequate coordination (Cortright et. al., 2007: 43, 
Rosand and Millar, 2007: 61) 
As a third issue, we observe that fulfilling UN requirements by most of the 
countries necessitates resources and assistance, which the UN has problems to 
provide. Cortright et. al argue that the CTC and CTED ―have failed to  perform 
adequately in facilitating  the coordinated delivery of assistance by donor countries 
and agencies.‖ (Cortright et. al., 2007: 35). Accordingly, to overcome this problem, 
the establishment of a fund to countries in need of help has been proposed, but the 
fund has not been established yet. One of the reasons mentioned for this is the 
opposition of the USA, allegedly because it sees as adequate the bilateral 
arrangements (Cortright et. al., 2007: 36). Cortright et. al also argue that ―many 
states need help to improve  policing and law enforcement systems‖, but instead of 
using UN channels, donor countries prefer providing assistance bilaterally to 
countries in need (Cortright et. al., 2007: 35). 
Although the UN is still trying to establish a common understanding and 
definition of terrorism,  the UN‘s inability to develop such a common understanding 
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and definition should also be added to the list of its inadequacies (Cortright et. al., 
2007: 44-45,  Rosand and Millar, 2007: 51) 
 
5.1.1.2 Interpol (The International Criminal Police Organization) 
The second largest international organization after the UN is Interpol, which 
was created in 1923. According to the webpage of Interpol it is the world‘s largest 
international police organization with 188 member countries.
15
 Bantekas and Nash 
define Interpol as ―an intergovernmental organization which facilitates co-operation 
between national law enforcement agencies‖ but stress that ―it is not an operational 
agency in the same manner as a conventional domestic police force‖ (Bantekas and 
Nash, 2007; 407-409)
16. Deflem and Maybin define it as ―an organization that aims 
to provide and promote mutual assistance between criminal police authorities within 
the limits of national laws and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights‖ (Deflem 
and Maybin, 2005: 178). Interpol‘s structure includes a General Assembly as the 
supreme governing body meeting annually by delegates of member countries; an 
Executive Committee with 13 members elected by the general assembly; a General 
Secretariat located in Lyon staffed by officials from more than 80 countries, while 
the Secretariat also has six Sub-Regional Bureaus and a liaison office at the United 
Nations in New York; National Central Bureaus (NCB) at each member country; 
Advisors as experts who may be appointed by the Executive Committee and a 
Commission for the Control of Interpol‘s Files as an independent body. 
                                                 
15
 Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp on 01.12.2009. 
16
 Also look at Deflem and Maybin (2005: 178) who argue that ―Interpol  is not a supranational police 
agency with investigative powers but a cooperative network intended to foster collaboration and to 
provide assistance in police work among law enforcement agencies in many nations.‖ 
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According to Interpol‘s webpage, Sub-Regional Bureaus of Interpol are 
located in Abidjan (serving West Africa), Buenos Aires (South America), Harare 
(Southern Africa), Nairobi (East Africa), San Salvador (Central America) and 
Yaounde (Cameroon), while  a liaison office in Bangkok is serving Southeast Asia
17
. 
According to the same source, Regional Bureaus may also work with regional police 
chiefs committees in three designs which are exemplified as follows:   
 1) Regional Bureaus act as the permanent secretariats of the Police Chief 
Committees as follows: 
-Abidjan serves WAPCCO (West African Police Chiefs Committee)  
-Yaoundé serves  CAPCCO (Central African Police Chiefs Committee).  
-Harare serves SARPCCO (Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-
operation Organization).  
-Nairobi serves EAPCCO (East African Police Chiefs Co-operation 
Organization). 
2) In the following examples, RBs are building ties with Police Chief 
Committees in the region: 
-Asia, between the South-East Asia Liaison Office (LoBang) and 
ASEANOPOL (Association of South-East Asian Nations Chiefs of Police);  
-Central America, between the RB in San Salvador and the CJPCAC 
(Comisión de Jefes de Policía de Centro América y el Caribe - Commission of 
Chiefs of Police of Central America and the Caribbean).
18
 
3) And lastly ―Relations between the RBs and the SPCPC (South Pacific 
Chiefs of Police Conference) and the ACCP (Association of Caribbean 
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Retrieved from   http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/srb/default.asp  on 01.12.2009. 
18
 Retrieved from   http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/srb/default.asp on 01.12.2009. 
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Commissioners of Police) are managed directly from the Organization's 
Headquarters in Lyon.‖ 19 
Regarding Interpol another important issue is regional conferences, which 
―bring together National Central Bureaus (NCBs) in each of Interpol‘s four statutory 
regions to discuss global and regional policing issues‖ as committees of the General 
Assembly with a statutory meeting character.
20
 In 1997, Interpol decided to hold 
regular regional conferences on the four continents of Africa, the Americas, Asia 
and Europe.
21
  
Interpol also establishes co-operation agreements with other international 
organizations, and  there are international conventions linked with Interpol. 
22
 
Interpol ―facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists all 
organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat 
international crime.‖23 The webpage of Interpol outlines the core functions of the 
organization, namely,  securing global police communication services by running a 
global police communications system called I-24/7, managing operational data 
services and databases for police by providing databases and services which ensure 
that police worldwide have access to the information and services they need to 
prevent and  investigate crimes, providing operational police support services which 
support law enforcement officials in its priority crime areas of fugitives, public 
                                                 
19
 Retrieved from   http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/srb/default.asp  on 01.12.2009. 
20
 Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Conferences/Default.asp  on 13.04.009.  
21
 Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Americas/Default.asp  on 13.04.2009.  
22
  A detailed list of those material can be found at Interpol webpage from the following adres:  
http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/LegalMaterials/default.asp 
23
 This sentence which identifies the mandate of Interpol has been taken from the webpage of 
Interpol. It is retrieved from  http://www.interpol.org/public/icpo/default.asp  on 28, 11, 2007 
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safety and terrorism, drugs and organized crime, trafficking in human beings and 
financial and high-tech crime, and carrying out police training and development.
24
 
Terrorism was not on Interpol‘s agenda for a long time due to the issue‘s 
political nature (Fooner, 1989: 9-10). This approach was reflected in Article 3 of its 
constitution as follows: "It is strictly forbidden for the Organization  to undertake 
any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character"
25
. 
It is argued on the Interpol webpage that there are three resolutions which modified 
the framework for interpreting Article 3
26
. The first move was at Lisbon in 1951, 
when the theory of predominance was introduced, so the Organization examined the 
requests on a case by case basis without being bound by the requesting country. But 
the real change came in 1984, when a resolution accepted at the Luxembourg 
General Assembly permitted the organization to become involved with terrorist 
cases under certain conditions. Bresler notes that in 1985 decision was taken to 
establish a specialist Anti-Terrorism Group at the Washington General Assembly 
(Bresler, 1992: 257). Then another resolution at Rome in 1994 enabled Interpol to 
‖process requests concerning violations of humanitarian law under certain 
conditions‖27. Regarding Article 3 of Interpol‘s constitution, which forbids 
intervention in cases with political, military, religious or racial character, Bantekas 
and Nash argue that Interpol has intended to bring a change in 1984. Although 
Interpol did not then amend article 3, nevertheless ―the revised guidelines provided 
                                                 
24
 Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/about.asp  on 24.03.009. 
25
Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FS07.asp  on 
24.03.2009. 
26
Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FS07.asp  on 
24.03.2009. 
27
 Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FS07.asp   on 
24.03.004. 
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Interpol with a more pragmatic basis for distinguishing between ordinary criminal 
offences and ‗politically motivated offences‘‖ (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 409).  
Although the above mentioned resolutions are key changes mentioned on the 
Interpol webpage, Deflem and Maybin propose that Interpol, within its legal 
borders, has developed antiterrorist activities since the 1970s, beginning with a 
resolution which focused on cooperation regarding criminal acts against civil 
international aviation, which was followed by a 1971 resolution focused on the 
holding of hostages, a 1979 resolution about organized crime, and a 1981 resolution 
about explosive substances. Deflem and Maybin then point out that ―Interpol took a 
more explicit move toward the policing of terrorism in 1983,‖ and they go on to 
describe developments in the following years including the General Assembly 
Meeting in Washington in 1985 (Deflem and Maybin, 2005: 178-179). According to 
Deflem and Maybin, with those changes Interpol mainly tried to depoliticize 
terrorism by breaking down a politically sensitive crime into several components, in 
order to focus on only its criminal components and thereby make police cooperation 
and investigation possible (Deflem and Maybin, 2005: 175, 180, 188).  
Fooner (1989:10) argues that Interpol was too late to enter into the terrorism 
field in the 1960s because there were already several antiterrorist organizations, 
theories, and systems related to terrorism at that time. We have also read in the 
relevant parts of this thesis that Interpol‘s reluctance to deal with terrorism cases 
drove European Police Organizations to establish their own cooperative schemes.  
However, we  can also observe that Interpol has made changes in its policies 
regarding terrorism cases. Especially in the years since 9/11, the organization‘s 
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counter-terrorism related activities have increased dramatically, making terrorism 
one of Interpol‘s priority areas.  
According to the information on Interpol`s webpage the organization‘s 
several activities in the fight against terrorism include supporting member states by 
making resources available, information gathering, processing and dissemination to 
member states as observed in the example of the Fusion Task Force created after 
9/11. They also include issuing practical guidelines and implementing projects in 
coordination with national bureaus and regional offices.
28
 
While describing Interpol‘s activities, Bantekas and Nash (2007:412) 
mention the organization‘s various terrorism related activities; for example an 
Interpol-UN Special Security Council Notice, which ―is used to identify terrorist 
suspects who are banned from using international travel or from using financial 
institutions.‖  As another point ―Interpol also sends incident response teams (IRT) to 
the scene of natural disasters and terrorist attacks‖ to provide assistance to national 
authorities (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 413).  
Although positive remarks and developments have taken place in terms of 
Interpol‘s activities against terrorism, we should also take into account the various 
problems that have emerged throughout the organization‘s history. As mentioned 
above, Interpol had problems in dealing with crimes of political, ethnic and religious 
nature because of Article 3 of its constitution. As Deflem and Maybin point out, 
Interpol‘s structure may bring different national police forces together, but national 
concerns affect international cooperation. and the lack of a universally accepted 
definition of terrorism makes enforcement at an international level difficult (Deflem 
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139 
 
and Maybin, 2005: 183-188).  This is an inherent problem of Interpol emanating 
from its organizational structure. Because of Interpol‘s inefficiency in terrorism 
related issues we observe that other initiatives may be searched by states. For 
example, Interpol‘s inability is shown as an important reason for the establishment 
of TREVI by European countries (Deflem and Maybin, 2005: 185, Gammelgard: 
2001: 238) In an attempt to overcome this problem, Interpol has established several 
resolutions to make room for dealing with such crimes. Their success remains to be 
seen. Even after 9/11, Deflem argues, FBI officials preferred unilaterally conducted 
operations instead of sharing sensitive information with Interpol  (Deflem and 
Maybin, 2005: 184).  
Bantekas and Nash also point out several problems during the period 
between 1970 and 1990, in terms of Interpol‘s inefficiency in matters of internal 
security, disclosure of information relating to serious crimes, passing information to 
terrorist organizations by representatives of States allegedly sympathetic to terrorist 
organizations, and membership of several states that were allegedly harboring 
international terrorists (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 413-414). An inefficient system of 
information exchange due to the organization‘s bureaucratic and laborious nature is 
another point of criticism (Bantekas and Nash, 2007:414) which personal 
communications with active liaison officers at Interpol also reveal. It should be 
noted that Bantekas and Nash go on to point out positive moves by Interpol, 
including the reiteration of the prohibition of political, ethnic and religious disputes 
by the Secretary General of Interpol after 9/11, and effective improvements in 
telecommunication security (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 414). 
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5.1.2 Regional Initiatives 
 
5.1.2.1 Europe 
 
5.1.2.1.1 Brief History of Police Cooperation in Europe 
In terms of regional organizations focusing on crime and terrorism, Europe is 
a very active region. European countries have instigated different initiatives, which 
also focused on anti-terrorism cooperation such as Europol, the Southeast European 
Cooperation Initiative (SECI), the Nordic Police and Customs Cooperation (PTN),  
and Schengen. Currently, Europol as a police entity plays a dominant role within the 
EU in terms of police cooperation. Therefore this section investigates Europol in 
greatest detail, while giving brief information about other entities. 
 Counter-terrorism initiatives by European countries go back to the 1970s 
when terrorism emerged as an important issue (Bures and Ahern, 2007: 188, 
Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 423). The terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972 
increased the fears of terrorism in Europe. According to Anderson et. al. (1995:53), 
Interpol`s Secretary General Nepote rejected getting involved with terrorism during 
this period. Bantekas and Nash also mention the European view during this period 
that ‖Interpol was not serving the interests of European countries as well as it 
should‖ (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 423). Consequently, the European Community 
looked for its own initiatives to deal with the problem and created TREVI in Rome 
in mid 1970s as a forum to coordinate an effective response to international 
terrorism (Anderson et.al: 1995: 53, Bures and Ahern, 2007: 189). The States of the 
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European Community found TREVI more effective than Interpol (Bures and Ahern, 
189). Lodge also mentions the dissatisfaction of EC states towards international 
measures against terrorism, while establishing their own structure throughout the 
1970s and 80s (Lodge, 1989: 30). The Treaty on European Union  of 1992 
(Maastricht Treaty) established the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar, which covered 
TREVI and previous informal structures, with a provision for the establishment of 
Europol, which came into existence in 1999 by terminating its predecessor, the 
Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) that was operationalized in 1994 (Bures and Ahern, 
2007: 189-190). The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and The Tampere European 
Council decisions in 1999 also contributed to counter-terrorism and police 
cooperation, which are now placed under the area of freedom, security, and justice. 
Other initiatives by European countries are worth noting. The Policing 
Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT) was established in 1979 following the 
murder of the British Ambassador to The Hague, with an aim to develop cooperation 
against terrorism among relevant organizations (Benyon et. al. 1993: 187, 188).  
According to Benyon, PWGOT established its own communication system, one 
reason for which was reluctance to use Interpol facilities for security reasons 
(Benyon et. al. 1993: 188). PWGOT has organized conferences and carried out 
exchanges of personnel for improving cooperation (Benyon et. al. 1993:  188-189). 
Based on quotation from Bresler , Benyon et. al. implies  that trusting each other and 
passing information to each other without question were the characteristics of the 
relations within PWGOT (Benyon et. al. 1993: 190, Bresler, 1992:162). This is an 
important finding because it can be said to reflect the informal nature of cooperation 
and the level of trust between police forces in Europe during this period.  
  
 
142 
 
 In addition to TREVI and PWGOT, Anderson et. al. point to the 
establishment of other initiatives such as the Club of Berne, the Club of Vienna, and 
the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism; however, those 
initiatives are found limited because of differences among states (Anderson et. al., 
1995: 29)  
Benyon et. al also argue that there were secret networks, whose existence 
and activities were often hidden from public view, ―for the exchange of intelligence 
on an international and European level‖ (Benyon et. al. 1993: 212, 216). They argue 
that Kilowatt, the Vienna Group and The Berne Club could be considered as falling 
into the category of such secret networks. Kilowatt was formed in the late 1970s to 
combat terrorism rooted from the Middle East. Its contributors are believed to be 
―the security agencies of all EU countries plus Canada, Israel, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United States.‖ (Benyon et. al. 1993: 284). The Vienna Group, 
formed in 1978 by the Interior Ministers of Austria, France, Germany, Italy and 
Switzerland on terrorism related issues, holds annual meetings by ministers and 
divisional managers of security agencies (Benyon et. al. 1993: 284). The Club of 
Berne, formed in 1971, includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and the United States, and is a 
forum for discussions on the suppression of terrorism and espionage (Benyon et. al. 
1993: 284). Moving on to the Counter-terrorism Group (CTG), Keohane argues that 
Club of Berne ―brings together the heads of all 25 EU domestic intelligence 
services, plus those from Norway and Switzerland‖ and that these intelligence heads 
established the CTG in 2001. (Keohane, 2005: 30). According to Keohane the CTG 
works closely with the EU but there is no formal links and ―most national 
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intelligence services are reluctant to give the EU any formal role― (Keohane, 2005: 
30-31). Benyon et. al also mention another secret network as the Star Group, 
established in 1972 by the lead of BKA for cooperation against drug trafficking 
(Benyon et. al. 1993: 284). 
 
5.1.2.1.2 EU Based Initiatives 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council titled as ―Enhancing police and customs cooperation in the European 
Union‖ (COM (2004) 376) basically reveals structures related to police cooperation 
within the EU which covers Schengen Cooperation, Europol, Task Force of EU 
Police Chiefs, The European Police College and other subjects areas of cooperation 
such as investigative techniques, forensic science, terrorism, public order and 
security of high-level meetings (EU, 2004) 
Among those groups, Europol and Schengen will be explored here in detail 
as key police cooperation structures. Before going into the details of these two 
entities, brief definitions of the Task Force of EU Police Chiefs and The European 
Police College will be provided.  
The European Police Chiefs Operational Task Force (TFPC) was established 
by the Tampere European Council ―to exchange, in cooperation with Europol, 
experience, best practices and information on current trends in cross-border crime‖ 
(EU, 2004: 19). This initiative can be interpreted as ineffective because leading 
police officials of member states do not give priority to European issues, differences 
in the competences of police representatives, structural differences of member 
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countries (in some states there is one national head of police but in federal systems 
the representation is complex) and overloaded agendas; however TFPC meetings are 
believed to improve bilateral and multilateral contacts. (EU, 2004: 20)  
 
5.1.2.1.2.1 The European Police College (CEPOL)  
The European Police College (CEPOL) was established by decision of the 
Council on 22 December 2000 as a network of national training institutes to increase 
knowledge related to police organization and structures, to provide training, and to 
encourage co-operation with other training institutes (EU, 2004: 21). Although 
CEPOL has had structural problems, it managed to establish the ―European Police 
Learning Network‖ (EPLN), an Internet site offering virtual police training (EU, 
2004: 22).  
 
5.1.2.1.2.2 Europol 
The best known European initiative, Europol, was put into operation in 1999. 
The following section attempts  to understand both Europol and also several aspects 
of the EU‘s policies regarding police cooperation. According to its webpage: 
Europol is the European Union law enforcement organisation that 
handles criminal intelligence. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness 
and cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member 
States in preventing and combating serious international organised 
crime and terrorism. The mission of Europol is to make a significant 
contribution to the European Union‘s law enforcement action against 
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organised crime and terrorism, with an emphasis on targeting criminal 
organizations.
29
  
In the EU structure Europol is accountable to the Council of Ministers for 
Justice and Home Affairs, which is responsible for the main control and guidance.
30
 
Bantekas and Nash criticize this situation, because Europol activities ―have not been 
subject to any significant scrutiny by the European Parliament‖ (Bantekas and Nash, 
2007: 423). 
Within its structure it also has a liaison system, in which every member 
country to Europol has representatives in Europol headquarters in the Hague. Those 
representatives are called as Europol liaison officers (ELOs) who are ―seconded to 
Europol by the Member States as representatives of their national law enforcement 
agencies‖.31 However, third parties and organizations with agreements can also send 
liaison officers. According to the 2007 Europol Annual Report, the personnel of 
Europol consists of 421 Europol Staff, 114 Europol Liaison Officers (working for 
and under the authority of the member states or third states and organizations with 
an cooperation agreement signed with Europol), and 57 others such as national or 
seconded experts (Europol 2007 Report; 2008:42), Accordingly, the numbers of 
liaison officers at Europol are as follows: Austria 3, Belgium 6, Bulgaria 2, Cyprus , 
the Czech Republic 2, Denmark 5, Estonia 3, Finland 3, France 8, Germany 7, 
Greece 4, Hungary 5, Ireland , Italy 3, Latvia 1, Lithuania 3, Luxemburg 1, Malta 1, 
Netherlands 9, Poland 2, Portugal 3, Romania 2, Slovakia 2, Slovenia 2, Spain 6, 
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 Retrieved from  http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=facts   on 30.03.2009 
30
 Retrieved from http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=mgmtcontrol&language=    on 
30.03.2009 
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Sweden 4, United Kingdom 8, Australia 1, Canada 2, Colombia 3, Iceland 1, 
Norway, Switzerland, USA 3 and Interpol 1. (Europol Annual Report 2007, 2008: 
42). In addition to attending general meetings, countries can send their 
representatives to talk directly on site with the other relevant representatives. 
According to a manager in Europol‘s Counter-Terrorism Unit; 
If there is a vital issue to be shared among all member countries, 
gathering all the representatives together only takes a matter of 
minutes—a tremendous advantage as it allows for all countries to be 
immediately informed about an urgent issue (Interview on 15/11/ 
2006).  
Establishing Europol was the result of a series of meetings and summits by 
member states. The first ring of the series was the Maastricht Treaty of February 7, 
1992, which proposed the establishment of Europol with an aim of succeeding 
police cooperation between member states. The Political Declaration 32 on Police 
Cooperation was also signed in February 1992 by member states for committing 
themselves to cooperation (Rauchs and Koenig, 2001: 46), and the Europol 
Convention of 1995, that came into force in 1998, ―provides the legal basis for 
Europol‖ (Europol, 2008: 41). Europol, as a successor to the Europol Drugs Unit 
established in 1995, became active in 1999.
 32
 According to the Europol Annual 
Report 2007, three protocols amending the Europol Convention entered into force in 
2007 (Europol, 2008: 41).   
According to a Europol  fact sheet, the organization supports law 
enforcement activities of the member states mainly against illicit drug trafficking, 
illicit immigration networks, terrorism, forgery of money (counterfeiting of the 
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Euro) and other means of payment, trafficking in human beings (including child 
pornography), illicit vehicle trafficking, and money laundering.
33
  
Rauchs and Koenig argue that Europol‘s mandate , ―as of 1999, has been 
extended to include far more than illicit drug trafficking‖ including terrorism 
(Rauchs and Koenig, 2001: 44). In the field of terrorism ―Europol created a 
counterterrorism preparatory group‖ in 1998 and as a result of the report of this 
group, Europol`s mandate has been extended to include counterterrorism (Rauchs 
and Koenig, 2001: 54). Since then Europol has developed different programs in its 
counter-terrorism activities such as the Counter Terrorism Program (CTP), the 
Counter Proliferation Program (CPP), the Networking Program (NP), the 
Preparedness Program (PP) and the Training and Education Program (TEP) 
(Europol, 2006). 
After the September 11 attacks, the European Union issued several decisions 
for struggling against terrorism. Those decisions focused on aligning terrorism 
related legislation, setting out minimum rules on terrorist offences, setting up 
cooperation between member states, combating the financing of terrorist groups, and 
easing information sharing between countries. The EU`s Plan of Action  after 9/11 
included the establishment of a European arrest warrant, enhancement of 
cooperation and intelligence sharing, enhancement of judicial cooperation through 
Eurojust, establishing a binding definition, and identification of terrorist groups 
(Keohane, 2005: 17-19). 
According to information on the Europol webpage, Europol supports 
member states by facilitating the exchange of information between Europol Liaison 
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Officers (ELOs), providing operational analysis, generating strategic reports and 
crime analysis, and providing expertise and technical support for investigations and 
operations.
34
 
 As can be understood from this overview, Europol is performing as an 
intelligence gathering and analysis entity. It does not have an armed force. It 
depends on activities and cooperation of its member`s national law enforcement 
bodies. As mentioned in the 2007 Europol Annual Report,  Europol has cooperative 
agreements with the states of Australia, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, USA, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Columbia, Moldova, Russian 
Federation and Turkey and with organizations such as Eurojust, Interpol, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, European Commission, European Monitoring 
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, World Customs Organisation. (Europol 
Annual Report 2007, 2008: 49). 
Despite those developments, Bures and Ahern find EU`s post 9/11 
counterterrorism policy ―to be more of a paper tiger than an effective counter-
terrorism device‖ even though it achieved legal arrangements and cooperation 
strengthening measures (Bures and Ahern, 2007: 187). Keohane also mentions 
several problems related to the EU‘s counter-terrorism policies. For Keohane, the 
EU‘s ability to tackle terrorism is limited for at least two reasons: first ―the EU is not 
a national government‖ and second, ―‗counter-terrorism‘ is not in itself a defined 
policy area‖ (Keohane, 2005: 2). Keohane also points out differences between EU 
governments in prosecuting terrorists and organizing police forces (Keohane, 2005: 
5-6). In terms of organizing police forces differently, Keohane argues that some 
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countries have a dual system (as in the case of France and Italy where the 
carabinieri in Italy and the gendarmerie in France is answerable to the defense 
ministry while the others are answerable to the justice or interior ministry), while 
others have national (Denmark, Finland, Ireland) or decentralised (UK and Spain) 
forces (Keohane, 2005: 6). Brady also mentions differences in organizing police 
forces as ―Europe‘s 1.2 million police officers operate in very different, and at times, 
incompatible ways‖ (Brady,2008:104). 
Bantekas and Nash argue that Europol has the ―power to obtain and hold a 
wide range of information‖ but this situation creates problems in terms of scrutiny 
and accountability (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 425). Another issue that Bantekas and 
Nash mention is the agreement between the US and Europol on exchange of 
personal data which created concern regarding data protection (Bantekas and Nash, 
2007:427). Bantekas and Nash also mention two major criticisms as legal deficit 
(Europol‘s exemption from ECJ‘s review of cases involving matters of law and 
order) and democratic deficit (its lack of accountability before the European 
Parliament) (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 427-428). 
One more criticism that Keohane argues is the prosecution differences of EU 
countries: Accordingly; 
EU governments prosecute terrorists in different ways. For instance, 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands have weak terrorism laws 
and therefore often have difficulty in keeping suspects in jail. In 
Germany, Al-Qaeda suspects remain free, when in other countries 
they would face arrest. In Britain, where the terrorism laws are 
tougher, it is the secret services that dominate the country‘s 
antiterrorism efforts. In France and Spain, a special counter-
terrorism judge investigates and prosecutes suspected terrorists. 
(Keohane, 2005: 5). 
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  Keohane also mentions Javier Solana‘s internal report in 2004, which 
identifies three shortfalls: non-implementation of EU agreements by some states; 
lacking of sufficient resources; and poor co-ordination between EU officials 
working on law enforcement, foreign and defense policies. (Keohane, 2005: 18). 
Other points that Keohane mentions are the existence of a plethora of other 
institutions and committees but the lack of Europol‘s lead institution role in 
counterterrorism efforts partly because not all national relevant parties share 
information with Europol and  partly because EU governments do not take Europol 
seriously (Keohane, 2005: 19-20). Keohane points out that anti-terrorist 
operations are carried out by member-states alone, not by the EU; but EU measures 
such as the arrest warrant can help the governments  (Keohane, 2005: 21). 
Therefore, Keohane mentions that the EU is encouraging usage of joint 
investigations and co-operation between smaller groups of governments and finds 
those flexible arrangements right due to their design ―to encourage better cross-
border co-operation, rather than relying solely on agreements between the 25 
governments in Brussels‖ (Keohane, 2005: 21-22). 
 For Brady, ―Europol has yet to become indispensable in cross-border 
investigations, partly due to serious bureaucratic problems that inhibit its usefulness. 
Governments are in the process of negotiating a major overhaul of the organization‘s 
basic powers‖ (Brady, 2008:104). In a pessimistic comment, Brady also argues that 
―law enforcement cooperation across Europe as a whole has yet to match the degree 
of cooperation achieved by the criminals‖ (Brady, 2008:104). 
Interviews with practitioners and liaison officers also reveal several 
impotencies regarding cooperation at Europol. For example, an official at Europol 
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explained to me that ―although states are obliged to give information to Europol 
about their activities and cases, there are states that give no information‖ (Interview 
on 15/11/2006). Several liaison officers also believe that international organizations 
are not productive in specific urgent cases. In the words of one liaison officer at 
Europol: ―International organizations such as Europol and Interpol are good for 
coming together, talking on issues, setting agendas, and planning the future, but I do 
not believe that they help in cases when urgent response is needed‖ (Interview on 
17/08/2006).   
 
5.1.2.1.2.3 Schengen 
Schengen was agreed upon in 1985 by France, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg, and then the Schengen Implementing Convention 
was introduced in 1990 by creating a territory called the ―Schengen Area,‖ in which 
free movement of goods, services, capital and workers was enabled (Bantekas and 
Nash, 2007: 428-429). The Convention also allowed for the establishment of an 
information system called SIS (Schengen Information System). A new second 
generation information system called SIS II is under progress. Based on Anderson 
et.al.‘s (1995: 58) arguments, improving co-operation between customs and police 
authorities in drugs, serious international crime and illegal immigration were the 
main aims behind the setting up of the SIS. Bantekas and Nash also argues that 
Schengen introduced ―a system of compensatory measures centered on policing and 
immigration which were designed to tackle the increase in cross-border crime‖ 
(Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 429). Among other police cooperation issues Schengen 
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also provides hot pursuit possibility, meaning that police can pursue fugitives across 
borders (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 429). There is also ―provision for the exchange 
of liaison officers between the parties‖ (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 430). The 
Schengen Agreement was incorporated into the framework of the EU in 1999 by a 
protocol (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 430). There are previous agreements and 
arrangements between several European countries predating the Schengen 
Agreement, such as the 1958 Benelux Treaty, the 1977 Convention of Paris, the 
1984 Saarbrücken Agreement, and the 1949 Police Border Agreement between the 
Netherlands and Belgium (Anderson et.al., 1995: 59-60). Currently all EU countries 
are full Schengen members except for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the 
United Kingdom (EU, 2010). Although the UK and Ireland are members of the 
European Union, they have not signed the  Schengen Convention, but they partially 
participate in Schengen issues related to policing and judicial cooperation (Bantekas 
and Nash, 2007: 430). 
 
5.1.2.1.3 Initiatives Outside the EU Framework 
 Beside initiatives and organizations within the EU structure, I also would 
like to mention several other initiatives in Europe, such as the OSCE, the SECİ 
Center, PTN, and others.  
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5.1.2.1.3.1 OSCE 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an 
international organization, which has 56 participating states from Europe,  Central 
Asia, and North America. It was established in the 1970s as the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) with an aim to safeguard security, and 
functioned as a series of meetings and conferences until 1990. It then focused on 
responding to the new challenges of the post-Cold War period, and its name was 
changed to OSCE in 1994.
35
 The OSCE is concerned with early warning, conflict 
prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation through its 19 
missions or field operations in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, 
and Central Asia.
36
 
 The OSCE also has policing activities. According to its webpage the 
organization  has strengthened its police-related activities regarding  transnational 
and organized crime, while other policing activities are pronounced as having 
advisers and assistance programmes in missions, providing police 
education/training, community policing, and supporting administrative/structural 
reforms.
37
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 Retrieved from  http://www.osce.org/about/19298.html  on 25.03.2009. 
36
 Retrieved from  http://www.osce.org/about/19298.html  on 25.03.2009. 
37
 Retrieved from  http://www.osce.org/activities/13046.html  on 25.03.2009. 
  
 
154 
 
5.1.2.1.3.2 SECI Center 
 According to its webpage, SECI Center (The Southeast European 
Cooperation Initiative) ―is an operational regional organization bringing together 
police and customs authorities from 13 member countries in Southeast Europe‖38.  
The agreement to establish SECI was signed on 26 May 1999, with the agreement 
entering into force on 1 February 2000. The headquarters are located in Bucharest, 
Romania. Currently, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, 
Hungary, the F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovenia, and Turkey are the member countries. As a real operative collaboration of 
customs and police forces, the organization works ―under the guidance and counsel 
of recommendations and directives of the INTERPOL and WCO‖39 
According to the webpage of SECI, the organization commit itself ―to 
sustain the Southeast European countries‘ declared war against organized crime and 
to strengthen the law enforcement capabilities for countering organized crime.‖40 
 SECI is constituted by police and customs representatives. Liaison officers 
of member states are placed in one place for the aim of speeding up the exchange of 
information process. SECI has several task forces, including those on Human 
Trafficking, Drugs Trafficking, Financial and Computer Crime, Stolen Vehicles, and 
Container Security. It also has an Anti-Terrorism Task Force, which aims ―to help 
identify operational, legislative and structural obstacles in cooperation against crime 
and terrorism in the region, create links and trust among investigators.‖41 
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 Retrieved from  http://www.secicenter.org/  on 25.03.2009. 
39
 Retrieved from  http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About_SECI  on 25.03.2009.  
40
 Retrieved from  http://www.secicenter.org/p128/Mission_and_objectives   on 25.03.2009. 
41
 Retrieved from http://www.secicenter.org/p263/Anti_Terrorism_Task_Force  on 25.03.2009.  
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5.1.2.1.3.3 PTN 
The Nordic Cooperation and Nordic Police and Customs Cooperation (PTN) 
is a cooperative initiative of Nordic Countries that has been in existence since the 
1970s (EU, 2003b: 7, 12). According to the website of Danish National Police: 
Police and Customs Cooperation in the Nordic countries (PTN) was 
established in 1984, and was directed solely against drug-related 
crime. But in 1996, acknowledging that cross-border crime between 
the Nordic countries was taking on a wider aspect, the Nordic 
Ministers for Justice decided that the PTN cooperation should be 
extended to include all forms of cross-border crime.
 42 
 
 
An interesting note about the PTN countries is that they have common 
liaison officers. In this system, a liaison officer from one Nordic country may 
represent all Nordic countries in a host country. 
 
5.1.2.1.4 Other Cooperative Initiatives in Europe 
The establishment of bilateral and multilateral police cooperation initiatives 
has been a common practice in Europe. In fact we see that EU also promotes such 
cooperative practices in Europe. In his 2005 article, Keohane argues that ―the EU 
encourages smaller groups of governments to co-operate more closely on joint 
investigations and prosecutions‖ then he gives the following bilateral and 
multilateral examples: establishment of a combined counter-terrorism unit by France 
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Retrieved from http://www.politi.dk/en_gl/International_cooperation/?WBCMODE=Presentation 
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and Spain in 2004, agreement signed by British and Irish governments in 2005 to 
deepen their anti-terrorism collaboration, meetings of the interior ministers of the 
five biggest EU member-states (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) to 
discuss counter-terrorism efforts; the Benelux Countries; the Salzburg Group 
(Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, and  Ukraine as 
observer), the Baltic Sea Task Force (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden) (Keohane , 2005; 21) 
There are also other cooperative initiatives in Europe. Among the many  
examples we can count here the following ones as examples drawn from various 
sources. Austria is an active country in establishing cooperative police initiatives in 
its region as seen in the establishment of MEPA (Middle European Police 
Academy). Edelbacher writes that a former police president of Vienna, Dr. Bögl, 
and a former Hungarian Ambassador to Austria, Dr. Fontane, agreed to create the 
Austrian-Hungarian Police Academy in 1991 (Edelbacher, 2001: 123). Later, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Switzerland joined this 
Academy and it became MEPA. At MEPA, young leaders of law enforcement 
receive two to three months of training.  
 Edelbacher (2001: 126) also notes that police presidents and heads of 
criminal sections of the cities of Berlin, Bern, Bratislava, Budapest, Munich, Prague 
and Vienna meet regularly.  
 The Netherlands have established Police Partnership Programs (PPP) with 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, the aim of which is to promote the 
exchange of professional knowledge and experience, a sharing of best police 
practices, and the creation of mutual understanding and respect (Mlicki, 2001: 219) 
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 In the trinational Upper Rhine Area of Basel (Switzerland), Freiburg 
(Germany) and Mulhouse (France), a close international cooperation has been 
established since 1980, and was later enriched in 1996 by a conference system  
(Mohler, 2001: 277). 
 Schulte also talks about the Association of European Police Colleges 
(AEPC) which was created by leading police colleges in 1996 (Schulte, 2001: 155). 
 It is also observed that Interpol has involvement in a number of European 
cooperation initiatives which are Stability pact for South Eastern Europe, Southeast 
European Co-operative Initiative (SECI), Southeast Europe Police Chiefs 
Association, United Nations interim administration Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK), 
European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPMBH), Europol, 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders (FRONTEX), Other European union institutions and projects (European 
Union/Interpol Cards Project, European Police Chiefs Task Force), the Task Force 
on organized crime in the Baltic Sea region (BSTF), The Commonwealth of the 
Independent States (CIS), TACIS Russian Federation and Ukraine and International 
Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) 
43
 
 According to Interpol‘s webpage, SEPCA – the Southeast Europe Police 
Chiefs Association-- includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 
Serbia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Moldova Montenegro) is supported by Canadian authorities ―to improve police 
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 Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Europe/coopInitiatives.asp  on 13.04.2009. 
Detailed information about those initiatives can be found on this webpage. 
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cooperation between members, develop professionalism, and facilitate reforms in 
the police services.‖44 
 
5.1.2.2 America 
According to Villacis  ‖the main forum for taking counter-terrorism action‖ 
at the Western Hemisphere is the Organization of American States (OAS), which 
was established in 1948 (Villacis, 2006: 149).  OAS is an international organization 
developed by the countries of the Americas to ―achieve an order of peace and 
justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend 
their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence.‖45 The OAS is 
made up 35 member states which are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Grenada, Suriname, 
Dominica, Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
The Bahamas, St. Kitts and Nevis, Canada, Belize, and Guyana. The Cuba 
government has been excluded from participation since 1962, however, so the 
number of active participants is 34.
46
 
Villacis argues that terrorism has been on the agenda of the OAS since the 
1960s and in 1971 the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism was 
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 Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Europe/coopInitiatives.asp#3a   on 
13.04.2009 
45
 Retrieved from http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/faq_detail.asp?sec=37  on 07.04.2009. 
46
 Retrieved from http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/faq_detail.asp?sec=38  on 07.04.2009. By the 
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adopted as a legal regime (Villacis, 2006: 149). Examples of previous important 
terrorist events in the history of the OAS are the bombing at the Israeli Embassy in 
Buenos Aires, in 1992; the bombing of the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association 
building in 1994, and the seizure of  the Japanese Embassy in Peru by rebels in 
1996. In terms of current situation, The Inter-American Convention against 
Terrorism of  2002 draws the general lines of cooperative efforts in the region while 
the CICTE (The OAS‘ Inter-American Committee against Terrorism) seems to be 
the leading organization in building and developing cooperation between member 
states against terrorism.  
 From the account of Villacis we understood that establishing a common 
definition was also on the agenda of OAS but then ―…it was agreed to forgo 
defining terrorism strictu senso in order to avoid having the same discussions and 
the lack of results in other fora‖ and so the OAS Convention followed the sectoral 
approach (Villacis, 2006: 150). Villacis mentions the lack of counter-terrorism 
capabilities in many countries as one of the grave shortcomings of the OAS, 
although the existence of political will provides a positive point (Villacis, 2006: 
153). 
Beside the OAS, several authors also mention other cooperative initiatives in 
the region. Within South America there are bilateral, regional and multiregional 
initiatives. The most important regional initiative is MERCOSUR, which is a trading 
block similar to the European Union, and formed by Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and 
Paraguay. The national heads of police forces of MERCOSUR states have regular 
meetings (Marsiglia, 2001: 102). According to Marsiglia, the main fields of 
cooperation are exchange of criminal information and training exchange between 
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Nations (Marsiglia, 2001: 100 ). Marsiglia also notes that ―Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Venezuela have a combined illegal drug-fighting strategy,‖ and 
also Interpol has a sub-regional bureau in Buenos Aires, which manages cooperation 
between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela (Marsiglia, 2001:101). For Marsiglia, the main 
extraregional cooperation partners are USA (mainly DEA) and Europe (through 
IRELA – the Institute for Relations between Europe and Latin America) (Marsiglia, 
2001:101) 
It is also clear from the literature and from reports that the relationship 
between the USA and Canada is quite close. An example of cooperation between the 
USA and Canada is the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), a 
police association created in the USA, but with members mostly from both countries 
(Deflem, 2001:72).  
We learn from the Interpol webpage that a regional police committee exists 
in Central America called the CJPCAC (Comisión de Jefes de Policía de Centro 
América y el Caribe - Commission of Chiefs of Police of Central America and the 
Caribbean) and the Interpol Regional Bureau in San Salvador is trying to build 
relations with that committee. 
47
 
  
5.1.2.3 Africa  
The African Union is the most important organization in Africa for dealing 
with terrorism. The African Union is the new name of The Organization African 
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161 
 
Unity (OAU) established in 1963 and replaced with African Union in 2002. It has 53 
member states. One of the aims of the Union is ―to promote peace, security, and 
stability on the continent‖48 The African Union has established instruments to fight 
against terrorism, such as the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combatting of Terrorism, the 2002 Plan of Action of the African Union for the 
Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism, and the 2004 Protocol to the OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism.
49
 Those instruments 
have articles related to promoting police and law enforcement cooperation. Also, the 
African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), as an institution 
of the AU Commission, has been created ―to boost the capacity of the Union in the 
prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa,‖ The center was established in 
Algiers in 2004 by OAU members.
50
 Kanu (2006: 171) points to the Embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and argues that the fight against terrorism 
began in earnest in Africa long before other parts of the world,  although the attacks 
in the US on 9/11 propelled the world into action. According to Kanu, the African 
Union has done its best in  responding to terrorism, and implies that much more 
must be done to tackle ―..its root causes such as poverty, underdevelopment, 
inequality and the ensuing despair leading to frustration, anger and alienation…‖ 
(Kanu, 2006: 175). 
We can also observe other police cooperation initiatives in Africa. Ebbe 
(2001, 64) draws a general picture of police cooperation in the continent, but firstly 
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 Retrieved from http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAu/au_in_a_nutshell_en.htm  on 
14.04.2009. Detailed information about the Union and its organizational structure can be found on the 
webpage. 
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 Retrieved from  http://www.africa-union.org/Terrorism/terrorism2.htm# on 14.04.2009.  
50
 Retrieved from  http://www.africa-union.org/Terrorism/terrorism2.htm   on 14.04.2009.  
  
 
162 
 
mentions that ―African nations were created artificially‖ by colonial western powers 
in a manner that they have small areas but lots of neighbours, consequently, cross-
border crime is easy. According to Ebbe (2001, 64), after many African  states 
gained their independence in the 1980s, international crime, including drug 
smuggling, organized crimes and terrorism, increased in the continent.  
 Ebbe summarizes international cooperative efforts in Africa as follows: 
 -Most African states established bilateral and multilateral treaties, 
 -Interpol established National Central Bureaus and Sub-regional Bureaus 
with communication capabilities; 
 -The UN and Interpol sponsored conferences and seminars. 
 -Holding biennial All-African Police Chiefs of Police 
 -Establishment of Regional Associations of Chiefs of Police, and 
 African countries have benefitted from the assistance of countries such as 
Britain, France, Germany, the United States and Canada (Ebbe, 2001: 65-66). 
According to Ebbe (2001: 66-67) there are four important problems of police 
cooperation in Africa. The first one is language, as there is no single lingua france 
across the continent. Rather, both French and English are languages which are both 
used in the continent, and that situation may cause problems. The second problem is 
strained and unfriendly relations between the police and citizens, stemming from the 
police being seen as the oppressor—a leftover image from the days  of colonization. 
The last two problems are financial problems and corruption. 
Turning to the details of the police cooperation initiatives in Africa, we can 
first see that there are regional police committees in Africa. As examined in Interpol 
section regional bureaus in Africa work with African Police Committees  which are 
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WAPCCO (West African Police Chiefs Committee), CAPCCO (Central African 
Police Chiefs Committee, SARPCCO (Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-
operation Organization) and  EAPCCO (East African Police Chiefs Co-operation) 
by acting as their permanent secretariats.
51  
The East African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization (EAPCCO) was 
founded in Kampala in 1998 with an aim to fight against transnational and organized 
crime. Nine of its 11 members also signed an agreement in the field of terrorism.
52
 
The aim of the organization is to prevent cross-border crime within the region. It 
recognizes the Interpol Sub Regional Bureau in Nairobi as its secretariat. Burundi, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Eritrea, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda 
and Tanzania are member states. On the webpage of Interpol, the following 
organizations are also given as cooperation partners of EAPCCO:  the Institute for 
Security Studies (South Africa and Nairobi), Safer Africa, the Regional Centre For 
Small Arms (RECSA), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
and the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (Eastern Africa and Vienna).
53
 
The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization 
(SARPCCO) was established in 1995 in Zimbabwe, and anti-terrorism is one of its 
priority crime areas.
54
 Angola, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, the Democratic 
Republic de Congo, Swaziland, Lesotho, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Mauritius, 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique are member states of SARPCCO. According to Rajabu, 
the signing of agreement to set up the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) was an important step in establishing mutual assistance in various police 
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 Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/srb/default.asp  on 24.03.2009 
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 Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/SRB/EAPCCO.pdf  on 14.04.2009.  
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matters because The protocol is ―intended to ensure legality and efficiency while 
bypassing the normal diplomatic procedures otherwise required for an official 
exchange between two sovereign nations‖ (Rajabu, 2001: 291). On the webpage of 
Interpol, the following organizations are also given as cooperation partners of 
SARPCCO: the East and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(Tanzania), the Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), Safer Africa,  the 
Southern African Development Committee South Africa), Southern African Human 
Rights Trust (Zimbabwe) and the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (South 
Africa and Vienna)
55
 
The Central African Police Chiefs Committee (Comité des Chefs de Police 
de l'Afrique Centrale - C.C.P.A.C.) was founded in 1997
56
. Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic, The Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Chad are members of the 
organization.  
The Comité des Chefs de Police de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CCPAO)  or  West 
African Police Chiefs Committee was established in 1997.
57
 Its members are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cap Vert, the Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mali, Maritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
 As a final note, we can point to the East African Inter-State Defense and 
Security Sub-Committee, which has been created to assess the security situation in 
the East African region (Rajabu, 2001:292). 
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5.1.2.4 Asia 
Police cooperation in Asia is generally well developed in South Asia. 
According to Leong, ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), through 
its regional forum ―has initiated a regionwide security dialogue‖ (Leong 2001: 114). 
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. In the following years, they were joined by Brunei 
Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia.
58
  
The ASEAN countries also developed a special cooperation with China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1997, which is called The ASEAN Plus 
Three.
59
 ASEAN Countries also have special cooperative initiatives with Australia 
and New Zealand in the region, including on terrorism issues. For example, in 2004, 
Australia signed the ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration on Cooperation in 
Combating International Terrorism.
60
 
The ASEAN Chiefs of National Police or ASEANAPOL has been 
established for police cooperation (Teck, 2001:246). The leaders of law enforcement 
agencies have gathered annually since 1981 under the ASEANAPOL umbrella to 
discuss police matters and to cooperate. The ASEANAPOL has had a computerized 
database system since 1997, and conducts exchanges of personnel and training 
among its members (Teck, 2001:247). According to the webpage of ASEAN, 
ASEANAPOL had its 28
th
 Conference between 25-28 May 2008, and decided to 
reinforce cooperation against terrorism.
61
  
                                                 
58
 Retrieved from http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm  on 6.05.2009.  
59
 Retrieved from  http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm  on 06.05.2009 
60
 Retrieved from  http://www.aseansec.org/16576.htm  on 06.05.2009. 
61
 Retrieved from http://www.aseansec.org/21619.htm  on 06.05.2009 
  
 
166 
 
 The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) also 
facilitates law enforcement cooperation (Kumar, 2001: 109, and Rajaguru, 
2001:264). For Rajaguru, ―The foci of regional police cooperation under the 
umbrella of the SAARC agreement are terrorism and drug trafficking‖ (Rajaguru, 
2001: 264). SAARC was established in 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
62
 Afghanistan later joined the association. 
SAARC signed a Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism in 1987 which 
came into force in 1988, and in 2004, an Additional Protocol to the SAARC 
Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was signed to strengthen the 
original convention.
63
 In 1995 SAARC established the Terrorist Offences 
Monitoring Desk (STOMD) ―to collate, analyze and disseminate information on 
terrorist offences, tactics, strategies and methods.‖64 
Since 1996, SAARC has held eight Conferences on Cooperation in Police 
Matters about networking among Police Authorities in the Member States, the 
establishment of ‗SAARCPOL‘, the prevention of organized crimes, and training.65 
 Kumar notes that ―As long ago as 1962, the United Nations and the 
Government of Japan established the Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention 
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI)‖ with an aim to promote crime 
prevention and criminal justice cooperation (Kumar, 2001: 109). According to the 
webpage of the organization, UNAFEI is a regional institute of the United Nations 
and the aim of UNAFEI is to promote ―the sound development of criminal justice 
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systems and mutual cooperation in Asia and the Pacific Region.‖66 UNAFEI‘s 
activities also include terrorism related subjects, for example its 132
nd
 international 
course and seminars is titled as ―Strengthening the Legal Regime for Combating 
Terrorism.‖67   
 
5.1.2.5 Others 
 
5.1.2.5.1 The League of Arab States 
According to Samy (2006:155), The League of Arab States has focused on 
terrorism since 1994, when it adopted an Arab strategy to combat terrorism. The 
Council of Arab Interior Ministers then adopted a code of conduct in 1996, under 
which ―The Arab countries agreed on the necessity of exchanging information in the 
fields of investigations and judicial procedures, which highlighted the importance of 
transparency and swift flow of information between law enforcement authorities in 
Member States‖ (Samy, 2006: 156).  
Samy also points out that a preliminary three year plan was adopted in 1998, 
then the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted on 22 April 
1998 and entered into force on 7 May 1999,  followed by another three year plan in 
2001 (Samy, 2006: 155-156). For Samy, one of the important achievements of the 
League of Arab States is, unlike the UN, to ―share a clear view regarding the acts 
which constitute terrorism and which are not‖ (Samy, 2006: 157). 
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Samy also mentions the Criminal Police Bureau, a subsidiary body of the 
Council of Arab Ministers of Interior, which was ―assigned to follow up the Member 
States‘ implementation of the Convention.‖ It is further obliged to prepare an annual 
report for Justice and Interior Ministers of the Arab League and to review and assess 
the measures after five years of practice (Samy, 2006: 158). 
 
5.1.2.5.2 Organization of the Islamic Conference 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an inter-governmental 
organization, established in 1969, has 57 members. According to its webpage;  
The Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world and 
ensuring to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world 
in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among 
various people of the world.
68
  
 
With respect specifically to the subject of this study, the OIC has a 
Convention on Combatting International Terrorism. 
 OIC members come from different regions of the world, but are primarily 
from Africa and Asia, including the Middle East (Hmoud, 2006: 161). According to 
Hmoud, OIC actions in relation to terrorism have taken three forms: political 
statements; the Code of Conduct, which was endorsed by the 1994 Islamic Summit; 
and the 1999 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 
Combatting Terrorism (Hmoud, 2006: 162).  
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Hmoud argues that Islam‘s association with terrorism ―has been a key factor 
in framing OIC efforts in dealing with terrorism‖ and while some states took 
defensive positions, others acted proactively by cooperating with the international 
efforts (Hmoud, 2006:162). According to Hmoud, declarations and resolutions, non-
binding in nature but reflecting the political stand of OIC members, have three 
principles: the condemnation of terrorism; distinguishing the aim of self-
determination and fighting against foreign occupation from terrorism; and lastly, 
avoiding the association of Islam with terrorism (Hmoud, 2006: 162-163).  
The convention, on the other hand, has two characteristics: ―it defines 
terrorism and terrorist crimes‖ and it sets areas and procedure of cooperation 
(Hmoud, 2006: 164). As the conclusion Hmoud argues that: 
 The convention needs to be reviewed by the OIC in order to make it 
an effective law enforcement instrument for combating terrorism. 
Such a review should include redefining terrorism and terrorist acts 
and unifying the two terms; revisiting the issue of political crimes; 
establishing terrorist acts as crimes under national laws and 
providing for the situations where jurisdictions must be established; 
and refining the language of the Convention to overcome 
ambiguities and legal uncertainties ( Hmoud, 2006: 169). 
  
5.1.3 Evaluation of International Organizations 
As observed, there are a variety of international organizations established for 
police cooperation and almost all of them have interest in and practices intended for 
improving cooperation in the counter-terrorism field. Although they undoubtedly 
have many positive contributions, we can also observe several inabilities and 
inefficiencies in these organizations. 
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An examination of UN activities shows that its terrorism related initiatives 
have been intensified after the 9/11 attacks. Remarks on the UN webpage reveal that 
it has become a more successful organization in terms of establishing new standards, 
and managing cooperative arrangements and contribution of states to its activities 
and arrangements. However critics reveal that the UN has shortcomings such as 
being unable to establish a common definition of terrorism, inter-organizational 
disharmony and by-passing UN channels by powerful states when they prefer 
bilateral relationships. Consequently, the existence of the UN as a ground for 
coming together and establishing long-term policies is essential in countering 
terrorism worldwide. On the other hand, by being aware of the limits of the 
organization, especially powerful states seem to look for bilateral relations, thus by-
passing UN channels.  
Regarding Interpol, it can be argued that this organization has seesawed 
throughout its history in terms of its policies regarding terrorism. By being bound by 
its Constitution‘s third article, which bans involvement with cases of a political 
nature, Interpol tried to keep a distance to terrorism related issues during the 1960s. 
However we observe that as terrorism has gathered significance over time, Interpol 
has tried to find ways to deal with terrorism which conform to its policy. Although 
this dilemma still exists today, we observe that terrorism is one of the most 
important areas of focus for Interpol.  
Cooperative police relationship patterns in Europe, which has been presented 
above in detail, provides us a rich view. As examined, those relationships include 
practices related to terrorism within their own structures as well. The existence of 
cooperative forms established in organizational, bilateral, or multilateral varieties 
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create an overlapping structure. States, by taking part in different cooperative 
schemes within and around Europe, benefit from such a rich variety. European 
examples show that states do not restrict themselves to participating in cooperative 
endeavours. Thus, besides taking part in umbrella organizations covering all of 
Europe, such as Europol, states may also look for other multilateral or bilateral 
initiatives to focus on problems within their close neighborhood. Therefore states in 
Europe present a nature that is open to pursuing cooperation in policing issues. One 
reason for this openness may be the history of policing in Europe, such as 
cooperative initiatives during the Anarchist wave. A positive approach to 
cooperation throughout history on the continent also makes Europe one of the 
pioneers in designing and adopting innovations in cooperative policing patterns. 
 Although not as diverse as Europe, cooperative initiatives in other continents 
such as America, Asia, and Africa can also be observed. In addition, regional 
organizations such as the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic 
Conference also have initiatives in counter-terrorism fields.  
All those initiatives show that global, regional and other varieties of 
international organizations have had an interest in promoting cooperation against 
terrorism, and police cooperation has an important place in those cooperative 
arrangements. Examples reveal that although a certain success level has been 
attained; much more needs to be done. Problems such as inability to achieve a 
common ground for definition and understanding on terrorism still exist as the prime 
challenges, but, it can still be said that international organizations have been trying 
to make progress in promoting cooperation against terrorism.  
 
  
 
172 
 
5.2 Conventions (16 Legal Instruments) 
Conventions are legal instruments focusing on a specific subject, which are 
signed by states. States which sign those conventions, are expected to abide by their 
rules. The most well-known conventions regarding terrorism have been established 
by the United Nations (listed in Table 6). UN efforts to establish conventions in the 
terrorism field date back to the 1930s, for example a UN Convention was adopted in 
1937 for the prevention and punishment of terrorism, but never came into force. As 
provided in Table 6, The UN has 16 international counter-terrorism legal 
instruments.
69
  
UN legal instruments on terrorism do not cover terrorism as a whole. On the 
contrary, existing legal instruments focus on specific offences, which are: ―offences 
linked to the financing of terrorism (1), offences based on the victim‘s status (2), 
offences linked to civil aviation(3),  offences linked to ships and fixed platforms (4) 
and offences linked to dangerous materials(5)‖ (UN, 2006:16). These conventions 
reveal a reactionary nature, because they were created when specific issues became a 
problem. For example, when hijacking and offences against aviation emerged as an 
important problem in the 1960s, the Aircraft Convention in 1963, the Unlawful 
Seizure Convention in 1970, and the Civil Aviation Convention in 1971 were 
created. The UN‘s efforts are still continuing to create a Comprehensive Convention 
against International Terrorism, which aims to define terrorism and create a common 
understanding on the issue. The practice of criminalizing issue-specific areas of 
terrorism is identified as a thematic approach by Nash and Bantekas who argue that, 
―The thematic route, despite current discussions on a single comprehensive 
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convention, so far appears the only vehicle guaranteeing both international co-
operation and relative consensus‖ (Bantekas and Nash, 2007: 198). 
It is mentioned in the UN publication entitled Legislative Guide to the 
Universal Legal Regime Against Terrorism that ―the existing conventions and 
protocols contain no conspiracy, planning, preparation or other prospective 
provisions. They punish only offences that have been ‗committed‘, ‗attempted‘, 
‗aided or abetted‘, ‗ordered‘, ‗directed‘ or ‗contributed to‘‖ (UN, 2008: 6), with the 
exception of the Financing Convention. Participation of states to those conventions 
is essential because ―… the legal authority to enforce these measures against 
terrorism is exclusively within the responsibility of sovereign States‖ (UN, 2008: 1). 
It is mentioned on the web page of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism 
Committee that the rate of adherence to these conventions and protocols by Member 
States was low before but the rate of adherence has increased after the 9/11 attacks 
and the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373.
70
 Accordingly: 
…some two-thirds of UN Member States have either ratified or 
acceded to at least 10 of the 16 instruments, and there is no longer 
any country that has neither signed nor become a party to at least one 
of them.
71
  
Becoming a party to the UN conventions requires both an international and a 
domestic procedure. The international procedure requires deposit of a legal 
document with the depository of the Convention, while the domestic procedure in 
general necessitates approval by the relevant organs of the state and legislative 
action to adopt the domestic laws (UN, 2008: 10).  
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 Retrieved from  http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/laws.html#t1  on 13.05.2009.  
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 http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/laws.html#t1 retrieved on 13.05.2009. 
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Table-6: UN Legal Instruments
72
 
 
 
 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 
signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. 
 
 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the 
Hague on 16 December 1970. 
 
 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971. 
 
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973. 
 
 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted at New York on 
17 December 1979 
 
 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed at Vienna on 
26 October 1979.  
 
 Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
signed at Vienna on 8 July 2005. 
 
 Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, DONE AT Montreal on 23 
September 1971, signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988. 
 
 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988 
 
 Protocol to Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation, adopted at London  on 14 October 2005 
 
 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988 
 
 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, adopted at London on 14 
October 2005. 
 
 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
signed at Montreal on 1 March 1991. 
 
 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted at 
New York on 15 December 1997. 
 
 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
adopted at New York on 9 December 1999 
 
 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
adopted at New York on 13 April 2005 
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 Source: Webpage of UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee: 
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In terms of requirements from states that are party to UN legal instruments; 
nine conventions, four protocols and one amendment except for the1963 Convention 
on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft and The 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 
require: 
 (a) criminalization of the conduct defined in a particular agreement 
as a punishable offence; (b) establishment of specified grounds of 
jurisdiction over that offence, such as the registration of an aircraft 
or ship, or the location of an attack; and (c) the ability and obligation 
to refer a case against a suspected or accused offender to domestic 
authorities for prosecution if extradition is not granted pursuant to 
the applicable agreement and to furnish related forms of international 
cooperation. (UN, 2008: 13) 
 
The UN Publication entitled as Legislative Guide to the Universal Regime 
against Terrorism (UN, 2008: 24-28) mentions four issues common to all 
conventions and their application by countries. The first issue is defining terrorist 
acts and terrorism, which requires the repetition of the terminology used in 
international conventions while creating domestic legislation. The second issue is 
proving motive or intent, which requires that a political, ideological or religious 
motive should be in the commission of the act. The third issue is special laws and 
code amendments that touch upon the issue of creating special laws or amending 
relevant penal laws to fill the gaps between the domestic laws and the requirements 
of international legal instruments. The last issue is the relevancy of the universal 
instruments to all countries which focus on creating an understanding about how 
agreements could possibly be relevant to the circumstances of a country.  
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5.2.1 Conventions by Regional or Other Organizations 
In addition to UN Conventions at the global level, we can also observe the 
existence of other conventions, for example, regional conventions established by 
organizations such as the European Union and Organization of American States. 
There are also conventions established by organizations such as the Islamic 
Conference, which exceeds beyond a specific region. Such regional/other 
organizational instruments are provided in Table 7. 
According to the UN publication entitled Legislative Guide to the Universal 
Legal Regime Against Terrorism, ―The inadequacy of reactive criminal law 
mechanisms, that depend upon violence being attempted or accomplished, to protect 
society against persons willing to die for a cause is also leading to greater attention 
to preventive anti-terrorism mechanisms at the regional level‖(UN, 2008: 9). 
Another UN publication on the internet, the Guide for the Legislative 
Incorporation and Implementation of the Universal Anti-Terrorism Instruments 
investigates offences covered by the universal instruments and gives several 
examples of how regional conventions also give place to those offences. 
Accordingly, regional conventions are basically divided into two groups based on 
the political offence exception criteria. The first group of conventions, which are the 
Inter-American Convention against Terrorism of the OAS, the SAARC Regional 
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, and the Treaty on Cooperation among 
States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating 
Terrorism and European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, all share a 
common point in that they ―exclude applicability of the political offence exception 
for the offences they define; the European Convention nevertheless authorizes this 
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exception by providing for reservations to the treaty, provided they are applied 
judiciously and case by case‖ (UN, 2006: 41-43).73  
Table-7: Regional/Other Organizational Legal Instruments
74
 
 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed at a meeting held at the 
General Secretariat of the League of Arab States in Cairo on 22 April 1998. 
 
 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating 
International Terrorism, adopted at Ouagadougou on 1 July 1999. 
 
 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, concluded at Strasbourg on 
27 January 1977. 
 
 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of 
Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 
concluded at Washington, D.C. on 2 February 1971. 
 
 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted at Algiers 
on 14 July 1999. 
 
 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, signed at Kathmandu 
on 4 November 1987.  
 
 Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in Combating Terrorism, done at Minsk on 4 June 1999. 
 
 Council on Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, opened for signature 
at Warsaw, 16 May 2005, CETS No. 196 
 
 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature at 
Warsaw , 16 May 2005, CETS No. 198 
 
 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, adopted at the second plenary session 
held on 3 June 2002, in ILM 42 (2003), p.19. www.ciste.oas.org 
 
 Additional Protocol of the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of 
Terrorism, done in Islamabad on 6 January 2004    www. Infopak.gov.pk/saarc.. 
 
 Protocol to the OUA Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism 
adopted by the Assembly of the African Union  
 
 Protocol Amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 2003  
 
 EU Framework Decision 2002 on combating terrorism  
 
  Agreement on Cooperation among the Governments of the GUAM Participating 
States in the Field of Combat Against Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other 
Dangerous Types of Crimes 2002  
                                                 
73
 De Feo (2006: 114) also discusses this issue in his study.  
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 The information gathered from the following sources were combined in this table:  
International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism, Edited by Giuseppe Nesi. 2006  
and UN webpage retrieved from  
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/compendium/Compendium/Regional_Conventions.htm 
 on 15.05.2009 
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On the other hand, the second group of conventions, namely, the Arab 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, the Convention of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, and the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 
instead ―eliminates the exception for the offences they define, but exclude struggles 
for self-determination from their scope of application‖ (UN, 2006: 42). 
Both the UN sources and De Feo mention hesitations over whether the 
second group of conventions comply with the 1997 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the Security Council resolution 1373 
(UN, 2006: 43; De Feo, 2006: 114-117). 
According to De Feo, there are two possible interpretations about this issue. 
First, if the armed struggle exclusion is interpreted as jus ad bellum, which in 
international law means ―…the legitimacy of the resort to armed struggle itself, in 
which case all political violence committed in that struggle would be excluded from 
the coverage of conventions‖, then possible conflicts may emerge with the overall 
approach of the twelve UN anti-terrorism conventions and protocols (De Feo, 2006: 
119). On the other hand, De Feo argues that if the exclusion is interpreted as jus in 
bello, which means not taking only justification into account but also means and 
targets, including the prohibition of attacks on civilians under humanitarian law 
principles, then ―this interpretation would resolve any potential conflict between UN 
and regional instruments‖ (De Feo, 2006: 119).  
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5.2.2 Evaluation of the Conventions 
The UN has throughout its history focused on establishing a common 
understanding of terrorism. However, its inability to reach this aim forced the 
organization to look for other mechanisms. The establishment of conventions has 
been the prime method, by which the organization has focused on only specific 
matters, and thus avoided the wider complex phenomenon of terrorism. However, 
the accounts on UN publications reveal that higher levels of success in acceptance 
and implementation of the conventions by states were achieved after the 9/11 
attacks. This point requires attention because it reflects the changing atmosphere in 
global perceptions of these conventions following the 9/11 attacks. Nevertheless, the 
UN‘s inability to establish a general convention, understanding, and definition 
regarding terrorism continues.  
The existence of regional and other organizational conventions also reflects 
the importance of establishing similar tools. However discussions about the second 
group of regional or other organizational conventions--those which exclude 
struggles for self-determination from their scope--reflects that diversity still exists in 
terms of establishing a common ground.  
 
5.3 Regimes 
 There are different definitions of regimes by scholars; however I will give a 
few examples here. The most widely referred to definition belongs to Krasner, who 
writes that: "Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors` expectations converge 
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in a given area of international relations‖ (Krasner, 1982: 186). According to 
Krasner, principles and norms are basic defining characteristics of a regime, and 
their change means the change of the regime itself, while regimes change rules and 
decision-making procedures also change (Krasner, 1982:187). Krasner implies that 
regimes should be established for long terms, and with a sense of obligation 
(Krasner, 1982:187).  
 Haggard and Simmons summarize regime definitions under three headings: 
patterned behaviour, based on Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins‘s 
understanding, convergent norms and understandings, based on Krasner`s 
definition, and multilateral agreements between states that outline explicit 
injunctions, based on Oran Young`s definition (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 492-
496). 
 According to Keohane and Nye, international regimes are governing 
arrangements which are established by ―creating or accepting procedures, rules, or 
institutions for certain kinds of activity‖ so ―governments regulate and control 
transnational and interstate relations‖ (Keohane and Nye, 1977:5). 
 We can also talk about different approaches to regimes. For example 
Hasenclever et al. propose that there are three main approaches, which are power-
based, interest-based, and knowledge-based (Hasenclever and et al., 1997: 1). 
Accordingly, power-based theories are influenced by realist understandings and 
argue that relative gains are important, with less of an emphasis on institutionalism. 
Interest-based theories are influenced by neoliberal principles, with a strong 
emphasis on institutionalism. Lastly, knowledge-based theories focus on 
preferences, interests, and identities in regime formation. According to Hasenclever 
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and et al., the degree of institutionalism is an important difference among those 
theories. Regarding the effectiveness of regimes, the same authors mention two 
overlapping ideas, which are regime strength and regime robustness (Hasenclever 
and et al., 1997: 2).  
 Haggard and Simmons view the regime literature ―as an experiment in 
reconciling the idealist and realist traditions‖ (1987: 492). According to them there 
are four dimensions of regimes, namely, strength, organizational form, scope, and 
allocational mode. Strength refers to the degree of compliance; scope is the range of 
issues covered by the regime, organizational form covers issues such as 
membership, administrative forms, and regulations, and allocational mode refers to 
mechanisms for resource allocation (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 496-498). 
Haggard and Simmons also propose various theoretical approaches for 
understanding regimes, which are structural (hegemonic stability) approaches, 
game-theoretic approaches, functional approaches with an emphasis on behaviours, 
and institutionalism and cognitive approaches (Haggard and Simmons, 1987: 498-
513). If we combine game-theoretic approaches and functional approaches under the 
same heading, this proposal is almost the same classification as that of Hasenclever 
and et al. 
 Another scholar, Haas, contributes the term ―epistemic communities,‖ which 
are constituted by experts of an issue area. According to Haas (1989, 377) regimes 
are not only ―static summaries of rules and norms‖ but also ―vehicles for 
international learning that produce convergent state policies.‖ For Haas, epistemic 
communities  refer to ―a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common 
set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies 
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governing these relationships will be applied‖ (Haas, 1989: 384, footnote 20). He 
goes on to argue that epistemic communities ―may introduce new policy 
alternatives‖ and convince governments to pursue them (Haas, 1989: 402). 
In terms of critics, Strange is the most famous critic of regimes and she 
argues five shortcoming of regime theory. She proposes that regime theory is a 
passing fad that will not make a long-term contribution to knowledge, that it is 
imprecise, value biased, overly static and narrow-minded due to its state-centered 
paradigm (Strange, 1982: 479). 
 
5.3.1 Security Regimes 
 As this study is basically on security regimes, it is important to mention 
Jervis`s argument that a security regime consists of ―…those principles, rules, and 
norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others 
will reciprocate‖ (Jervis, 1982: 357). According to him, by following the prisoner‘s 
dilemma concept, ―states will benefit by setting up rules and institutions to control 
the competition among them‖ (Jervis, 1982: 358). He argues that security regimes 
are ―difficult to achieve, because of the fear that the other is violating or will violate 
the common understanding.‖ (Jervis, 1982: 358).  
 Jervis writes that there are five conditions for forming a security regime: the 
support of great powers; a shared value on security and cooperation; no belief in 
expansion to provide security; seeing war and individualistic pursuit as costly; and 
being distanced from negative implications of security dilemma. (Jervis, 1982: 360-
362). 
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 Since this dissertation focuses on cooperation against terrorism, specifically 
police cooperation, talking about relevant regimes may be useful. In the terrorism 
field, UN conventions and other international agreements constitute the ground for 
those regimes. Therefore, labelling those conventions and international agreements 
as regimes could also be a method of classification. However, as I am looking for 
policing practices at the functional level in particular, employing the regime 
expression to those functional initiatives seems to be more proper for the purposes 
of this study. For example, a UN report focusing on strengthening international 
cooperation, including the legal regime against terrorism, mentions several tools for 
international cooperation in criminal matters as ―extradition, mutual legal assistance, 
transfer of criminal proceedings, transfer of sentenced persons, recognition of 
foreign penal judgements, freezing and seizing of assets and law enforcement 
cooperation‖ (UN, 2005b:13).   
Wyngaert and Stessens (1995:142), who investigated cooperation in criminal 
matters in the European Union, based on Maastricht Treaty, divide cooperation in 
criminal matters into three areas: judicial co-operation; police co-operation; and 
administrative co-operation. This seems a useful and simple classification to use as a 
framework for understanding cooperative regimes against terrorism.  
Judicial cooperation succeeds cooperation between judicial authorities of 
states. Police may take role in the processes of judicial cooperation in varying 
degrees, such as compiling files, transferring them to judicial authorities etc. An 
administrative regime constitutes those agencies that conduct administrative 
functions, such as customs, immigration and so on. The importance of those 
agencies is increasing in the current era because of the cross-border nature of 
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terrorism. Identifying and capturing terrorists and hazardous materials at borders is 
one of the vital issues of fighting against terrorism. Lastly, police cooperation itself 
is becoming a regime in terms of establishing cooperation, sharing intelligence, and 
improving terrorism fighting capabilities.    
 
5.3.2 Judicial Cooperation   
According to Wyngaert and Stessens ―Judicial co-operation refers to co-
operation between judicial authorities, in the framework of a criminal investigation 
or a trial‖ (1995:142). 
The UN publication entitled Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal 
Regime Against Terrorism states that, ―There being no international tribunal with 
competence for acts of terrorism, those acts can only be dealt with by domestic 
courts‖ (UN, 2008: 39). Consequently, prosecution and punishment of terrorist acts 
can only be achieved by judicial cooperation.  
The following tools can be classified in this field of cooperation: extradition, 
mutual legal assistance, transfer of criminal proceedings, transfer of sentenced 
persons, recognition of foreign penal judgements, freezing and seizing of assets. It 
can be argued that judicial cooperation forms constitute a regime and these forms 
can be titled as ―judicial co-operation regimes‖, because there are rules and norms of 
each form. First those tools will be defined below; afterwards relevant issues related 
to terrorism will be explored briefly.  
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Extradition is handing over a criminal by a state to another state for trial. 
Extradition is practiced according to agreements, generally bilateral or multilateral, 
between parties. National legislation is also an important component of the 
extradition procedure. Basic rules of extradition can be stated as follows: 1-States 
generally do not extradite their own citizens, 2-Political offences are not accepted as 
extraditable offences as principle. 3-Based on the double criminality principle, the 
crime must be defined and punishable in both requesting and requested states. 4-The 
person cannot be tried again for an offence which he has been tried before. 5-The 
person can be tried for only the crime that he is extradited for. 6-There is expectation 
of a fair trial. 
According to Wyngaert and Stessens (1995: 145) ―The term mutual 
assistance refers to co-operation between judicial authorities, as opposed to police 
co-operation and administrative co-operation.‖  Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLATs) are agreements of assistance between states to gather and exchange 
information and evidence related to an investigation via judicial ways. MLATs 
include assistance in examining people, transfers and gathering evidence. Examples 
of such treaties include the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters, and, in terms of bilateral arrangements, the treaty between the United States 
and Switzerland which came into force in January 1977. The United Nations has 
also produced a Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance. 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons is another method of judicial cooperation, 
meaning that a sentenced person may be transferred from one state to the other state 
to serve the sentence imposed on him/her. 
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 According to Wyngaert and Stessens (1995: 161), Transfer of proceedings 
allows the transmitting of criminal proceedings to the state ―deemed to be in the best 
position to try the case‖ and it is used when extradition is not viable due to offence-
sentence fulfilment or a semi-administrative offence.  
 As a last method, the freezing and seizing of assets obviously refers to the 
freezing and seizing of accused individual or corporate assets in one or more states, 
as based on the decision of judicial authorities.  
The UN‘s Legislative Guide to the Universal Legal Regime Against 
Terrorism summarizes important points regarding the use of these tools as follows. 
Accordingly, there is a mutual legal assistance article ―in all of the subsequent  
conventions that create criminal offences (except the 1991 Convention on the 
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection)‖ (UN, 2008:39) and 
―The most fundamental rule of international cooperation established by the 
terrorism-related conventions and protocols is the principle of extradite or prosecute. 
This obligation is found in all of the terrorism-related agreements that define 
criminal offences‖ (UN, 2008: 37).  
Although the above mentioned two issues create the image that cooperation 
on terrorism can easily be established between parties, two other issues, namely, 
dual criminality and human rights considerations, can make the issue problematic. In 
terms of dual criminality; international cooperation based on UN Conventions does 
not require commission of the act with a racial, religious, political or other 
ideological motive, but many countries require a specified state of mind which: 
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may be a general criminal intent (to do the prohibited act 
‗intentionally‘, or in some instruments ‗willfully‘) or a specific intent 
in other cases (in order to intimidate a population or to coerce a 
government or international organization to do or to refrain from 
doing any act). If a country that defines an offence as only requiring 
a general or specific intent were to request international cooperation 
from a country that also requires an ideological motivation as an 
element of the offence, the question arises whether dual criminality 
exists (UN, 2008: 41). 
 
 Lastly issues related to protections for political activity against 
discrimination, requiring fair treatment and considering human rights, play an 
important role in successful management of judicial cooperation between parties.  
 Judicial cooperation regimes constitute an important field for police 
cooperation. Police authorities as part of criminal investigations may take a role in 
the processes of given judicial cooperation actions. Therefore, as partners of judicial 
authorities, police forces should have an understanding of how the components of 
judicial regime operate.  
 
5.3.3 Police Cooperation 
It can be argued that police cooperation has been broadening over time. As 
this study reveals, it is possible to see various examples and applications of 
cooperative police initiatives in all four domains of the cooperative security 
framework. To exemplify this point, we see bilateral relations and agreements, the 
establishment of international and regional institutions such as Interpol and Europol, 
and the existence of police associations as non-state entities. In the following 
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chapters of this dissertation, those various cooperative methods will be investigated 
in detail.  
There are other significant issues to be held in mind about police 
cooperation. For example, the difference between judicial cooperation and police 
cooperation is important. Wyngaert and Stessens summarize this distinction in the 
following passage: 
Police co-operation involves the co-operation between national 
police forces. The distinction lies in the fact that the police co-
operation is not necessarily part of a criminal investigation in the 
requesting state, whereas judicial co-operation always aims at 
furthering such an investigation. Police co-operation is often aimed 
at preventing crime, whereas judicial co-operation presupposes that 
the crime has already been committed. Moreover, police co-
operation is evolving towards being more and more proactive, 
whereas judicial co-operation remains essentially reactive. However, 
in practice, the distinction is often less clear: information, 
transmitted through channels of police co-operation is often 
eventually used in a criminal investigation and produced as evidence 
at a trial. Police co-operation, as opposed to judicial co-operation, 
often occurs on an informal basis, and is often considered as much 
more efficient, because the substantive and procedural rules 
governing judicial co-operation don‘t exist. Even if police co-
operation is granted on the condition that the information transmitted 
will be used ―for police purposes only‖, there is no guarantee that 
this will actually be the case in practice, and in some member states, 
police officers may not be able to comply with the requirement. The 
result, however, is that police co-operation may be used as a 
substitute for judicial co-operation, in order to circumvent the 
existing obligations, which may result in abuse (Wyngaert and 
Stessens, 1995: 145). 
 
This passage reveals another issue of police cooperation, which is formal and 
informal cooperation. While formal cooperation emphasizes interaction between 
police forces according to the existing rules of information exchange and judicial 
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cooperation, informal cooperation emphasizes a more flexible way of conducting 
cooperation between police forces.  
 Joutsen argues that ―international cooperation need not be based on formal 
agreements between states. Domestic law may allow the authorities to engage in 
various forms of cooperation‖ (Joutsen, 2004: 256). Accordingly, in situations 
where trust emerges, less formal forms of bilateral cooperation can be initiated 
between the central authorities or between the authorities in border areas, and 
bilateral executive agreements may follow such relations (Joutsen, 2004: 256-257). 
According to Joutsen, Interpol cooperation ―…is not based on any international 
instrument; instead, the criminal police of each participating state have simply 
decided to cooperate with one another within the framework of Interpol‖ (Joutsen, 
2004:257). 
 One of the main aims of this study is to track the changes in police 
cooperation. The following chapters and especially the sections on police liaison 
practices reveal the direction and the size of those changes.  
 
5.3.4 Administrative Cooperation 
Administrative cooperation regimes include cooperation between 
administrative entities such as customs and immigration authorities. Although such 
entities are generally labelled as administrative authorities, we should keep in mind 
that those entities may have policing powers in several countries. Administrative 
regimes are becoming increasingly important with the increasing threat level of 
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terrorism. As the cross-border nature of terrorism grows over time, the importance 
of controlling borders and human movements becomes ever more important.   
Since the 9/11 attacks, it is evident that the importance of securing territory 
has increased dramatically. By securing territory, states initially aimed at controlling 
people who are entering into the country. The purpose of this move is the fear that 
people who are entering the country may be terrorists. Illegal immigration is one of 
the most important aspects of security today. So states are focusing on this issue. 
The second aim of controlling territory is preventing the entrance of materials that 
can be used for terrorist activity. 
As the above shows, agencies which conduct administrative functions 
constitute an important regime against terrorism and also present themselves as a 
vital partner for police forces.  
  
5.4 Overall Evaluation of the Liberal / State-Centric Domain before 9/11 
The liberal/state-centric domain, which consists of international 
organizations, conventions, and regimes, is also an important area in the fight 
against terrorism. This area makes the establishment of international norms, 
structures, and entities possible in the fight against terrorism. However, differences 
of parties on terrorism issues make sound cooperation problematic in this field. In 
fact, this problem was acknowledged by several of those organizations themselves 
as exemplified by the UN‘s confession on its website, which clearly states that many 
states are not a party to legal instruments or are not implementing them. Similarly, 
extradition, a very effective tool against criminals, is almost an unused tool in 
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terrorism issues because of the political crime exception. Those comments do not 
aim to downplay the importance and role of traditional methods in dealing with 
terrorism, however, the impotency that they remind us of, forces us to think about 
reconstructing some of the traditional methods and look for new innovative ways. 
This study therefore focuses on police cooperation, which represents a promising 
area for innovative ways of dealing with terrorism.  
The examples during the Anarchist wave show us that liberal/state-centric 
forms have long been a strategy in the fight against terrorism. States, unable to deal 
with violence individually, need international cooperation and support. Therefore, 
there have long been liberal/state-centric initiatives on the scene to create an 
international understanding. States take part in those initiatives to share their 
problems and opinions.   
The overall assessment of the liberal/state-centric realm shows us that 
terrorism has been an important issue of cooperation for entities in this realm since 
Anarchism, in other words, since the beginning of terrorism in its modern 
understanding. Despite the efforts of those entities, differences of contributing 
parties have kept cooperation in a limited position. Success was possible only at 
criminalizing certain acts of terrorism, while collaboration on more important issues 
such as establishing a common understanding or reaching a universally acceptable 
definition of terrorism was impossible.  
From the narratives of several sources mentioned in this study, we observe 
success stories for Europe, which was able to have an understanding on terrorism, 
and which was able to create cooperation between various law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies even before 9/11. Europe‘s success lies in the fact that 
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countries in this region have the advantage of creating almost a common 
understanding about the threat and the way to respond it. While there were several 
attempts at countering terrorism before 9/11, the real changes seem to come to the 
surface after 9/11. For example, in UN publications it is argued that becoming party 
to legal instruments has increased after 9/11. We also observe that more has been 
done both at the global and at the regional levels after the September 11 attacks.  
 
5.5 New Initiatives of the Liberal / State-Centric Domain: Transformation of 
the liberal/state-centric domain 
Although institutions in the liberal/state-centric domain still represent their 
previous characteristics and systemic shortcomings, careful investigation reveals 
some important changes. First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that international 
organizations are more focused on terrorism issues today when compared to the 
past. The European example shows that agreement on certain topics by member 
countries within a relatively smaller regional environment may produce attainable 
results such as a common framework of terrorism and establishment of a common 
structure to deal with terrorism issues. Nobody, including international 
organizations, can deny the importance of terrorism in today‘s world; therefore it 
would not be an exaggeration to assume that a focus on terrorism by liberal/state-
centric entities will continue to grow in the future.  
Another issue in the liberal/state-centric domain is the fact that usage of 
liaison officers has gained a new perspective in recent years as will be examined in 
detail in Chapter 7. We can talk about three important trends in establishing 
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liaisonship system in this domain. The first issue is the employment of liaison 
officers from non-member states to member based international organizations. For 
example, FBI, Secret Service and DEA liaison officers have been deployed to 
Europol. Similarly, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Australia and Colombia also have 
liaison offices in Europol, although they are not members of the EU. The second 
trend in this domain is deployment of liaison officers by an international 
organization to a non-member state, as is the case with a liaison officer from 
Europol being appointed to Washington DC.  A third trend is the deployment of 
liaison officers between international police organizations. According to information 
on the webpages of Europol and Interpol, they have each exchanged liaison officers 
with each other.  All of these three trends of liaison officer exchanges by 
international organizations and non-member states have been launched in the post 
9/11 era and with a special concern on terrorism. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
THE LIBERAL / MULTICENTRIC AND REALIST 
MULTICENTRIC DOMAINS 
 
 
 
 This chapter mainly focuses on multi-centric section of the forms of 
relationship dimension, which is believed to host the most transnationalizing forms. 
Therefore both realist and also liberal multi-centric domains are investigated here. 
 
6.1 Liberal /Multi-Centric Domain 
 This domain covers liberal actors and multi-centric relationships. This area is 
far from the influence of state actors. Traditionally this area is constituted by non-
governmental organizations, individuals, and private entities.  
 Entities in this area may have an interest in terrorism issues; however their 
role in shaping state behavior and agendas has been accepted as limited in the past, 
especially in the terrorism field. This approach has begun to change with the 
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emergence as actors of transnational terrorist groups with an ability to influence the 
state dominated international relations field.  
While terrorist groups emerged as non-state groups in this realm, this study 
is exploring whether countering actors have also emerged. It is possible to classify 
several groups under this domain. First of all we can talk about Police Associations 
and Policing Focused Initiatives, while private security companies constitute the 
second group.  
 
6.1.1 Police Associations and Police Focused Initiatives 
The first case to look at is the establishment of international police 
associations and their function of providing platform for discussions and 
information/experience sharing, as seen in the example of the The National Bureau 
of Identification established by an American initiative, IACP (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police), was used as a point for establishing international 
contact for other countries (Jensen, 2001: 29). Members of such associations may be 
active police managers and police officers, as well as retired ones. Any activity of 
such associations related to crimes, is to set up a place for discussions.  
The IPA (International Police Association) was founded in 1950 by an 
English police sergeant, Arthur Troop, with an aim to establish friendship and 
cooperation between police officers. Service through friendship is the slogan of the 
IPA. According to the webpage of the IPA there are 300,000 members, who are on 
active duty or retired. IPA as an independent body has 60 national sections and as 
activities, it encourages personal contacts, develops social and cultural activities, 
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facilitates information exchange and publications, and improves international 
cooperation through friendly contacts.  The supreme body of the IPA is the 
International Executive Council, which meets every year, while the IPA World 
Congress meets every three years. 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is another such 
association. The IACP was founded in 1893 in the United States, and opened its 
European bureau in the 1980s. According to the webpage of IACP, the aim of the 
association is to: 
advance the science and art of police services; to develop and 
disseminate improved administrative, technical and operational 
practices and promote their use in police work; to foster police 
cooperation and the exchange of information and experience among 
police administrators throughout the world; to bring about 
recruitment and training in the police profession of qualified persons; 
and to encourage adherence of all police officers to high professional 
standards of performance and conduct.
75
 
 
The International Union of Police Associations (IUPA) is a North American 
trade union chartered for law enforcement, corrections and related support 
personnel. The IUPA is a participant in the AFL-CIO (American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations). The IUPA was originally chartered 
as the "National Conference of Police Associations" (N.C.P.A.) in 1954. In 1966 the 
organization's charter changed to include Canadian police associations, leading to a 
change of name to the "International Conference of Police Associations". A split 
among member organizations over whether or not to join the AFL-CIO led those in 
favor of joining to leave the ICPA and form the IUPA, which joined the AFL-CIO in 
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1979. The focus of the IUPA expanded during the 1990s to include corrections 
personnel and organizations from Puerto Rico. The IUPA is governed by a 
President, Vice-president and Board, the Board representing the sixteen 
geographical regions that the organization covers. Fourteen of these regions are 
contained in the United States; one region includes Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands 
and the Caribbean; and one region includes Canada and the states of New York, 
New Jersey and Alaska. The IUPA currently has more than 100,000 members in 372 
local chapters across 32 US states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
The IAWP (International Association of Women Police), founded in 1915, 
has nearly 2500 members from over 50 countries worldwide. According to the 
webpage of the IAWP, its mission and purpose is to strengthen, unite, and raise the 
profile of women in criminal justice internationally. To ensure the mission of the 
association, the IAWP is committed to programs that provide professional 
development, training, recognition, mentoring, networking, and peer support. 
In the appendix part of the International Police Cooperation book by Koenig 
and Das, it is argued that the IPES (The International Police Executive Symposium) 
founded in 1994, ―.brings police researchers and practitioners closer; to facilitate 
cross-cultural, international, and interdisciplinary exchanges for the enrichment of 
the profession of policing;…‖ (Koenig and Das, 2001:345). The IPES is funded by 
institutional supporters and sponsors that host IPES events around the world. It 
encourages ―…discussions and writing on challenging topics of contemporary 
importance…‖ through an array of initiatives including conferences and publications 
(Koenig and Das, 2001:345).  
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6.1.2 Private Security Companies 
Private security companies, as special entities focusing on protection and 
threats, have always been involved in terrorism issues. The first example can be 
presented here as the Pinkerton Detective Agency, which provided their services to 
the Germans to watch Anarchists in the USA during the Anarchist wave (Jensen, 
2001: 28). According to its webpage, its name today is the Pinkerton Government 
Services, and it is ―a legacy of the company formed by Allan Pinkerton in 1850.‖76 
In the following years we can observe the emergence of companies which 
provide security to the private sector, as it too may become a target of terrorism. 
There is as well the emergence of think-tanks or private entities specialized in 
training, education and evaluation and with an interest in terrorism matters.   
Those examples reveal that private companies may deal with terrorism issues 
to different degrees over time. Therefore, the current level of interest and practices 
of the private companies in terrorism related issues requires investigation.  
 
6.1.3 Liberal/ Multi-Centric Responses to Terrorism 
 We should accept that liberal entities such as NGOs, associations, think-
tanks, private firms, and similar entities have always carried a potential of being a 
partner to the state actors in terrorism related activities.  
Usage of private entities became part of the struggle against terrorism 
starting from the Anarchist wave, as exemplified by the Pinkerton example. During 
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the second half of the 20
th
 century, the world witnessed increasing incidents of 
terrorism and selection of both agents and institutions of governments and of 
individuals or private firms. Because it was not an easy task to secure all security 
threat targets by governments alone, private security firms began to fulfill several 
security functions for providing protection against terrorism.   
 Another development with the increase of terrorism worldwide has been the 
emergence of private individuals and institutions in the evaluation of trends in 
terrorism. Think-tanks can be seen as examples of such entities.    
 
6.1.4 New Initiatives of the Liberal/Multi-Centric Domain: Increasing Usage of 
the Liberal / Multi-Centric Domain as a Support Mechanism for Police 
Cooperation 
In the liberal/multi-centric domain it can be argued that room for cooperation 
by non-governmental groups and organizations is growing. Initiatives in this area 
have previous older examples such as non-governmental international police 
organizations (e.g. the International Police Association (IPA), the International 
Association of Women Police (IAWP), the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP), and the International Police Executive Symposium.) Those 
organizations contribute to the shared understandings between police officers around 
the world in different areas. For example the IPA is a worldwide police 
organization, which aims to increase and improve social interaction among its 
members. The International Police Executive Symposium is an academic platform, 
  
 
200 
 
which organizes conferences to discuss specific police problems. All these 
organizations contribute to the establishment of a discussion ground for members.  
 Although the police organizations mentioned above serve to create an 
atmosphere of belonging and help between police officers around the world, they do 
not mainly serve the aim of creating a better transnational security cooperation, as 
real cooperation takes place between official entities of the states.  
 As a second issue in this realm, we see private entities, which may provide 
different services to governments and private companies. Private security firms have 
long been cooperative partners for states in countering terrorism. Basically, private 
security firms provide security and protection services to both government and 
private entities. Those services also help in achieving security against terrorist 
attacks.  
 A third group in this realm is comprised of organizations which provide 
information and reports to their clients, which exist within the government, 
intelligence and law enforcement bodies. The Intel Center (www.intelcenter.com) 
and The Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE-www.siteinstitute.com) are 
examples of such entities. Although such initiatives have long been on the scene, 
recent developments in gathering intelligence by such entities and sharing them with 
others including government bodies have begun to attract more attention due to their 
direct focus on terrorist groups. The SITE institute represents a perfect example 
today. This institute surfs the internet with a special focus on web pages and chat 
rooms to trace terrorist content (Wells, 2006).  According to the information on the 
website of SITE, www.siteinstitute.org, this institute translates four kinds of sources: 
transcripts of terrorist leaders‘ speeches, videos and messages; secondly, terrorist 
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books, magazines, fatwas and training manuals, thirdly, terrorist communiqués; and 
lastly terrorist chatter discussing potential targets, methods of attack and other 
relevant material.
77
 Those translations are then provided to clients including 
government entities including law enforcement bodies. This individual involvement 
is an important development in the fight against terrorism, which has always been 
accepted as a domain of states. As understood, government entities are also 
becoming clients of such private initiatives.  
 As for the private entities, although they are valuable information providers, 
they may be controversial. For example, a basic search on the internet reveals 
numerous websites full of hesitations and accusations about Rita Katz, the owner of 
SITE, because of her Jewish background, alleged links with Mossad, and the killing 
of her father by the Saddam Regime in Iraq. Those allegations make the information 
that services such as hers provide, problematic for some.  
  As a fourth issue we can talk about the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) example. In this example we observe that the NYPD, as a local entity, has 
sent liaison officers overseas. We will examine details of this example in the 
following sections. 
 A fifth issue is the strategy of inserting individuals with special assets into 
the counter-terrorism system, especially at the local level but with international 
influence. Although different examples can be given at different locations, the one 
that I would like to narrate is the New York example. When I wanted to interview 
with an NYPD official about New York‘s international liaison system, a Turkish 
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origin person employed by the NYPD Director‘s office contacted me.. In fact this 
person, Erhan Yıldırım, was a religious leader at the Turkish Fatih Mosque in 
Brooklyn, where we met for an interview on 3 March 2007
78
. He established links 
with New York Police after the disastrous earthquake in Turkey in 1999, for the 
purpose of initiating a support rally (Canikligil, 2007).  His strong ties with the New 
York Police opened the way for him to become a part-time liaison officer between 
the NYPD and the Muslim Community (Shulman, 2007). Erhan Yıldırım as a 
community coordinator works at Police Headquarters directly under Commissioner 
Ray Kelly, and carries a police ID (Witt, 2007). During our interview I observed that 
he was involved with the police work more than a public liaison officer: ―Raymond 
Kelly wants me to visit him at least two times a month. Beside community meetings, 
I join some of the staff meetings with him.‖ He was also involved with the 
establishment of NYPD liaison officers around the world. He narrated the liaison 
system in detail and said that ―Overseas liaison officers have my name in their 
phone books. When they need to know anything special about Islam or culture there, 
they just call me and ask. I inform them about what they would like to learn.‖ He 
also explained his duties in this way: ―I take part during the international visits of 
police forces from Muslim countries to the NYPD and Raymond Kelly. This 
situation surprises visiting delegations because although I am originally a civilian I 
have a role in official circles.‖ Based on our interview I got the feeling that this 
Muslim citizen was not only a community liaison but also an important asset of the 
New York Police for conducting its international operations.      
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 Those examples show that, usage of the liberal/multi-centric domain as a 
supportive mechanism may be productive. However some of those methods may 
also be controversial, as in the SITE and Blackwater cases. Therefore, careful 
employment of those methods is crucial. Although benefitting from those supportive 
mechanisms is a necessity, states should look for other options to initiate more 
secure and reliable methods.   
 Transforming the current state entities into new structures with an ability to 
function in the multicentric world may be one of the options in hand. At this point, it 
seems feasible to propose that the facilitation of Police Liaison Officers (PLOs) and 
their evolution in the terrorism field presents a promising example.  
 
6.2 The Realist/Multi-Centric Domain 
This domain covers realist actors but multi-centric relationships. Establishing 
transnational relations has always been on the scene as exemplified in the USA case. 
We can also recall aforementioned European examples, where various sub-state 
entities have initiated their own cooperative ventures for decades, such as the regular 
meetings of the heads of police from Berlin, Bern, Bratislava, Budapest, Munich, 
Prague and Vienna, the close international cooperation in the tri-national Upper 
Rhine Area between Basel (Switzerland), Freiburg (Germany) and Mulhouse 
(France) since 1980s, police cooperation between France and England for the 
securing of the Channel Tunnel Region, and the Police Partnership Programs (PPP) 
of Netherlands with Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Another example is 
the Metropolitan Police of London. The Metropolitan Police have a Counter 
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Terrorism Command which is responsible for undertaking counter-terrorism 
investigations not only in London but in the UK and abroad. In this structure, 
although the Metropolitan Police is mainly established as an agency for the 
metropolitan area of London, they also function as a support agency for 
investigations outside of the city. Most importantly, the Counter-Terrorism 
Command of the Metropolitan Police is ―the police single point of contact for 
international partners in counter-terrorism matters‖ with an ability to investigate 
overseas attacks against British interests.
79
 These examples show that parts or sub-
sections of realist actors have proven to have the ability to establish links by using 
multi-centric relationship formats.  
 Another important part of police cooperation in this domain is the informal 
side of establishing cooperation. Establishing informal individual contacts and 
establishing information/experience sharing channels between police forces and 
managers were observed during the Anarchist wave. For example, at the 1898 
Conference, several police forces agreed to forward to each other lists of expellees 
on a monthly basis (Jensen, 1981: 332). Jensen also argues that direct relations 
between higher police officers enabled secret information sharing and surveillance 
of Anarchists (Jensen, 2001:19). 
 Another important application during the Anarchist wave is employing 
officers or hiring agents abroad to get information about the citizens of a country. 
Jensen notes that during the Anarchist era, Italy placed a police officer in New York 
to monitor Anarchists (Jensen, 2001: 28). Germany hired a New York police officer 
to keep watch on the famous Anarchist Johann Most, and hired other agents, 
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including agents from the Pinkerton Detective Agency, in New York and Chicago 
(Jensen, 2001:28).  Austria -Hungary and Russia also had agents in America 
(Jensen, 2001: 28). 
 Informal interaction implies daily contacts between police officers. While 
more details will be discussed on this in later sections, it can be said here that 
informal cooperation offers several advantages to police organizations, from easing 
communication to increasing trust between parties. Having an understanding about 
what is going on both at the threat and also at the response levels is essential for 
police organizations, and the flexible, day to day nature of informal cooperation 
helps parties to understand those issues. What we observe in today‘s world is the 
increasing importance of informal cooperation and the realization of this point by an 
increasing number of actors.  
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CHAPTER 7 
POLICE LIAISON OFFICERS 
 
 
 
 
 Bearing in mind the previous sections, we can argue that usage of liaison 
officers has become a common strategy in almost all fields of cooperative security 
initiatives, which is depicted in the earlier presented realist/liberal and state-
centric/multi-centric table designs. It seems that recent developments in terrorism 
especially after 9/11 have heightened the need for liaison officers. In order to link 
the usage of liaison officers with terrorism, the background to liaison officers will be 
briefly outlined first. Then, I will examine current developments about the usage of 
liaison officers in policing and terrorism field.  
  
7.1 The Scope of Police Liaisonship 
Several definitions can be found for liaison officers. The following definition 
of liaison officers by the European Council reflects the general characteristics of the 
term. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, it can be accepted as a guiding 
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definition which outlines the general characteristics of what a liaison officer is and 
what the functions of liaison officers are: 
…`liaison officer` means a representative of one of the Member 
States, posted abroad by a law enforcement agency to one or more 
third countries or to international organisations to establish and 
maintain contacts with the authorities in those countries or 
organisations with a view to contributing to preventing or 
investigating criminal offences (EU, 2003: 4). 
 
Because this definition has been formulated for an international organization, 
the liaison officer is defined as a representative of a member state. In this study, the 
term liaison officer is used in a wider perspective. This study focuses on liaison 
officers of states, international organizations, and local police entities; therefore 
construction of a liaison officer definition in this study will be formulated as a 
representative of a state, an international organization or a local police entity. The 
main function of a liaison officer as mentioned in the above definition is to establish 
and maintain contacts with the relevant authorities of the host entity; therefore 
establishment of a liaison officer system carries out a vital communicative role 
between police authorities. The aim of establishing such a system between police 
forces is to prevent crimes and investigating criminal offences. Consequently, it is 
possible to argue that police liaison officers cover a wide area of responsibility in 
fighting against crimes. One significant point, that should be mentioned here is that 
the work of liaison officers is defined and structured based on agreements between 
parties. Those agreements clearly define the expected patterns of behaviour by the 
liaison officers. Logically, liaison officers do not initiate any intelligence gathering 
or investigation activities by themselves in the host country. The main purpose of 
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their existence is to act in cooperation with their partners in investigating crimes, 
information sharing, and experience sharing.  
The following passage taken from a UN publication titled Cross-Cutting 
Issues – International Cooperation by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime basically 
focuses on the activities of law enforcement liaison officers: 
Law enforcement liaison officers provide direct contact with the law 
enforcement and government authorities of the host State. They can 
develop professional relationships, build confidence and trust, and 
generally facilitate the liaison between the law enforcement agencies 
in the States involved. When the legal systems of the States concerned 
are very different, liaison officers can also advise law enforcement 
and prosecutorial authorities, both in their own State and in the host 
State, on how to formulate a request for assistance. The role of such 
liaison officers can be enhanced by ensuring that they have access, in 
accordance with the law of the host country, to all agencies in that 
country with relevant responsibilities (UN, 2006b: 18). 
 
Block defines liaison officers as: 
law enforcement officers stationed in another territorial jurisdiction 
where they do not have any formal powers but are tasked with 
maintaining contacts and acting as intermediary between their agency 
and the law enforcement agencies in the host country (Block, 2008: 
77).  
 
7.2 The History of Using Police Liaison Officers 
Appointing police liaison officers goes back to the late 19
th
 century when the 
world witnessed the Anarchist wave. The Police Union of German States, 
established in 1851, has been proposed as a pioneer of police cooperation 
(Gerspacher and Dupont, 2007: 350). While narrating the mid-1800s, Deflem argues 
  
 
209 
 
that the Police Union of German States appointed a German police officer at the 
German embassy in London and ―other agents were placed in Paris, London, 
Brussels, and even in New York‖ (Deflem, 2002:49-53)80. As another example, 
Fijnaut argues that the Russians established a special bureau in Paris, and other 
cooperative initiatives in Berlin and several other European cities with an aim to 
police revolutionary activity organizing abroad against the Russian Empire (Fijnaut, 
1997: 110-111). Even the U.S. Marshals Service, which was founded in 1789, has 
had among its aims the establishing of international cooperation, while US customs 
involved sending or stationing agents abroad (Nadelmann: 1993 p: 48-49 and 22-
24).  
 According to Bailey: 
In the wake of World War II, the United States pioneered the practice 
of having law-enforcement officers (as distinct from intelligence 
agents, state security officers and embassy security personnel) as 
attaches. The large number of law –enforcement agencies at the 
federal level in the United States led to a proliferation on overseas 
postings… (Bailey, 1995: 388).  
 
Accordingly, after World War II, The FBI was the first agency to establish 
overseas posts for counterintelligence and organised crime (Bailey, 1995: 388). 
Another reason for the emergence liaison posts was the communist threat, for 
example, Switzerland allowed French, British and American agents to serve in 
embassies in Berne to ―observe the communist presence‖ (Deflem, 2002: 116). But 
it was really in the 1970s that the use of liaison officers increased dramatically, and 
this was due to drug related issues. Block supports this proposal for Europe when 
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arguing that the use of liaison officers emerged in Europe in the second half of the 
1970s for combatting against drug trafficking, and then ―spilled over to combating 
organized crime and counter-terrorism‖ (Block, 2008: 77). 
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substance of 1988 encouraged the usage of liaison officers. In 
Paragraph 1-e of Article 9 of this convention, member parties are urged to "facilitate 
effective co-ordination between their competent agencies and services and promote 
the exchange of personnel and other experts, including the posting of liaison 
officers" (UN, 1988: 10).   
In fact, due to the focus on drugs, police liaison officers have often been 
referred to as drug liaison officers. This situation began to change in the 1990s with 
the spread of cross-border terrorism, and the subsequent gradual growth in states 
permitting the involvement of police liaison officers with terrorism cases. Andreas 
and Nadelmann (2006: vii) argue that today‘s global counterterrorism campaign is 
built on previous policing efforts against drugs. Today`s developments, which will 
be explored in detail in the coming pages, verifies Andreas and Nadelmann`s 
proposal in terms of the liaison officers.  
Based on given historical development, it can be argued that the usage of 
police liaison officers throughout history has presented a flexible and opportunistic 
employment by states, which initiated this method in areas of great concern of the 
time. For example, this method was first initiated during the Anarchist era with a 
political concern because of the increasing threat of Anarchism. In the following 
years, while usage of liaison officers in the political area decreased, it is possible to 
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observe an increasing importance of liaison officers in the drugs field. With the 
emergence of terrorism as an important issue again, terrorism has once again 
become a primary occupation for liaison officers. Unsurprisingly perhaps, terrorism 
therefore seems to play a key role in the deployment of new liaison posts. In the 
words of one liaison officer:  
I have learnt that as threats to states change in time, our focus as 
liaison officers may also change. Sometimes I am so surprised when 
dealing with terrorism cases today, because I had specialization as a 
police officer to deal with drugs. Time shows that as world changes 
we have to adopt (Personal communication, 29 May 2006). 
 
 
7.3 Ways of Appointing Liaison Officers 
As seen in Table 8, there are several ways of appointing liaison officers. 
Liaison officer (LO) deployment can be examined basically on two dimensions:  the 
LO Employing Entity and the LO Receiving Entity. Those entities may be states, 
international organizations, or local authorities. ‗States‘ includes police and law 
enforcement organizations as sub-state entities.  International organizations signify 
not only international or regional police organizations but also organizations which 
have an influence on police work. Finally, local entities includes local sub-state 
entities with an ability to develop individual international cooperative initiatives. 
According to the above, there may be several scenarios of establishing liaison 
officer employment. The below sections will investigate those scenarios individually 
by focusing on their varieties.  
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Table-8: Methods of Liaison Officer Employment 
 
 LO Employing Entity 
State International 
Organization 
(IO) 
Local 
Authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LO 
Receiving 
Entity 
 
 
State 
 
1. 
Stationing 
in one 
country 
Bilateral 
appointment 
at General 
Police 
Headquarters 
 
 
 
 
 
Europol LO 
appointed  to 
USA 
 
 
 
 
 
NYPD LOs 
appointed  
to other 
countries 
 
State to state 
employment 
bid, stationing 
in other cities 
Lack of police 
representation, 
rep. By other 
diplomatic 
personnel, 
usually 
military LOs 
2. Accredited to other 
states in the same region 
3. Representing other 
states in the host country 
 
Intl. Org. 
(IO) 
1. Membership structure 
(e.g. Europol) 
LOs 
appointed 
between 
Interpol and 
Europol 
NYPD LO 
appointed 
at Interpol  2. Appointment of non-
member countries‘ LOs to 
an IO 
 
Local 
Authority 
 
Jordan, Jamaica, South 
Korean Los in New York 
 European 
examples, 
esp. 
between 
border 
cities 
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7.3.1 Appointment of Liaison Officers Between States 
Bilateral employment of liaison officers from state to state is the most basic 
and common way of establishing a police liaisonship system. As revealed in the 
historical narrative, its roots go back to the Anarchy era of terrorism in the late 19
th
 
century. Today we face various and developed models of liaisonship deployment 
between states.  
The most widely found model is the establishment of bilateral liaison 
officers between police organizations in the respective cities where the Central 
Police Headquarters are placed. In this model, police liaison officers are generally 
stationed at the embassies of the sending country. There are, however, also examples 
where the host police organization provides facilities to the liaison officers. For 
example, according to the information on the webpages of Interpol, Germany hosts 
liaison officers at the Federal Criminal Police Office,
81
 known as BKA. States may 
also have liaison officer deployment in other cities of the host country. In such cases 
there may be more than one liaison office in the host country. The FBI may be 
mentioned here as a significant example. Examining the webpage of the FBI reveals 
many examples of more than one office in the same country. To exemplify the 
practice, we can give examples of the FBI`s offices in Germany and Italy. The FBI 
has offices in Berlin and Rome but also has sub offices in Frankfurt, and Milan.
82
  If 
states do not have bilateral police liaison appointments between each other, other 
diplomatic personnel at the embassies may also act as police liaison officers. For 
                                                 
81
 Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Europe/pjsystems/Germany.asp on  
30.4.2008 
82
 Retrieved from   http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/europe.htm  3.12.2009. 
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example I have learnt at a NATO workshop meeting
83
 in Ankara that the Military 
Attaché of Egypt, who joined the meeting, is also performing the police liaison 
functions at the Egyptian Embassy (Personal Communication, 6/12/2007). 
As a second way of establishing bilateral relationship, states may use their 
liaison officer in one country as an accredited liaison officer for other countries in 
the region. As a prime example it is mentioned on the webpage of the FBI that 
―…Legal Attaché offices- commonly known as Legats- and smaller sub-offices in 
75 key cities around the globe, provide coverage for more than 200 countries, 
territories, and islands.‖84  
A third and also interesting method is the usage of common liaison officers 
by several states in a host country. For example, a liaison officer from one Nordic 
country represents all Nordic countries in a host country. Such a practice presents an 
interesting case because it requires that a state trust the agent of another state in 
conducting operations on behalf of its interest in a third country. The information 
provided on the Interpol webpage about the Police and Justice System of Finland 
demonstrates this system. Interpol webpage provides information that ―Finland 
participates in the Nordic Liaison Project whereby each Nordic liaison officer posted 
abroad also represents the other Nordic countries.‖85 The information on this 
Interpol page shows that there are 20 countries which host Nordic Liaison Officers. 
Those countries are mentioned as follows and the country names in the parentheses 
imply which Nordic country or countries have liaison officers there: Albania 
                                                 
83
 International Security Cooperation: Intelligence Practices  NATO Advanced Research Workshop 
Bilkent Hotel Ankara, Turkey December 6-8, 2007 
84
 Retrieved  from http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/legat.htm  on  3.12.2009 
85
 Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Europe/pjsystems/Finland.asp#43 on 
30.04.2008 
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(Denmark) , Arab Emirates (Norway & Denmark), Bulgaria (Norway), China 
(Finland), Estonia (Finland & Sweden), Germany (Sweden), Latvia (Sweden) , 
Lithuania (Sweden & Finland), Netherlands (Sweden), Morocco (Denmark starts 
08/07), Pakistan (Norway), Poland (Sweden), Russia (Finland, Sweden, Denmark & 
Norway), Serbia (Sweden & Norway), Spain (Finland & Norway), Syria (Sweden), 
Thailand (Sweden & Denmark), Turkey (Denmark), Ukraine (Denmark), United 
Kingdom (Norway).  
 
7.3.2 Appointment of Liaison Officers between States and International 
Organizations 
Establishing an organizational structure based on membership and the 
deployment of liaison officers from contributing parties is a significant example in 
terms of establishing a liaison system between states and international organizations.  
Although Europol has an individual organizational structure, it also provides an 
establishment for the representation of each country by their liaison officers. 
Communication and cooperation between member countries are carried out through 
the liaison officers appointed to Europol. Therefore, most functions of Europol are 
basically founded on the establishment of the liaison system between the 
organization and the member countries. Another example is the Southeast European 
Co-operative Initiative (SECI), which was established in Romania after the decision 
taken at Euro-Atlantic cooperation in May 1995 in Vienna.
86
 The Police and 
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 Retrieved from  http://www.secicenter.org/m106/About_SECI on 15.05.2008 
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customs representatives from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Greece, Hungary, F.Y.R. of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and 
Turkey work together at the SECI Center. According to the information on the SECI 
webpage, liaison officer appointment began at the beginning of January 2001 with 
just two officers, and then by the end of 2002 twelve Member States appointed 19 
liaison officers (10 customs and 9 police) to the SECI Regional Center.
87
 
Recent developments show us that deployment of liaison officers between 
membership-based international organizations and non-member states is also 
becoming a significant practice. The following examples reveal how such practice is 
developing in the world especially around Europol. A first example should be the 
liaisonship relation between the USA and Europol. According to the information 
provided in Europol`s 2003 Annual Report, strategic and operational co-operation 
agreement was signed between the two parties just after the 9/11 attacks (Europol, 
2003). The following summer witnessed the appointment of two EUROPOL Liaison 
Officers in Washington in August 2002 (Europol, 2003; Europol, 2002). Co-
operation between the USA and Europol has improved the liaisonship appointment 
between the two entities. According to the 2005 Europol Annual Report, the USA`s 
Secret Service and FBI first deployed officers to Europol in 2005 (Europol, 2006b, 
3), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has employed a liaison officer 
at Europol since 2006 (Europol, 2007:57).  
Norway, as a non-EU member country, also has a liaison bureau at Europol 
(Europol, 2002b). The first complete year for the Norwegian Bureau at Europol was 
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2003 (Europol, 2003). The Europol Annual Report 2006 also reveals the 
employment of liaison officers by Switzerland and Colombia to Europol and 
Europol‘s preparations to open liaison offices for Canadian, Icelandic and US Postal 
Inspection Services in early 2007 (Europol, 2007: 21). According to Platypus 
Magazine, which is The Journal of the Australian Federal Police, Australia also has 
an agreement with Europol to appoint a liaison officer to the Hague in 2007 
(Platypus Magazine, 2007: 14)
88
.  
Another interesting case that should be mentioned here is the possibility of 
using bilateral liaison officers of member countries in third countries as accredited 
liaison officers by other member states of an international organization. For 
example, a European Union Council Decision (EU: 2003) regulate the common use 
of liaison officers posted abroad by the law enforcement agencies of the Member 
States. 
   
7.3.3 Appointment of Police Liaison Officers Between International 
Organizations 
Establishment of liaison officer posts between international organizations is 
another new trend. According to the Europol Annual Report 2003, Europol recruited 
a liaison officer for its planned Interpol liaison office in 2002 and then a 
Memorandum of Understanding in relation to the Interpol liaison officer was signed 
in May 2003 (Europol, 2003). The Europol Annual Report 2004 revealed that 
                                                 
88
Also look at Europol page of  
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deployment of a Europol Liaison Officer to Interpol took place at the beginning of 
2004 (Europol, 2005: 17). In return, an Interpol Liaison Officer was deployed to 
Europol in 2006 (Europol, 2007: 21; Interpol, 2007). Another significant liaison 
officer appointment took place between Interpol and the United Nations. Finally, 
although the two organizations had had a co-operation agreement since 1996, 
Interpol for the first time appointed a special representative to the United Nations in 
2004.
89
  
 
7.3.4 Appointment of Police Liaison Officers by Local Authorities 
The history of police cooperation showed us that establishing cooperation 
between police forces in the border regions through local law enforcement channels 
has been a common practice. However, current developments reveal that the 
international activity of local police forces has reached new dimensions after 9/11, 
in particular with the NYPD`s overseas liaison officer appointment initiative.  
The first example of this is the appointment of liaison officers by Local 
Police Forces to overseas posts abroad. The liaison program of the NYPD, which 
started in 2002 following the 9/11 attacks, is very well known today as a significant 
example. According to the NYPD homepage, the New York Police has LOs in 
Amman, Jordan; Lyon, France; London, England; Madrid, Spain; Montreal, Canada; 
Paris, France; Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Singapore, Tel Aviv, Israel; 
and Toronto, Canada (NYPD, 2008). A news report also reveals that the NYPD 
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planned sending a liaison officer to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates in mid-2008 
to help with counterterrorism efforts (Lemire, 2008). This strategy was largely built 
up however for countering terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, 
for the sole aim of protecting a local place, in this case, New York, from such 
tragedies. The NYPD example also shows us that a local entity may initiate an 
international cooperative strategy in the counter-terrorism field, which has been 
accepted as a state level issue (Nussbaum, 2007: 214-18). Another dimension of the 
counter-terrorism liaisonship strategy of New York City is its presentation of a 
model to other local entities. As mentioned, above the Toronto and Madrid police 
forces already have liaison officers in New York. Other news in the media also 
reflects the desire of other local police forces in the USA to host or send liaison 
officers. For example, a Los Angeles Times report reveals that New York City‘s 
practice was to be copied soon by the Los Angeles Police Department (McGreevy, 
2006). A report by a US Congressman, Bennie G. Thompson, also indicates that Los 
Angeles, Miami, Las Vegas and Chicago would like to replicate New York‘s 
experience (Thomspson, 2006:11). Thompson also argues that because sending 
liaison officers is costly, the LAPD and other major city police and sheriffs would 
like to pool their resources to establish such an overseas liaison system (Thomspson, 
2006:11). In his report, Thompson, also proposes the establishment of a ―Foreign 
Liaison Officers Against Terrorism (FLOAT) Grant Program‖ (Thomspson, 
2006:12). 
Faherty`s news also enriches the available analysis by providing the second 
variety of liaison officer appointment involving local authorities. In this second 
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variety, we see the appointment of the officers of national police departments to a 
local police entity (Faherty, 2008). According to Faherty, in addition to the police 
officer from Toronto and the newly agreed-upon appointment of a Madrid police 
department officer, the officers of national police departments of Jordan, Jamaica 
and South Korea are working at police headquarters in New York as part of ―a 
growing number of international law enforcement agencies stationing officers in 
New York‖ (Faherty, 2008).  
A third variety of liaison officer appointment at the local level is the 
establishment of a liaisonship link between a local entity and an international 
organization. Our example is again the NYPD, which has employed a liaison officer 
to Interpol headquarters in Lyon (Elkies, 2005; Nussbaum, 2010: 150; NYC, 2005).  
Finally, it should also be mentioned here that there may be Interpol Offices 
at local levels. These offices act in relation with their NCBs (National Central 
Bureaus), however, so their working mechanism does not reflect a liaisonship 
structure.  
 
7.3.5 Examination of Various Forms of Police Liaisonship Appointments 
Examination of various police liaison types reveals that use of this method is 
recognized as an important tool of establishing international relations and 
cooperation for police actors. The range of police actors deploying liaison officers 
comprises national police forces, international police organizations, and local police 
entities. Examination of the motives and strategies of police organizations to use a 
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liaison system reveals that each organization has its own priorities in establishing 
this system, and indeed, there are cases which suggest that the priorities of those 
actors may even clash with each other in surprising ways. A bizarre example of such 
a case is the creation of local and federal rivals in one country with respect to the 
NYPD`s international liaison program and the FBI`s strong opposition to this project 
at the initial stages. What this interesting case reminds us is that we are living in a 
globalized world, and that the transnational environment gives local actors various 
opportunities to bypass and even supercede federal actors in the international arena. 
In fact, each method seems to have its own advantages and disadvantages for police 
organizations, therefore examination of those differences may help us to draw a 
balanced opinion about their distinct application.   
Despite the emergence of different methods, bilateral liaison appointment 
between states has long remained the most widely used method of police liaisonship. 
Both data found in various country and international organization reports and web 
pages and also interviews with police officers shows that states primarily focus on 
their bilateral liaison system in cooperation with partners. As a first example, to 
show that states mainly prefer bilateral liaisonship appointment with other states, 
looks at the relationship between Europol and the USA. The Europol Annual 
Reports of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 show that Europol would like to improve the 
level of cooperation between itself and the US law enforcement bodies via the 
liaison channel between Europol and the USA. However, accounts in the reports 
reveal that US law enforcement entities give priority to bilateral relations with 
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European Union countries individually. It is argued, in the Europol Annual Report 
2003 that:  
A difficulty concerning information exchange remains since an 
internal US policy stipulates making use of the bilateral liaison 
network in EU Member States as a first priority (this is particularly 
true of the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI), and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) (Europol, 2003).  
 
Similar remarks have been placed in the 2004 and 2005 Europol Annual 
Reports as follows:  
As a preliminary conclusion, it was confirmed that the co-operation 
agreements between Europol and the US law enforcement authorities 
have been implemented. The full potential however had not been 
accomplished due to the US policy of utilising bilateral co-operation 
with EU Member States as a matter of priority (Europol, 2005: 16; 
Europol, 2006c).  
 
 The Europol Annual Report 2006 draws similar conclusions, but this time 
only for the FBI: 
The FBI mandate to engage in increased bilateral cooperation with 
European police and security partners though European-based Legal 
Attaché Offices preclude active engagement of the Europol liaison 
bureau, but increased FBI cooperation with the multilateral aspects of 
Europol is expected in the future (Europol, 2007: 58).  
 
These excerpts clearly show that for a state level law enforcement entity, 
establishing liaison with its state counterparts seems to carry a different and more 
valuable meaning.  
Another example drawing attention to the importance of bilateral liaison 
appointments, involves Europol itself. Europol was established to conduct police 
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cooperation under one umbrella organization in the EU. Its liaison bureaus scheme 
aims to bring the liaison representatives of all countries under the same structure to 
facilitate cooperation between the member states and the organization. Logically, 
one may think that this structure makes unnecessary the need to appoint liaison 
officers between states bilaterally. However, the reality doesn‘t reflect this logical 
thinking. Several members of Europol still have bilateral liaison officers between 
themselves, instead of using their officers located at Europol Headquarters. The 
information on the webpage of Interpol also shows that countries such as Austria, 
Germany, France, the Czech Republic, the Nordic Countries, Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, and Spain have LO posts in other European countries although they are 
members of Europol.
90
 As a significant example among those countries, we can give 
as an example the liaison officers of Germany, which are located in fellow Europol 
member countries of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
91
 According to the information on this same 
webpage, Belgium, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom as members of Europol also have liaison officers in 
Germany. This example clearly shows that member countries of the same 
international organization also prefer establishing bilateral relations between each 
other.  
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A police manager, representing his country at Europol, argued that ―I am 
strongly opposed of using bilateral liaison appointments between member countries 
instead of using Europol structure. Bilateral appointment is costly for states and is 
not contributing to the foundation purposes of Europol‖ (Personal Communication, 
2 May 2007). In fact this argument reflects an ongoing debate at Europol. As 
another European police manager argued: 
Using only Europol channel and liaison offices at the headquarters 
between member states and ending the practice of liaison officer 
employments bilaterally between member states is proposed by a few 
countries, but accepting such a proposal seems to be impossible right 
now‖(Personal Communication on 3 May 2007). 
 
This issue is also related to the question of to what degree the member states 
would like to have an operationally powerful Europol. According to Gerspacher and 
Dupont, Denmark proposed to increase the operational powers of Europol while 
France resisted it because ―an increase in powers must be accompanied by adequate 
control mechanisms‖ (Gerspacher and Dupont, 2007: 359). The following words of 
a liaison officer explains the practical reason for not ending bilateral liaison 
appointments between member states of Europol: ―Impotencies of Europol channels 
urge several European States not to deplete their liaison officer posts in other 
European States‖ (Personal communication: 17/08/2006). These arguments and 
member states` tendency to have bilateral police liaison links with other members 
shows that states may be in need of establishing bilateral relations although they are 
in the same IOs as members.  
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The general impression, as based on a series of interviews with liaison 
officers and police managers, is that organizations such as Europol and Interpol are 
good for policy setting, establishing common standards, and creating data 
warehouses. However, they also noted some problems that are faced in practice. 
First of all, the interviews revealed a tendency to focus criticisms on the bureaucratic 
structure of international organizations as a negative characteristic. A liaison officer 
who had experience both at international organizations and in bilateral appointments 
argued that ―Bureaucracy dominates the relationships at international organizations. 
Processing a request at an international organization may take months. On the other 
hand bilateral liaison officers may conclude the same requests in hours and even in 
minutes‖ (Interview with a Liaison Officer on 26/10/2005). Similarly, a deputy 
National Police Commissioner of a country argued that: 
Through our liaison officers, we can get very important and urgent 
information in quite a short time when we need them. Otherwise we 
could have waited for days through other channels. Therefore we give 
special importance in employing liaison officers to areas of our 
concern (Interview on 27/09/2007).  
 
These arguments comparing the use of bilateral liaison officers and international 
organizations seems to be a contradiction to another argument which was expressed, 
namely, that it is possible to bring LOs (Liaison Officer) at Europol into the meeting 
room ―in five minutes‖. From that quote it can bee understood that physically, those 
LOs at Europol can be rapidly gathered for informing them on general urgent issues. 
For example, informing them about intelligence that an attack will take place 
somewhere in Europe. But the counter-argument of officials here implies something 
else, which is actually about the speed of investigations. This distinction was 
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suggested as well by a National Police Commissioner of another country, who also 
argued that ―We have been receiving requests of Liaison Officer employment by our 
partners more and more because quite a lot of police organizations believe that 
employing liaison officers [bilaterally] is an important way of succeeding timely and 
successful cooperation‖ (Interview on 25/11/2004). 
 The emergence of local police authorities as actors of international police 
cooperation against terrorism also seems to be a growing development. It can be 
argued that one of the reasons for the emergence of the NYPD`s international liaison 
system has been the absence of support by federal law enforcement agencies or their 
inability to prevent New York attacks (Pincus, 2008, Linzer, 2008). Therefore the 
NYPD`s top management decided to establish their own system of intelligence 
gathering and policing terrorism. One of the methods that the agency utilized was 
establishing an international liaison system by sending police officers overseas to 
ask questions about subjects relevant to New York. This situation angered the FBI, 
as the federal law enforcement agency, and a race began between a federal and a 
local agency emerged. This race even affected several investigations, according to 
Linzer, who argued that the NYPD had good relations with other key intelligence 
agencies and with the Department of Homeland Security, but:  ―...the FBI, protective 
of turf and disdainful of local initiative, froze Kelly's department out of two New 
York-related terrorism investigations, officials say‖ (Linzer, 2008). Linzer`s 
following sentence shows that the problems between the FBI and the NYPD seem to 
have been moderated: ―But, recently, officials in the FBI and the NYPD said the 
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bitterness that plagued their first years after the 2001 attacks has faded‖(Linzer, 
2008).  
 The narrative given above discloses several insights. Police agencies have 
several alternatives for international cooperation through establishing a liaison 
system. International organizations created based on a liaison system help to 
establish common standards and methods for all members. Therefore, taking part in 
such organizations is important for police organizations to have a say. Bilateral 
appointments between police organizations help police authorities to speed up 
information-sharing and investigations in a secure way. Lastly, the emergence of 
local police authorities as international actors enriches the possibilities of police 
cooperation. Although tensions exist between those three types, we observe that 
actors adjust over time. When Europol complains that relations between itself and 
the USA`s law enforcement agencies are restricted due to the USA´s preference on 
bilateral relations between states, we clearly see that a bilateral relation between 
states carries different meanings than a relation with an international organization. If 
the FBI as a federal agency is in a position to adjust itself to the idea of a local 
police entity capable of establishing international capabilities, then we should see 
that today‘s world is providing various opportunities for different levels of police 
authorities. The table about the various types of liaisonship reveals that we face a 
complex relationship web between among levels of police authorities. States are 
very well aware of this web and its enlargement. It is interesting to note that states 
having those relationships seem not to be unhappy about the existence of such a 
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complex web. The reason for states` acknowledgement of this system may be an 
indication of states‘ gradual adaptation to this web of relations.  
 
7.4 Expansion of the Police Liaison System Around the World 
 We have been observing an expansion in the use of a police liaisonship 
system. First of all we see an expansion in terms of kinds of actors who use 
liaisonship. Police liaisonship has traditionally been a method employed by states at 
the national/federal level in either bilateral settings or in connection with member-
based international organizations. However, recent developments show us that 
deployment of liaison officers has become a method used by international 
organizations themselves in establishing relations with other actors and local 
authorities. In terms of international organizations, we observe four new 
developments. As the first example, international organizations may employ liaison 
officers to non-member states. For example, Europol has deployed two liaison 
officers to Washington DC (Europol, 2002).  Secondly, an international organization 
may accept liaison officers from non-member third countries, again as in the case of 
Europol.  Australia became the latest non-EU party to sign an operational agreement 
with Europol, following Iceland, Colombia, the United States, Switzerland, Canada, 
and Norway (Platypus Magazine, 2007:14). Europol also has working relationships 
with the FBI through their European-based Legal Attaché Offices. Information in 
the Europol 2006 report reveals that terrorism is a special concern in agreements 
between Europol and Switzerland, Colombia and the USA. A third development is 
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deployment of liaison officers between international organizations. The one example 
discussed here was employment of liaison bureaus between Europol and Interpol, 
based on a cooperation agreement signed on 5 November 2001 just after the 
September 11 attacks (Interpol-Europol Cooperation Agreement, 2001). While 
Europol opened a liaison bureau in Interpol in 2004 (Europol, 2005: 17), Interpol 
opened its Europol liaison bureau in 2007 (Interpol, 2007).  Lastly, as a fourth new 
development, we see employment of local LOs to an international organization, for 
example, an officer from the NYPD being stationed at Interpol Headquarters in 
Lyon.  
In terms of local level initiatives, the most interesting is the case of the New 
York Police Department. The NYPD has on its own initiative sent police liaison 
officers to 10 countries. The narratives in the relative sections show that Toronto and 
Madrid also have liaison officers in New York. This situation reveals that other local 
entities from other states also deal with liaison officer employment. Although a 
small example, the place of this example in the wider police liaison appointment 
scheme is significant.  
 Based on given narratives we can also talk about an expansion regarding the 
kind of relationship established between actors. Establishment of a liaisonship 
structure between a local entity and national police forces of other countries is one 
example of this situation. Logically, relationships between equals should be the 
norm in international relations. Accordingly, we expect a relationship between two 
national or federal forces to be conducted as though they are equals. But the 
liaisonship relation between a local entity and a national police force does not fit 
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into this picture. That seems to be the reason for the FBI`s strong initial reaction 
against the NYPD`s liaisonship initiative. By the same token, establishment of a 
liaison system between Interpol, as an international organization, and the NYPD, a 
local entity, also encourages us to make similar interpretations. In fact, when we 
look at those shifts in establishing relations between police forces, we see a 
transnationalization of relationships between different levels of police authorities. 
Thinking about the definitions of transnational relations, we can argue that the 
existing police actors of international cooperation and the varieties of relationships 
between them can be accepted as examples of transnationalization. First of all, we 
observe the existence of cross border interactions taking place between those actors. 
We do not observe control of a central foreign policy organ in the functioning of 
those systems. Additionally, as exemplified in the NYPD case we also observe the 
disappearance of national/federal level dominance over local level actors in 
establishing international relations. The capability of international police 
organizations in becoming cooperative partners with each other, with national and 
even local level police organizations also reflects how much police cooperation has 
been transnationalised. 
The third point in understanding the expansion of police liaison system is 
measuring the extent of police liaisonship. If various types of police liaisonship are 
evolved in the fight against terrorism, are they also growing in number? How many 
actual police cooperation agreements have been signed, and how many police liaison 
officers have actually been appointed between countries? These are seemingly 
simple questions, but surprisingly difficult to answer. In fact, I understood this 
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difficulty at the beginning of my thesis writing when I contacted an Interpol officer. 
I asked this officer where I could find a database that includes bilateral police 
cooperation agreements, which also set the ground for liaison officer appointments 
between police organizations. The answer was discouraging because he mentioned 
the impossibility of achieving such a result. He informed me that ―Interpol does not 
interest in agreements between states because of their bilateral nature and the 3
rd
 
article of Interpol Constitution legally and administratively do not allow establishing 
such a database. I guess that you are in a desperate pursuit‖ (E-mail communication, 
28 March 2007). In fact, conversations with other scholars who focus on policing 
issues revealed that lack of reliable statistical data regarding this issue is a common 
problem. For example, during an international conference in Ankara, I had the 
opportunity to meet with Otwin Marenin, a distinguished professor focusing on 
criminal justice. Regarding my thesis, his first question was if I had been able to find 
the exact numbers of liaison officers. I replied that I was not able to because of the 
difficulties mentioned in this study. He supported my argument by arguing that he 
was not even able to find those figures for the USA alone (Personal Communication, 
December 6, 2007). This example reflects the general difficulty of scholars in 
finding sound statistics on the issue.    
There are several reasons for not being able to achieve such a comprehensive 
dataset. The first reason is that the data that do exist are difficult to keep up to date 
because of the flexibility in appointing liaison officers. States appoint LOs based on 
their immediate needs. If a state needs to appoint a liaison officer to another state, 
application of such a decision may take only a few months. Similarly, as soon as that 
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specific need is gone, the states may withdraw the liaison officer. Therefore, 
appointing liaison officers reflects a dynamic process based on the needs of the 
states. This situation makes keeping a stable statistical understanding difficult to 
track.  
The second reason is that there is not an accessible comprehensive source for 
such data, especially data on bilateral appointments. It is possible to find information 
on the web pages of international organizations; however they seem to be quite 
restricted and narrow. For example, Interpol provides the names of the member 
countries on its webpage, but country-specific information can be found only on the 
European Police and Justice Systems page. According to the information provided 
on those country specific pages, 23 of the 188 member countries provide detailed 
information about their police and judicial systems including numbers of liaison 
posts.
92
 It is also possible to find data regarding bilateral appointments on the 
webpage of several national police organizations. For example, the FBI and DEA as 
the law enforcement organizations of the USA, the Australian Federal Police, the 
Estonian Police, the Lithuanian Police, and the Royal Canadian Metropolitan Police 
reveal information about their liaison postings on the internet.
93
 The Royal Canadian 
Metropolitan Police even provides the results of a survey measuring the success of 
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Information regarding police and judicial systems has been retrieved from 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Region/Europe/pjsystems/Default.asp, on 03.12.2009.  
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 Information regarding LO posts has retrieved on 30.04.2008 from the following webpages: FBI 
(http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/legat.htm),  
DEA (http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/international/foreign.html),   
Australian Federal Police (http://www.afp.gov.au/international/liaison.html),  
Estonian Police (http://www.politsei.ee/?id=1122)  
Lithuania ( http://www.policija.lt), 
RCMP (Royal Canadian Metropolitan Police) http://www.rcmp.ca/factsheets/fact_iob_e.htm  
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their LOs.
94
 There are also scholarly studies mentioning LO numbers, such as Block, 
who focuses on European experience,  argues that at the time of his writing, 2008, 
EU law enforcement agencies had approximately 100 LOs ―stationed in other EU 
Member States and approximately 250 stationed outside the Union in third 
countries‖ (Block, 2008: 78). 
However, it is impossible to construct a general view of a global police 
liaison system based on those country-specific pieces of information because not all 
organizations provide such data on their web pages. A relevant point here is the way 
that states perceive revealing data regarding police cooperation agreements or 
appointment of police liaison officers. While some states either provide information 
on their official webpage or permit international organizations to publicize them, 
several others may perceive that information as a national security issue. For 
example, as mentioned in another part of this study, my inquiry to police 
organizations to get information about their police cooperation agreements and 
appointment of police liaison officers was declined by several police organizations 
due to national security arguments. In fact, this hesitation is clearly reflected at the 
webpage of the British Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) in the following 
passage, which is the text written in response to a commonly asked question of 
―What will SOCA do overseas?‖: ―SOCA will maintain a large network of overseas 
officers. We do not provide details of where they are located or their work for 
security reasons.‖95 
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 This survey can be found at . http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/surveys-sondages/2005/survey-sondage-
partnrs-eng.htm  retrieved on 03.12.2009. 
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 Retrieved from   http://www.soca.gov.uk/faqs/index.html   on 29, April, 2008 
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Another observation that I have had during my study is the reality that 
absence of comprehensive datasets on the deployment of police liaison officers leads 
to a broad neglect of the issue. Despite the restrictive nature of statistical data 
presented in this study, restricted in the sense that they have been gathered only 
through open sources such as news and webpages of relevant organizations, the 
general big picture of liaison officer employment may cause surprise for some 
academicians and even practitioners due to the previous neglect. During a 
presentation in Ankara I observed several reactions. One of them was the reaction of 
a practitioner, who simply asked me where I had found the data shown at the 
presentation. I explained that most of the data can be found on the internet. I became 
aware that although he was dealing with this issue as a practitioner, he was not very 
much aware what was going on in the world in his own profession (Personal 
communication, December, 7, 2007). 
Despite the existing difficulties of gathering data I was able to obtain some 
information about the numbers of current and past liaison officers by searching the 
internet and by directly contacting national police organizations via their e-mail 
addresses. Internet searches for ―police cooperation agreement‖ and ―police liaison 
officer‖ revealed various news reports, reports of international organizations, and 
web-pages of police/law enforcement organizations. The search results showed that 
several countries provide police liaison officer employment information on the web-
pages of relevant entities, which may be the web page of police organizations or 
interior ministries. However the numbers of such countries doing so is not large.  
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 Numbers from the reports of international organizations or news can be 
found more easily, but are less likely to be accurate because of changes over time. 
Directly contacting the national police organizations was the best way to get the 
most accurate and up-to-date information, but as a method it also had some practical 
complications. The primary problem was that of the 145 countries whose police 
organizations or relevant ministries‘ e-mail addresses were found and to whom 
emails were sent requesting information, 40 bounced back as failed delivery. 
Ultimately however, based on a search on the internet, exploration of various 
reports, and e-mail communication with a number of police organizations, a total of 
554 police cooperation agreements between countries were found. The majority of 
those agreements were signed between countries in common regions,  which 
supports the assertion by Andreas and Nadelmann that most transnational law 
enforcement relationships are between neighbors (Andreas-Nadelmann, 2006:116).   
In terms of numbers of police liaison officers, 54 countries were found to be 
deploying police liaison officers to around 650 points, though just 13 send liaison 
officers to more than 10 different sites. The total number of those sites does not 
accurately reflect the total number of officers sent however, since more than one 
officer can be appointed to a liaison office. A more important point is that several 
liaison offices may cover a wider area. In other words, an office established in one 
country may be responsible for other countries in the same region. For example, the 
FBI legal attaché office in Nigeria is also responsible for Ghana, Togo, Benin, 
Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Cameroon.
96
 Taking this point into 
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 Retrieved May 17
th
 2008 from http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/africa.htm on 17.05.2008. 
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consideration, we can also argue that the liaison offices are responsible for more 
places than the given total number. In yet another example, the FBI currently has 
liaison offices in 75 key cities, but these cover almost all countries around the world 
because each liaison post is responsible for more than one country.  
In general, the numbers noted here are almost certainly underestimates of the 
total number of PLOs stationed around the world currently. Direct contact with 
national police organizations revealed more liaison agreements and postings than 
those revealed by the internet search. For example, no information about Lebanese 
police agreements was available on the internet, but an email from Lebanese 
authorities showed that they actually have bilateral police cooperation agreements 
with four other countries, and while the internet search showed only four LOs 
stationed in Lebanon, the email response attested to a total of 15. Similarly, the 
internet search found just eight Slovak LOs posted abroad, one foreign LO in 
Slovakia, and a total of eight police agreements between Slovakia and other 
countries. Direct reporting by the Slovakian authorities revealed however a total of 
10 Slovak LOs abroad, six foreign LOs in Slovakia, nine foreign LOs in third 
countries with agreements to work on behalf of Slovakia, and 26 police agreements 
with other countries. With respect to future numbers, the email replies also point to 
intentions to increase the numbers of LOs currently posted. Polish authorities predict 
increases from current numbers of 7-10 LOs to about 15 in the next few years, and 
Slovakia also reported intention so to open up two additional LO posts in the coming 
year. During my research, I have also observed that other countries expressed the 
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desire to create more posts, but pointed to budgetary or political restraints 
preventing this expansion.  
 
7.5 Growth of Bilateral PLOs 
While remaining aware of the difficulties of measuring the exact official 
numbers of police liaison officers, the information presented below gives some 
indication of growing numbers and increasing importance. Overall, the USA seems 
to have the lead in appointing liaison officers. This is in part because the USA has 
more than one agency appointing officers, each with a different focus. These include 
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the FBI, the Department of Homeland 
Security, the State Department, and the Department of Immigration and 
Naturalization. Among these, the DEA and the FBI are the most well known ones in 
terms of using liaison officers. The DEA has offices in 62 countries around the 
world, while the FBI, responsible for serious crimes and terrorism, has offices in 60 
countries. With such numbers, both organizations clearly have already a global 
reach, but in fact the numbers of American liaison posts is on the rise. Looking 
specifically at the FBI, in 1992 there were only 16 offices worldwide, but due to 
increasing international terrorism this had grown to 44 in June 2001, when  FBI 
Director Louis Freeh left office (Watson, 2002), and to 57 after 9/11.
97
 Former FBI 
director Louis Freeh testified in post-9/11 hearings that ―the FBI needed to 
significantly increase its international role and liaison with our foreign law 
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 Information in this sentence is a combination of Watson‘s comments and information on FBI‘s 
webpage. The webpage is retrieved from 
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation/international.htm on 27.11. 2007 
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enforcement and security counterparts‖ (Freeh, 2002) and in reference to the 1996 
Khobar bombings, stated that he would have done much better if he had ―had an FBI 
agent in Riyadh on June 25th, 1996, when that tragedy occurred, who had the trust 
and the relationship that the legate had three years later when he set up the office.‖ 
(Freeh, 2002b)  
The Liaison System is an important aspect of policing in Europe both 
internally between European countries and also externally in establishing relations 
with other countries. The previous narratives in this study reveal that Europol as an 
international organization takes the liaison appointment scheme to new horizons as 
seen in the examples of its liaison appointments with other international 
organizations and with non-member countries.  
Another region where the importance of police liaisonship against terrorism 
is increasingly recognized is Oceania, particularly following 9/11 and the attacks in 
Bali. The webpage of the New Zealand Police announces that establishing new 
liaison posts is seen as an important step in increasing capability to pre-empt and 
respond to terrorist attacks,
98
 and the Acting Deputy Commissioner of the New 
Zealand Police has said publicly that ―International co-operation is vital in 
responding to terrorist attacks‖ and that therefore their Liaison Officer network has 
been expanding since 2001 (Mckenzie-Mclean, 2006). The international network of 
Australian LOs gives them reach into virtually every corner of the globe (Thorp, 
2003), and has been compared in its vastness to that of the USA, with references to 
Australia being the ―new regional policeman‖ (McPhedran, 2004).   
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 Retrieved from   from http://www.police.govt.nz/service/counterterrorism  on 14.07.2007 
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In Asia, the ASEAN countries have several efforts focused on improving 
cooperation on crimes, particularly terrorism, and the exchange of LOs is becoming 
an important component of this cooperation. The 5
th
 ASEAN ministerial meeting in 
2005 focused on the establishment of police liaison officers in the member countries 
(Minhlong, 2005). Korea and Japan also contribute to cooperative efforts in the 
region, and a Xinhua News Agency report in 2004 notes China‘s calls for closer 
cooperation and for greater exchange of LOs.
99
 
The results of this inquiry into the growth of police liaisons reflect at least 
two important issues. First, while the numbers are on the rise, still, only about a 
quarter of all countries are able to send LOs to other countries, and only a quarter of 
those countries have managed to establish liaison posts widely—i.e. in more than ten 
countries. The USA, France, Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, Canada, and Australia 
can be accepted as the leading countries in appointing LOs, and so we can safely say 
that this is a method used predominantly by western states and by those that are 
economically strong.  
Secondly, it is important to consider the sensitive nature of establishing 
police agreements and LOs. While sending out email requests for information on 
LOs, the responses were not always positive. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
for example, replied only that police cooperation agreements are classified and that 
it was therefore not possible to release these numbers publicly. Similar replies were 
also received from Italy and the Czech Republic. Some other countries however, 
went out of their way to provide up-to-date and accurate information. What is 
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 ‗China calls for Closer Law Enforcement Cooperation in East Asia‘, Xinhua News Agency, BBC 
Monitoring Asia Pacific, 10.01.2004. Retrieved from LexisNexis on 18.12.2006. 
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interesting about this is the varying degrees of sensitivity with which different 
countries treat the issue of sharing this information. While some states openly place 
this information on their webpages, others refuse to make the information public for 
any reason. 
This fact in itself indicates the gray area in which this type of cooperation 
takes place. It is not necessarily seen as part of the traditional, completely secretive 
national security way of thinking, but it is not completely open either. It thus has 
clearly the potential to be invaded by a national security mentality. If this happens, 
police liaisons will become a part of international practices, with their age old 
limitations for cooperation, such as mistrust. If it can remain a less nationalized, 
more transnationalized practice, it will remain a powerful potential for cooperation. 
 
7.6 The Impact of Terrorism in Enlargement of Police Liaison Appointments 
The history of liaison officer appointments reveals that terrorism has an 
important impact in establishing liaison posts, their expansion, and also their demise. 
The reasons for the emergence of the earliest liaison formations, in the form of 
appointing police officers abroad or hiring agents to observe suspicious groups in 
other countries, was in response to the Anarchist movement, which is considered to 
be the initial form of modern terrorism. The cross-border nature of the Anarchist 
movement and the relationships between Anarchist groups in distant territories 
drove police forces to initiate various forms of cooperation, including sending their 
representatives abroad to monitor the Anarchist movements in other countries, and 
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cooperating on policing Anarchism. When Anarchism lost its influence, the method 
of liaison officer appointment also seems to fade.  
Liaison officer appointments became popular among law enforcement 
entities again after the end of the Second World War, but this time in the struggle 
against drugs. The need to establish cooperation between law enforcement entities in 
their fight against drugs made liaison officer appointment an important and popular 
strategy. The emphasis on liaison officer appointment paved the way to legal and 
practical developments in the expansion of this method. Placing this method in the 
Drug Convention of the UN, the use of liaisons in regional stages especially in 
Europe, and increasing state application as in the case of the USA, seems to have 
had a positive impact in the development of this strategy.  
Although the use of liaison officers has been a growing strategy, their role in 
terrorism related issues has not been noticed until recently, in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks. With the emergence of terrorism as the dominant security threat, the 
use of an LO system seems to be expanding through various dimensions.  
First, we observe that most of the new Liaison Officer appointment strategies 
adopted by international organizations, states, and local level police authorities has 
taken place since the 9/11 attacks. In terms of liaison officer appointments between 
Interpol and Europol, the decision to appoint bilateral liaison officers has taken 
place only after the signing of the Co-operation Agreement Between Interpol and 
Europol, which was signed on 5
th
 of November 2001 just after the 9/11 attacks.  The 
foundation of liaison appointments between Europol and the USA have also begun 
taking place since 9/11, starting on 6 December 2001, when both parties signed a 
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strategic agreement, which mentions cooperation against terrorism as an important 
aim (Europol, 2002). 
Interpol`s special representative appointment to the UN took place in 2004 
―to strengthen the global capacity to respond coherently to ever-changing 
developments in the world from a law enforcement perspective.‖100 The term 
―changing developments‖ refers, I would argue, to terrorism more than anything 
else. 
The NYPD`s ground-breaking moves in liaison appointments have also 
taken place in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, with an aim to prevent future 
terrorist attacks against New York. Information found on the webpage of the New 
York City Police Foundation, which supports the NYPD‘s liaison program by 
providing grants, reveals the following accomplishments of this program: 
• London, 2005 - Our post was in the tube at the time of the terrorist 
bombing. He was immediately in contact with the NYPD from the 
scene and conferred directly with Scotland Yard. This information 
was instrumental in the NYPD's strategic personnel redeployment 
both in subways and the streets. 
• Madrid, 2005 - Our post responded with an Interpol team and was 
the first non-Spanish law enforcement person to arrive at the scene of 
the terrorist attack and begin transmitting information back to the 
United States.
101
 
 
In an interesting sign of how these connections work, the NYPD 
Commissioner gave testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
& Governmental Affairs on January 8, 2009 regarding the lessons that the New 
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Retrieved from  http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/IntLiaison/UN.asp  on 17.05.2008 
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Retrieved  from http://www.nycpolicefoundation.org/global.asp on 11.03.2009 
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York City Police Department had drawn from the attacks in Mumbai. He pointed out 
that: 
 
Within hours of the end of the attacks, the NYPD notified the Indian 
government that we would be sending personnel there. On December 
1, we dispatched three senior officers. Their assignment was to gather 
as much information as possible about the tactics used in the attack. 
This is in keeping with a practice we have followed for several years. 
In all cases, our officers do not take part in investigative activity. In 
Mumbai, our officers toured crime scenes, took photographs, and 
asked questions of police officials. They relayed what they learned 
back to New York. 
 
These officers are part of the Police Department's overseas liaison 
program in which we post experienced personnel to 11 cities around 
the world. They partner with local police and intelligence agencies 
and respond when terrorist incidents occur. In this case, the most 
senior officer in the group had served as a liaison in Amman, Jordan. 
In July 2006, when seven bombs exploded in Mumbai trains and 
railway stations, he flew to the city on a similar mission. The 
relationships he forged during that trip proved helpful in November. 
(Kelly, 2009).  
 
According to a United States Department of Justice Report provided on the 
FBI`s web page, it is stated that ―By 1996, the FBI had 25 offices abroad. Since 
then, the number has doubled due in part to the threat of international terrorism 
directed against the United States.‖  
The experience in Asia and Oceania also reveals that states facing with the 
terrorism threat there have declared the liaison officer appointment as an important 
strategy in the fight against terrorism. The following two decisions taken from the 
Joint Communique of the 28th ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference Brunei 
Darussalam, 25-29 May 2008 shows that the practice of appointing liaison officers 
is encouraged by the members of the ASEAN organization:  
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8.12.5.To acknowledge the benefits of assigning police liaison officers 
in other member countries in facilitating mutual assistance amongst 
law enforcement agencies in the member countries; 
8.12.6.To continue encouraging remaining member countries that 
have not assigned police liaison officers to do so, where practical, to 
facilitate mutual assistance (ASEANAPOL, 2008). 
 
News reports from the Turkish Hürriyet daily newspaper mention the plan of 
Turkish Police Liaison Officer appointment to 20 places worldwide (Soner, 2008). 
In fact this plan signifies an increase of more than 100% in liaison officer 
appointments, an increase that can be quite easily charted. According to the country-
based information on the webpage of Interpol, on 1 March 2009 there were seven 
possible Turkish posts, of which five were vacant.
102
 Visiting the same page on 
14.12.2009 reveals updated numbers, showing that Turkey now has police liaison 
officer posts in 13 countries, and also one LO at the SECI Center
103
. This increase of 
almost 100% has been achieved in quite a short time.   
Turning to the case of China, a recent news report states that, ―China will 
send additional police officers to liaison with security forces in countries facing 
major terror threats, in a bid to boost cooperation and head off attacks,…‖ also ―An 
announcement on the ministry's Web site said police officers already posted abroad 
had played a key role in heading off attacks on Chinese diplomatic missions and 
financial institutions.‖104 
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 Retrieved from http://www.interpol.int/public/Region/Europe/pjsystems/turkey.asp?HM=1  on 
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Regarding this development in China, one analysis of public announcements 
by officials states that, with respect to police liaison appointments by China: China 
plans on sending PLOs to several countries ―facing terrorist threats to improve 
police networking and better combat terrorism…‖. (Zhe, 2008) These moves are 
being taken because sending PLOs is believed to be an effective way of expanding 
China‘s anti-terrorism frontline to meet the growing threat of terrorism and because 
ever since the first Chinese police liaison officer appointment to the USA in 1998, 
authorities in China have argued that LOs play an important role ―in combating 
cross-borders crimes‖ and ―have managed to provide a lot of valuable intelligence 
on terrorism‖ (Zhe, 2008).  
 The information given above reveals that the threat of terrorism has brought 
about an increase in the use of liaison appointments in various forms.  My research 
has also revealed that the proportion of liaison officers‘ working time devoted to 
terrorism issues has also increased. Information in an FBI report on their Legal 
Attaché Program reveals that since 9/11 ―their number one priority is the prevention 
of terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests. As a result, the bulk of 
the Legats‘ workload centers on counterterrorism activities‖ (USDOJ, 2004). 
Supporting this idea are the words of a police liaison officer, who represents 
his organization on all kinds of crimes, and who has been working as a liaison 
officer for more than 10 years in different parts of the world. He argued that he was 
mainly dealing with drug related crimes before 9/11, but now he devotes most of his 
time to terrorism related investigations and cooperation.  
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A police manager working at a National Police Headquarters that served as a 
host for liaison officers, explained that his country has been hosting liaison officers 
from several countries. Before 9/11, liaison officers of some of those countries were 
deployed only for drug related issues. According to him, 9/11 has changed the 
atmosphere and forced them to establish cooperation on terrorism issues as well as 
drug cases. He also argued that in such cases, having foreign liaison officers in his 
own country is a great advantage, because a liaison officer can easily open all 
needed doors to establish links and cooperation. This argument is also in line with 
Andreas and Nadelmann`s previously given argument that the current anti-terrorism 
structure has been established on the framework of the previous drug fighting 
structure.  
Another active LO argued that his presence in a host country is a great 
advantage in that it allows him to express his own country`s terrorism problems and 
approach first hand. He argued that terrorism has always been an area of reluctance 
for partners; therefore, convincing those partners to initiate an investigation could 
sometimes take years. He described his own experiences with such a case, where, in 
the absence of a liaison,  it took him 1½  years to convince the partner police 
authorities to initiate an investigation—a case which revealed numerous crimes such 
as money laundering, threats, and others for terrorist purposes. What frustrates 
police officers in such cases is that the criminal networks and activities behind the 
terrorist organization may use their political standing as a cover for justifying its 
activities, and thus complicate the work of the police. From the opposite perspective, 
this is the point Deflem attempted to make at a conference in Ankara, when he 
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proposed that police officers can best cooperate on terrorism issues when they see it, 
terrorism, as a crime.  
In fact this point deserves attention, because if a society and politicians in a 
country see a terrorist group as freedom fighters, the criminal activities of this 
terrorist group may easily be overlooked, not only by society but also by the police 
organization itself. Therefore, if a police organization would like to gather the 
support of the police organizations of other countries on terrorist groups, the 
primary aim should be to convince the other parties about the criminal and terrorist 
nature of the group. Appointing liaison officers can be seen as one way of informing 
the partners about the real nature of those groups. As exemplified in the words of 
one liaison officer, convincing the partners may take months and even years. 
  
7.7 Formal Cooperation 
Block, himself an ex-liaison officer who served in the Russian Federation, 
summarizes the work of liaison officers in the Russian Federation as follows:  
Taking a request for intelligence from the liaison officer‘s home 
country as an example, the first step in each case for the liaison officer 
would be to properly channel the request. This means finding the 
appropriate legal context and a competent law enforcement agency 
(and sometimes person) to deal with the actual substance of the 
request. In the next step, the translation of the request takes 
considerable effort although the actual linguistic translation is not the 
main reason for that. More effort is often needed to adapt inquiries to 
meet the Russian Federation legal and operational requirements for 
the case to be dealt with quickly. This entails providing sufficient 
information in the preferred format of the requested agency and 
sometimes rephrasing the actual questions so that they make sense to 
that law enforcement agency and match the way information is stored 
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there. Then the case is presented to the agency, often in person. 
Answers received from the requested agencies in their turn are 
translated, where necessary annotated with additional explanations 
and advice and then sent back to the requesting agency (Block, 2008: 
78). 
 
Interpol‘s web page makes available country profiles of several European 
states. Information on these web pages provides Possibilities of Police Cooperation 
and Access to Files Through Interpol National Central Bureaus.
105
 The information 
provided in Table 9 and Table 10 below gives the practices of Latvia, France and 
Finland in terms of possibilities of cooperation and access to files through Interpol‘s 
National Central Bureaus. ―Y‖ implies Yes, ―N‖ implies No. Explanations are given 
in the boxes and the empty boxes mean no information is provided on them.  As 
seen on the tables, those countries have different applications on the afore-
mentioned cooperative options. The reasons for choosing these three countries in 
particular are twofold: first, they all permit Interpol to provide that information on 
the Interpol web page; and second, their applications reflect differences. For 
example, regarding access to files options in terms of bank accounts, Latvia does not 
allow such access, while France does so, but requires a prosecutor‘s request or 
rogatory commission. Finland, on the other hand, sees this practice as possible in 
some cases.  
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Table-9: Investigation Possibilities of Latvia, France and Finland According to 
the Information on Interpol Webpage 
 
 
 LATVIA FRANCE FINLAND 
Telephone 
tracing 
 Y 
No special prior 
authorization unless ex-
directory and portable 
(COM-ROG. requested) 
Y 
(1-7 )In certain cases: 
Requirements are in Coercive 
Measures Act (450/1987) 
Telephone 
tapping 
Y 
With judge`s 
permission 
Y 
Decision by examining 
magistrate required 
Y 
(1-7 )In certain cases: 
Requirements are in Coercive 
Measures Act (450/1987 
Bugging public 
premises 
 N Y 
Bugging other 
premises 
Y 
With judge`s 
permission 
N Y 
(1-7 )In certain cases: 
Requirements are in Coercive 
Measures Act (450/1987 
Bugging Homes Y 
With judge`s 
permission 
N Y 
(1-7 )In certain cases: 
Requirements are in Coercive 
Measures Act (450/1987 
Electronic 
tracking 
surveillance 
 Y Y 
(1-7 )In certain cases: 
Requirements are in Coercive 
Measures Act (450/1987 
Surveillance  Y Y 
(1-7 )In certain cases: 
Requirements are in Coercive 
Measures Act (450/1987 
Pseudo-buying Y 
With 
prosecutor‘s 
permission 
Y 
With prior judicial 
authorization; provocation 
forbidden 
Y 
(8&10) In some cases: 
provisions are in Police Act 
(493/1995) 
Controlled 
delivery 
Y 
With 
prosecutor‘s 
permission 
Y 
With prior judicial 
authorization; provocation 
forbidden 
Y 
(8&10) In some cases: 
provisions are in Police Act 
(493/1995) 
Infiltration  Y 
Judicial authorization and 
supervision 
Y 
(8&10) In some cases: 
provisions are in Police Act 
(493/1995) 
Witness 
Protection 
Y 
With 
prosecutor‘s 
permission 
- 
Legislation being prepared 
N 
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It is possible to propose that there is generally common understandings on 
sharing information on issues such as wanted persons, missing persons, stolen motor 
vehicles etc., but for issues involving individual information and privacy we observe 
differences between countries.  It can be argued that country-specific principles 
regarding access to Interpol files also draw the general guidelines for Liaison 
Officers. Bilateral agreements between countries may also institute special 
information sharing compositions.  
 
Table-10: Access to files (through NCB) of Latvia, France and Finland 
According to Information on Interpol Webpage 
 
 
 LATVIA FRANCE FINLAND 
 
Y
/N
 
R
es
p
o
n
se
 
ti
m
e
 
R
em
a
rk
s 
R
es
p
o
n
se
 
T
im
e
 
R
em
a
rk
s 
Y
/N
 
R
es
p
o
n
se
 
ti
m
e
 
R
em
a
rk
s 
Wanted 
persons 
Y  Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y < 2 hrs On line 
Missing 
persons 
Y 2hrs Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y < 2 hrs On line 
Stolen 
motor 
vehicles 
Y 2-6hrs Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y < 2 hrs On line 
Stolen 
property 
Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y < 2 hrs On line 
Criminal 
records 
Y 2hrs Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y < 2 hrs 
Ministry of 
Justice: Only 
during office 
hours 
Fingerprints Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y < 2 hrs 
On line Only 
during office 
hours 
Photograph 
of criminals 
Y 2hrs Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Decentralize
d 
Y < 2 hrs Centralized 
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Serving 
prisoners 
Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y > 2 hrs On line 
Listed 
telephone 
subscribers 
Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
From France 
Telecom 
Y < 2 hrs  
Unlisted 
telephone 
subscribers 
Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Prosecutor‘s 
request or 
rogatory 
commission 
Y < 2 hrs  
Vehicle 
owners and 
registrations 
Y 24hrs Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Direct Y < 2 hrs On line 
Passports Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Prefecture Y < 2 hrs On line 
Company 
registers 
Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Commercial 
court 
registers 
Y < 2 hrs  
Driving 
licenses 
Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
 Y < 2 hrs On line 
National 
register / 
Electoral 
roll 
Y Immediate Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Prosecutor's 
request or 
rogatory 
commission 
Y < 2 hrs On line 
Register 
office 
records 
  Y 
Unquantifi
able 
    
Bank 
accounts N 
N  Y 
Unquantifi
able 
Prosecutor's 
request or 
rogatory 
commission 
Y&
N 
> 1 
week 
Possible in 
some cases 
Tax 
information 
N 
Y 3 days N 
Unquantifi
able 
Except at 
judicial 
authority‘s 
request 
N&
N 
> 1 
week 
Possible in 
some cases 
 
Investigation possibilities on the other hand focus on chances of operational 
activity between the police forces of the countries. Similar to the information 
sharing options, investigation possibilities also present differences between 
countries and different options such as gathering prosecutor approval or judge‘s 
approval for the execution of the investigation. A liaison officer should learn such 
principles of the country where he works, because those principles of information 
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sharing and investigation possibilities draw the formal framework for the work of 
the liaison officer.   
 
7.8 Liaison Officers as Brokers of Informal Cooperation 
Formal interactions between parties reflect the official picture of 
cooperation. Additionally, we may talk about another layer of interaction that takes 
place informally between parties, informal interaction, which implies daily contacts 
between police officers. The following passage that defines informal interaction is 
gathered from the webpage of the Kent Police, which is situated at the gateway from 
England to Europe via the Channel Tunnel and several ports, and therefore can be 
considered as an important example of a police authority in a position to establish 
international cooperation with its partners. Although this definition is established for 
the cooperative structure between specifically the Kent Police and its international 
partners, it can guide us to understand what informal cooperation is about. 
Accordingly, informal is:  
natural consequence of day to day contact through meetings, visits, 
telephone conversations, use of LinguaNet system, e.g. information 
required/given on a police to police basis by the spoken word or 
simple documentation. Such information would only be used for 
police purposes and cannot be used in judicial proceedings. The use of 
the information can, by negotiation, be upgraded to the levels and 
associated procedures of formal or FORMAL information.
106
 
 
                                                 
106
Retrieved on 29 September 2006 from 
http://www.kent.police.uk/About%20Kent%20Police/Policy/n/n95.html  
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Informal cooperation gives several advantages to police organizations. 
Undoubtedly, informal cooperation makes communication between parties faster 
and safer through spoken word and simple documentation. The spoken word as the 
fastest way of communication should be accepted as the heart of informal 
cooperation. Issues are discussed between parties without the existence of any 
delaying mechanisms. Then parties reach a specific conclusion about the issue at 
hand. If more steps are required formally to take further action, such as getting a 
prosecutor‘s approval, the parties move to a higher, more formal level. The informal 
nature of interactions at the initial stages actually reduces the chances for mistakes 
and safeguards the developments to keep on the right track. Informal cooperation 
also helps to increase trust and reliability between parties, and thus ease relations 
between different police organizations. According to Brady, working informally is a 
way of getting around differences between police forces in Europe. (Brady, 2008: 
104). Therefore, the use of LOs represents itself as an important strategy to 
overcome otherwise major challenges, because of the particular dual role of the 
liaison.  Liaison Officers represent the state, a formal entity, but act informally with 
their colleagues, and therefore become a formal representative who functions as an 
―informal fixer‖ (Nadelmann, 1993:109). 
As informal cooperation relies on day to day interaction, it helps parties to 
learn and trust each other. The higher the level of trust, informal cooperation may be 
more productive. Mutuality stays at the heart of establishing a trustworthy and 
reliable relationship. In a healthy relationship, partners try to satisfy each other by 
meeting the requests of the other party. Unreasonable refusals to requests will be 
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met in the same way. One liaison officer narrated a devastating episode in a country 
where the relationship between a liaison officer from one country and the officials of 
the host country went awry (Personal communication, 15 May 2008). According to 
his account, the liaison officer in question requested information about a fast 
developing operation that was taking place in the host country, because the case was 
also related to his country. Although the relations between the liaison officer and the 
official that the request had been directed to had been previously positive, the initial 
reply of the official was ―no,‖ without including a satisfactory explanation. This 
situation frustrated the liaison officer because he was not expecting such a reply. In 
the following days, as a response, the liaison officer either refused or slowed down 
several requests by the officials of the host country.  
As the above example shows, clearly, establishing—and keeping--trust 
between parties is important. Moreover, it deserves special attention when 
cooperation on terrorism is the issue. As explored in other parts of this study, 
terrorism is a sensitive issue because of the inherent differences between parties. 
Having a liaison officer link between police authorities of different countries may 
create a significant change in understanding each other‘s terrorism problem, and 
thus help to create an atmosphere of assistance and ultimately lead to more 
successful operations. However, the prerequisite of such a success seems to be 
having mutual understandings about the possibilities of cooperation, and equal 
desires to overcome any problem in a constructive way. Such informal methods of 
cooperation provide incentives for both ongoing cases and also for establishing 
preventive strategies, especially in countering terrorism. The following example 
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demonstrates how liaison officers can pass vital information to their partners in 
urgent cases when a sound cooperation is established between police organizations:  
After an explosion took place, we have found that the perpetrator had 
lived in a European Country before. We asked the LO of this country 
information about this person and we got all the information. However 
we could not have gotten the same information via letters of rogatory 
from the judicial authorities of the same country (Words of a police 
officer at the NATO conference Ankara, Turkey, December 6, 2007).  
 
This unique example shows how a liaison system may be beneficial and helpful in 
urgent cases, when established on an informal trusting relationship.   
Another positive side of establishing informal cooperation is its power to 
open paths to learning about the trends and unknown realities about crimes and also 
about one‘s partners. Formal cooperation generally focuses on specific cases and 
their procedures. However, having an understanding about what is going on both at 
the threat and also at the response level is essential for police organizations. 
Flexible, day to day nature of informal cooperation helps parties to understand those 
issues and follow up new developments. During informal communication with 
counterparts, police liaison officers share their experiences. During those 
information exchanges both parties give each other information about what is going 
on in cases, what kind of developments are taking place in criminal strategies, and 
what the ideas of other parties are about a specific problem. Sharing information in 
this way gives both parties a broader understanding about the trends in different 
problem areas. In that way, parties share current problems as well as ways to prevent 
crimes. This dimension seems to have been one of the guiding aims of establishing 
the NYPD liaison system. As discussed earlier, the NYPD liaison officers abroad try 
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to understand the terrorist organization and trends in the host countries with an aim 
of learning about terrorist strategies, techniques and links which may be used in 
New York. In terms of preventive strategies, learning about threats that others are 
experiencing may lead to taking necessary steps to avoid similar threats in one‘s 
own country. As terrorism is global today, a terrorist method used in one country 
may spread all over the world in just a few days, thus learning more about a terrorist 
method in time may be an invaluable lesson for another country. As a liaison officer 
put it ―Liaisonship is mostly about learning what is going on‖ (Personal 
Communiction, 7 February 2006). 
Although the police liaison system is officially established within the 
realist/state-centric domain, it is possible to argue that the informal character of the 
liaison role also extends its existence into the realist/multi-centric realm. In other 
words, while police liaisonship preserves its formally established nature, it functions 
informally in several ways. Formal cooperation, it should first be noted, takes place 
within the bureaucratic circles of the relationship. Mutual agreements, conventions 
and all other relevant legal documents shape the formal functioning of the 
relationship, and the rules for these formal relationships have been long established. 
However, informal relationships contribute a different and supportive attribute to 
formal relations. Spoken daily words may have a guiding role in what to do and plan 
for the future steps. Consequently, by establishing informal cooperative channels, 
parties may avoid unnecessary, time consuming cooperative initiatives. A deputy 
director of one national police force argued that: 
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We are expecting our liaison officers to explore the practices and laws 
of our partners before we initiate cooperation on a case. He should be 
able to advice us what to do and what to avoid.  Each case may have 
different characteristics and different ways to follow. Therefore those 
issues should be discussed with partners before taking a step to avoid 
mistakes. Our liaison officers first goes to relevant authorities and 
speak about the case to learn which way to follow, what to do and not 
to do. Then we take the step (Personal Communication, 27 September 
2007). 
 
 Liaison officers also have a role to play in informing their partners and 
influencing them to carry out desired actions. This point is connected with 
diplomacy in the way that was conceptualized by Morgenthau, namely, ―diplomacy 
must look at the political scene from the point of view of other nations‖ 
(Morgenthau, 1973: 543). Liaison officers should be able to transfer their own point 
of view to their partners in order to be able to gain their cooperation.  
The value of informal cooperation between police organizations has been 
mentioned in many studies. For example, Jensen argues that direct relations between 
higher police officers enabled secret information sharing and surveillance of 
Anarchists (Jensen, 2001:19). Informal communication between European police 
organizations is mentioned as an important aspect of cooperation in the fight against 
terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s. Police liaison officers also have been using 
informal communication between each other (Nadelmann, 1993:109). 
 
7.9 Actors of State Transnationalization (Who are the PLOs?) 
 The characteristics of police liaison officers are important to understand. 
Based on research on the police liaison system in Europe, Bigo (2000, 73-74) 
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summarizes the characteristics of police liaison officers as being on the margins of 
the police world, often multilingual, having some form of advanced education, being 
urbane and cosmopolitan, and  recognising each other as belonging to the same 
small elitist and political world. According to his study, they see their position as a 
promotion with financial and symbolic benefits. They report their job‘s emphasis on 
strategic analysis and on the use of analytical skills, requiring the ability to make 
comparisons between states. Based on this argument we can argue that the role of 
the police liaison necessitates a personality that is adaptive to transnationality. On 
the other hand, liaison officers have also been described a bit more cynically in the 
limited literature about them: 
The second model is that of the liaison, in the dual role of formal 
representative and informal ―fixer‖. Like the assorted representatives 
of the many non-law enforcement agencies that increasingly crowd 
U.S. embassies, few of whom engage in detective-like activities, U.S. 
law enforcement agents stationed abroad are expected to act both as 
official representatives of their agencies and as ―fixers‖ for the 
assorted  requests and problems that come their way. U.S. agents 
abroad often find their days crowded with fielding inquiries from U.S. 
based agents, transmitting requests for information and other 
assistance between local police agencies and U.S.-based law 
enforcement agencies, serving as hosts for fellow agents flown in on 
specific investigations, arranging reservations and programs for 
visiting politicians and high level officials, dealing with the media, 
giving speeches, and attending assorted social functions (Nadelmann, 
1993: 109-110). 
 
 This definition raises some interesting points about what might otherwise be 
considered a positive feature of liaison officers, their dual role between formality 
and informality, and seems to suggest the possibility that this duality might also 
prove overwhelming for a single liaison. It might also point to the possible root 
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causes to conflicts arising between some liaisons and other national representatives 
abroad, such as diplomats.  
 
7.10 Tension with diplomats 
There are two primary ways to describe the types of relations between police 
liaison officers and diplomats: In the first option there is almost no interaction 
between the two. This can be observed in the case of LOs serving at international 
organizations or appointed in border areas where LOs travel daily between the 
countries. The second option however is when the LOs are appointed to serve in an 
embassy abroad, and function there as part of the diplomatic mission. In these cases 
it is possible to see still further distinctions between types. In some cases, such as in 
that of the USA, the country aims to establish police liaisonship as an important part 
of the diplomatic relationship. As mentioned earlier in this study, ―the US State 
Department is increasingly involved in international police matters because the US 
government views the international crime problem as a component of foreign policy 
and national security, not just as a law enforcement issue.‖ (Deflem, 2001: 76), and 
police cooperation programs are ―part of the general foreign policy of the United 
States‖ (Marenin, 2001: 314). Therefore we can argue that there are states that 
accept and approve of the institution of the police liaison officer system as an 
individual entity and initiative. Those states seem to be well aware of the changes 
towards a more transnational world, and are willing to try and benefit from the 
flexible police liaison system.  
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On the other hand, in countries which do not have as well established 
liaisonship programs, it is more likely to observe problems and tensions arising 
between LOs and the diplomats they serve alongside. A liaison officer from a 
European country reported his own experiences this way: ―my Ambassador asked 
me quite a lot of times what I am doing as a liaison officer. And he still wonders 
why our country needs me‖ (Personal Communication on 15/12/2007).  The liaison 
officer of another country complained that ―the Ambassador did not want to give me 
a room at the Embassy. He doesn‘t see my work necessary‖ (Personal 
Communication on 22 March 2007). The same liaison officer later argued that he 
and the diplomats at the embassy have gradually come to understand each other 
better. That officer‘s experiences mirror the report by an official at the National 
Police Headquarters of another country, who observed that ―When we appointed a 
liaison officer to a country, the ambassador showed hesitation at first. But now this 
Embassy wants a second officer appointment today‖ (Personal Communication, 
24.04.2008). Yet another liaison officer argued that: 
The continuation of the liaison post to the country was in question by 
authorities, but the ambassador that I work strongly advocated the 
existence of the post. I was surprised because his attitude at the 
beginning of the post was quite neutral. He was behaving in a mood 
that my existence there was not significant (Personal Communication, 
18.10.2007).  
 
These examples are interesting because we see a change in the approach of 
embassies and embassy personnel towards the police liaison officers they work with. 
Moving from expressions of hesitation to openly requesting more liaison officers 
reveals that the diplomats are gradually adjusting to the idea and benefits of the 
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liaison appointment system. In other words diplomats, as agents of state-centric 
international structures, seem to be adjusting themselves to this transnational reality. 
 
7.11 Reasons to Apply a Liaison Officer System 
A number of arguments have been made in the literature and based on 
practitioners‘ accounts, that support the introduction of a liaison officer system. 
Among these is the following by Bailey: 
The liaison officer system has advantages because it allows direct 
personal contact among law enforcement officials in different 
countries. This can expedite investigations particularly by putting 
investigating officers in touch with the right authorities in the 
cooperating country. The good liaison officer can be a valuable 
resource in helping to clear up misunderstandings, and provide 
information about a foreign jurisdiction and its crime investigation 
and control policies. Sending police officers on temporary mission for 
the purposes of particular enquiries is not usually regarded as an 
adequate substitute for liaison officers, because often they cannot 
acquire sufficient information about the country to which they are 
visiting in the time available. The main way in which things go wrong 
is when liaison officers pursue enquiries in a foreign jurisdiction on 
their own initiative (Bailey, 1995: 389). 
 
 
Bailey also mentions that ―in the annual Justice Department submission to 
Congress, arguments defending the FBI budget state that the Legats play crucial 
roles in counterintelligence and in the fight against international organized 
crime.‖(Bailey, 1995: 388). 
In another account, Block argues that the contribution of LOs to the fight 
against organized crime is: 
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…particularly visible in cases that because of complexity, sensitivity, 
or urgency, need more active support than a simple information 
exchange that could pass through Interpol channels for example. 
Based on their personal contacts and knowledge of the different 
systems and cultures, liaison officers are able to swiftly channel 
requests for intelligence exchange and cooperation. In addition, they 
could—depending on the case—provide real-time liaison in 
operations or directly introduce investigators to appropriate 
cooperation partners. Liaison officers also frequently fulfill a 
supporting role by explaining legal, cultural, and organisational 
differences to investigators at both sides of the border (Block, 2008: 
77). 
 
Meanwhile, Schulte, talking about the German experience argues that:  
These liaison officers play an important role in the domain of 
international police cooperation. Besides the mere exchange of 
information, their work in local areas with police colleagues of other 
countries strengthens and reinforces the awareness that the fight 
against international crime must be carried out jointly (Schulte, 2001:  
152). 
 
What is interesting is that these accounts are based on experiences in 
different contexts and with respect to a variety of threats, yet they all converge on 
the point that liaison officers play an important role in developing international 
cooperation and thus responding to security challenges.  
 
7.12 Evaluation of the Police Liaisonship 
 Based on the examination of the history of terrorism and response it can be 
argued that there is a widening gap between the two. Moreover, the widening of this 
gap has accelerated since the end of the Cold War, as terrorism has become an 
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increasingly transnational phenomenon and the response has remained still 
predominantly at the international level. 
Recent efforts of police organizations show, however, that the police, as one 
of the key actors in fighting against terrorism, is trying to find ways of closing this 
gap. Police forces are trying to establish transnational networks, the most significant 
example of which is in the usage of liaison officers. Theoretically, application of 
liaison officers can be accepted as an example of transgovernmental relations, which 
has gathered scholarly attention in recent years.  
The liaison officer system reflects a network structure in which states place 
their officers in regional or global points with a desire to protect their national 
interests. But developments show that this network structure can not be labelled only 
as a national network, because interactions of liaison officers from different 
countries also serve to create a new broader network at the international level. As 
seen in the examples, several of those liaison officers may represent the interests of 
other states or members of international organizations. Liaison officers in a country 
may also constitute a network, where agents of several states can come together in a 
host country. In the words of one liaison officer: 
LOs, in the country that I work, come together monthly to socialize 
and discuss crime problems. Each LO gives a party. At that party he 
gives a lecture about a crime problem in his country and then we 
discuss about it. Then we eat and drink (Personal communication, 
22.03.2007).    
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Another liaison officer explained the benefits of having liaisons in this way: 
This is my third country that I work as a liaison officer. My partners 
here were in need of finding a contact point where I worked before. 
They asked me if I can find such a contact point in that country. It 
took my half an hour to establish a link for them (Personal 
communication, 10.05.2008).  
Yet another liaison officer described his experiences with other LOs in these 
words: 
I have many LO friends from different countries. When we work in 
the same country, we come together. I know where they are now. If I 
need any contact in a country, I also look for my previous LO friends 
from other countries. You may never guess who will help more 
(Personal communication, 20.March.2005). 
 
These examples show that the interactions of police liaison officers from 
different countries generate a kind of network. Talking about the existence of such a 
network brings to mind the idea of building ―networks to fight networks‖ (Arquilla, 
Ronfeldt, Zanini, 1999: 42). At this stage, it is impossible to draw strong 
assumptions about the existence of such an organized network structure in the fight 
against crime and terrorism, but, knowing about the existence of such a network and 
the possibility that in time it will increasingly have the capacity to produce positive 
results, seems to encourage the use of such a description.  
The use of a liaison system in police work has become a tool used by states, 
local entities, and also by international organizations, in cooperating with their 
counterparts all around the world. Interactions by these entities provide clear 
evidence that borders are truly ‗disappearing‘. It is no longer unimaginable that a 
local sub-state entity might appoint a liaison officer to another country, even 
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bypassing its own state level authorities. A transnational phenomenon, terrorism, has 
been the spark which has launched these innovative examples in the field of 
policing.  Police entities at the local, state, or institutional level are showing 
themselves to be in a position to restructure themselves and adapt to the new 
transnational threat environment. 
 How is it possible that police entities seem to be managing such a global 
accomplishment in establishing links between state, local, and institutional settings? 
There should be an identity or a driving philosophy behind this accomplishment. To 
answer this question it may be useful to look at how something becomes 
transnational. In that respect I find using Scholte‘s (2000:172) classification of non-
territorial communities a productive means for formulating this option. According to 
Scholte, in today‘s globalized world ―various solidarities have developed that lack a 
territorial referent,‖ which includes ―transworld communities related to class, 
gender, race, religious faith, sexual orientation and youth, as well as...a host of other 
shared concerns like disabilities, hobbies, political programmes and professions‖ 
(Scholte, 2000: 172). 
Drawing on this, we can see, for example, how religion, in the new terrorism 
case, is an important phenomenon to explain its transnational reach. I think what 
makes police cooperation an essential tool between police organizations is having a 
―police culture‖ as identity. This police culture lets police officers identify similar 
problems in the same way. In an interesting comment on this special relationship, 
one officer remarked: ―Although the country that I work has diplomatic tensions 
with mine, I never feel those tensions with my police counterparts, because as police 
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officers we look at crime and criminals, including terrorism, in the same way‖ 
(Personnel communication, 18/10/2007).  Deflem reformulates these words in an 
academic style when he argues that ―the objective of counter-terror policing is de-
politicization of terrorism and seeing terrorism as a crime‖ (Presentation at NATO 
conference, Ankara, Turkey, December 6, 2007). Ultimately, this point reflects the 
identity of police in evaluating terrorism as a security challenge; when it becomes 
possible to view terrorism as a crime, as seems to be the case among police officers, 
cooperation becomes easier. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
 
 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
Theoretically it can be argued that the assumptions of several theories can be 
used to explain various aspects of international police cooperation and the 
appointment of liaison officers. Therefore, understanding international police 
cooperation and liaison officer appointments requires taking into consideration all 
relevant theoretical approaches in applicable situations. When such an eclectic 
approach is applied, we observe that different parts of the cooperation issue can best 
be explained by different approaches. In this dissertation therefore, such a multi-
layer theoretical approach was implemented to understand the practices of police 
cooperation and liaison appointment experiences. This approach was the main 
assumption in establishing the framework based on realist/liberal and state-
centric/multi-centric approaches. Based on the accounts and findings presented in 
this study, it is possible to exemplify several findings as follows. 
Although realism views cooperation as limited, it can be argued that realism 
has a powerful explanatory power in interpreting police cooperation and the practice 
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of liaison officer appointments, especially when they occur in the realist/state-
centric domain, which is generally dominated by the interests of states in bilateral 
establishments. An important example of relations in this domain is the USA‘s 
approach in establishing ties with Europol and its member countries.  According to 
the Europol Reports of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, for information exchange the 
USA prefers its bilateral liaison network with EU Member States instead of using 
the direct Europol Channel, an approach that Europol interprets as a difficulty in its 
relations with the USA. This practice is a primary example that reflects basic realist 
assumptions regarding cooperation. The USA‘s practice of preferring direct bilateral 
relations with member countries instead of exchanging information with Europol, 
reflects the realist understanding which proposes the impotency of institutions. 
As mentioned in relevant parts of this study, bilateral relations occupy a 
significant place in cooperative security relations in particular. The USA‘s approach 
of relying on individual member states instead of Europol can be accepted as a 
significant sign of this approach. Another example is the bilateral Police Liaison 
Officer appointments between several Europol member countries. Such 
arrangements among a group of countries sharing a membership-based institutional 
entity, strongly suggests the continuing perceived worth of establishing bilateral 
relations. In addition to those examples, this dissertation also reveals the common 
and developing application of bilateral liaison officer appointments especially when 
regarding terrorism-related issues. Of course, other realist ideals such as achieving 
relative gains, focusing on national security, enhancing capabilities, and maintaining 
the ability for independent decision making, influences the choice for bilateral 
relations.   
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Approaches focusing on power have also been important throughout this 
study. Theoretically, powerful states may have the capacity to influence others more. 
It has also been observed that LO appointments sometimes seem to be a matter of 
resources. Therefore, the extent of LO appointments able to be made often depends 
on the power of the state.    
Although realism explains well the above mentioned issues, we also observe 
that liberal understandings have much to say when explaining the current structure 
of police cooperation and police liaison officer appointments. It was observed that 
international and regional organizations play an important role in both establishing 
common understanding, and also in building up norms and procedures to fight 
against terrorism. International and regional mechanisms also include cooperative 
initiatives in the policing fields. This study tried to investigate a wide array of those 
organizations and their activities in the terrorism and policing fields. During the 
course of the study, new practices that have been established in the cooperative 
policing field were presented, such as the establishment of new and innovative 
forms of LO postings. The first example was the establishment of LOs between 
international organizations. Another example noted was the appointment of LOs 
between international organizations and non-member states. As a last example, it 
was also observed that LOs are now being appointed between international 
organizations and sub-state entities, such as in the example of an LO appointment 
from the NYPD to Interpol.  
Another issue for which liberalism is useful to explain is the issue of linkage. 
It can be argued that the practice of police cooperation and especially the 
appointment of LOs have been facilitated by the diverse experiences of 
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organizations in the field. First of all, it is apparent that previous cooperative 
experiences against drugs and organized crime have been guiding what is being 
done today against terrorism. Secondly, what some are doing is constituting a model 
for others to imitate. Consequently, linkages established between between actors on 
some issues, creates a need to repeated interaction and imitation, which in turn 
facilitates cooperation. Andreas and Nadelmann‘s aforementioned argument that 
today‘s counter-terrorism campaign has been founded on the previous cooperative 
experiences against drugs and drug trafficking, also constitutes a supportive 
argument to this claim. During the conduct of this study, I also observed that 
previous drug-related structures are playing an important role in helping to build up 
and develop cooperation in counter-terrorism. Also, the experiences of the police 
organizations in different states constitute a source of learning knowledge for others.  
Talking about liberalism also necessitates recalling the importance of 
understanding the idea of a multi-centric world, and the role in it of sub-state 
entities, such as the New York Police Department and private initiatives such as 
SITE. Those examples revealed that the field of national security may go beyond the 
hands of the traditional owner of the concept, which was states. This study revealed 
that in today‘s security environment, states are not the only actors. We are living in a 
world that comprises a wide diversity of actors, none of which can be dismissed, 
even though they may not fit into earlier conceptualizations of security studies.  
  This research shows that although traditional thinking regarding state 
security still may exist, states have not been resisting changes and developments, 
and their relative openness to these changes is leading to what might be considered a 
transnationalization of several state structures and practices. From this perspective, 
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the argument follows that states are in fact trying to adapt to the changing threat 
environment.  
 One particular example of how states are adapting to this new threat 
environment can be seen in the practice of liaison officer appointments, which has 
been the case study of this thesis.  
 In fact, it may even be possible to also talk about a regime formation in 
establishing police liaisonship appointments. The findings here show that the use of 
liaison officer appointments, particularly in light of developing conceptualizations 
and realities with respect to new terrorism practices, is growing, and while doing so, 
it is creating its own rules, patterns, and decision-making procedures. What remains 
to be seen is how these developments will continue to unfold, both on the side of the 
threat, and on the side of those mandated to deal with that threat, the responders.  
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